Reasoning about conscious experience with axiomatic and graphical mathematics.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors cast aspects of consciousness in axiomatic mathematical terms, using the graphical calculus of general process theories (a.k.a. symmetric monoidal categories and Frobenius algebras therein).
About: This article is published in Consciousness and Cognition.The article was published on 2021-10-01 and is currently open access. It has received 5 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Axiom.
Citations
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TL;DR: It is argued that different models explicitly or implicitly subscribe to different notions of what constitutes a satisfactory explanation, use different tools in their explanatory endeavours, and even aim to explain very different phenomena.
Abstract: Models of consciousness aim to inspire new experimental protocols and aid interpretation of empirical evidence to reveal the structure of conscious experience. Nevertheless, no current model is univocally accepted on either theoretical or empirical grounds. Moreover, a straightforward comparison is difficult for conceptual reasons. In particular, we argue that different models explicitly or implicitly subscribe to different notions of what constitutes a satisfactory explanation, use different tools in their explanatory endeavours and even aim to explain very different phenomena. We thus present a framework to compare existing models in the field with respect to what we call their ‘explanatory profiles’. We focus on the following minimal dimensions: mode of explanation, mechanisms of explanation and target of explanation. We also discuss the empirical consequences of the discussed discrepancies among models. This approach may eventually lead to identifying driving assumptions, theoretical commitments, experimental predictions and a better design of future testing experiments. Finally, our conclusion points to more integrative theoretical research, where axiomatic models may play a critical role in solving current theoretical and experimental contradictions.
29 citations
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TL;DR: This work sets up a framework which naturally subsumes one of the main features of consciousness that is characterized as being other-dependent by defining a compact closed category where morphisms represent conscious processes.
Abstract: Scientific studies of consciousness rely on objects whose existence is assumed to be independent of any consciousness. On the contrary, we assume consciousness to be fundamental, and that one of the main features of consciousness is characterized as being other-dependent. We set up a framework which naturally subsumes this feature by defining a compact closed category where morphisms represent conscious processes. These morphisms are a composition of a set of generators, each being specified by their relations with other generators, and therefore co-dependent. The framework is general enough and fits well into a compositional model of consciousness. Interestingly, we also show how our proposal may become a step towards avoiding the hard problem of consciousness, and thereby address the combination problem of conscious experiences.
16 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, a compositional model of consciousness is proposed, where morphisms represent conscious processes and each morphism is a composition of a set of generators, each being specified by their relations with other generators, and therefore co-dependent.
Abstract: Scientific studies of consciousness rely on objects whose existence is assumed to be independent of any consciousness. On the contrary, we assume consciousness to be fundamental, and that one of the main features of consciousness is characterized as being other-dependent. We set up a framework which naturally subsumes this feature by defining a compact closed category where morphisms represent conscious processes. These morphisms are a composition of a set of generators, each being specified by their relations with other generators, and therefore co-dependent. The framework is general enough and fits well into a compositional model of consciousness. Interestingly, we also show how our proposal may become a step towards avoiding the hard problem of consciousness, and thereby address the combination problem of conscious experiences.
10 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper , the authors introduce the concept of adjunction from the category theory in mathematics, which allows to clarify the conceptual issues with a precise mathematical formulation and establishes coherence between two categories that cannot be considered equivalent, yet has an important relationship.
Abstract: What are the nature of the relationship among qualia, contents of consciousness, and behavioral reports? Traditionally, this type of question has been only addressed via a qualitative and philosophical approach. Some theorists emphasize an incomplete and inaccurate nature of reports of one's own qualia to discourage formal research programs on qualia. Other empirical researchers, however, have made substantial progress in understanding the structure of qualia from such limited reports. What is the precise relationship between the two? To answer this question, we introduce the concept of “adjoint” or “adjunction” from the category theory in mathematics. We claim that the adjunction captures some aspects of the nuanced relationships between qualia and reports. The concept of adjunction allows us to clarify the conceptual issues with a precise mathematical formulation. In particular, adjunction establishes coherence between two categories that cannot be considered equivalent, yet has an important relationship. This rises in empirical experimental situations between qualia and reports. More importantly, an idea of adjunction naturally leads to various proposals of new empirical experiments to test the predictions about the nature of their relationship as well as other issues in consciousness research.
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TL;DR: In this paper , a formal mathematical multilayer model for the biological neuroscience of conscious experience is proposed, which is based on a formal semantic to study biological systems, and an integrative account for several signatures and models of consciousness.
References
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01 Jan 1945
TL;DR: Carman as discussed by the authors described the body as an object and Mechanistic Physiology, and the experience of the body and classical psychology as a Sexed being, as well as the Synthesis of One's Own Body and Motility.
Abstract: Foreword, Taylor Carman Introduction, Claude Lefort Preface Introduction: Classical Prejudices and the Return to Phenomena I. Sensation II. Association and the Projection of Memories III. Attention and Judgment IV. The Phenomenal Field Part 1: The Body 1. The Body as an Object and Mechanistic Physiology 2. The Experience of the Body and Classical Psychology 3. The Spatiality of the One's Own Body and Motility 4. The Synthesis of One's Own Body 5. The Body as a Sexed Being 6. Speech and the Body as Expression Part 2: The Perceived World 7. Sensing 8. Space 9. The Thing and the Natural World 10. Others and the Human World Part 3: Being-For-Itself and Being-In-The-World 11. The Cogito 12. Temporality 13. Freedom Original Bibliography Bibliography of English Translations cited Additional Work Cited Index
9,938 citations
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TL;DR: Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable as mentioned in this paper, which is why current discussions of the problem give it little attention or get it obviously wrong.
Abstract: Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. Perhaps that is why current discussions of the problem give it little attention or get it obviously wrong. The recent wave of reductionist euphoria has produced several analyses of mental phenomena and mental concepts designed to explain the possibility of some variety of materialism, psychophysical identification, or reduction. But the problems dealt with are those common to this type of reduction and other types, and what makes the mind-body problem unique, and unlike the water-H2O problem or the Turing machine-IBM machine problem or the lightning-electrical discharge problem or the gene-DNA problem or the oak tree-hydrocarbon problem, is ignored.
4,669 citations
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TL;DR: The results confirm the persistent problems of Romance learners of Dutch with online gender processing and show that they cannot be overcome by reducing task demands related to the modality of stimulus presentation.
Abstract: Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) can reveal online processing differences between native speakers and second language (L2) learners during language comprehension. Using the P600 as a measure of native-likeness, we investigated processing of grammatical gender agreement in highly proficient immersed Romance L2 learners of Dutch. We demonstrate that these late learners consistently fail to show native-like sensitivity to gender violations. This appears to be due to a combination of differences from the gender marking in their L1 and the relatively opaque Dutch gender system. We find that L2 use predicts the effect magnitude of non-finite verb violations, a relatively regular and transparent construction, but not that of gender agreement violations. There were no effects of age of acquisition, length of residence, proficiency or offline gender knowledge. Additionally, a within-subject comparison of stimulus modalities (written vs. auditory) shows that immersed learners may show some of the effects only in the auditory modality; in non-finite verb violations, an early native-like N400 was only present for auditory stimuli. However, modality failed to influence the response to gender. Taken together, the results confirm the persistent problems of Romance learners of Dutch with online gender processing and show that they cannot be overcome by reducing task demands related to the modality of stimulus presentation.
1,059 citations
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TL;DR: The neurophenomenology approach of as mentioned in this paper is inspired by the style of inquiry of phenomenology and seeks articulations by mutual constraints between phenomena present in experience and the correlative field of phenomena established by the cognitive sciences.
Abstract: This paper starts with one of Chalmers' basic points: first-hand experience is an irreducible field of phenomena. I claim there is no 'theoretical fix' or 'extra ingredient' in nature that can possibly bridge this gap. Instead, the field of conscious phenomena requires a rigorous method and an explicit pragmatics for its exploration and analysis. My proposed approach, inspired by the style of inquiry of phenomenology, I have called neurophenomenol- ogy. It seeks articulations by mutual constraints between phenomena present in experience and the correlative field of phenomena established by the cognitive sciences. It needs to expand into a widening research community in which the method is cultivated further. This paper responds to the issues raised by D.J. Chalmers (1995) by offering a research direction which is quite radical in the way in which some basic methodological principles are linked to the scientific studies of consciousness. Neuro-phenomenology is the name I am using here to designate a quest to marry modern cognitive science and a disciplined approach to human experience, thus placing myself in the lineage of the continental tradition of phenomenology. 1 My claim is that the so-called hard problem that animates these Special Issues of the Journal of Consciousness Studies can only be addressed productively by gathering a research community armed with new pragmatic tools ena- bling them to develop a science of consciousness. I will claim that no piecemeal empirical correlates, nor purely theoretical principles, will really help us at this stage. We need to turn to a systematic exploration of the only link between mind and consciousness that seems both obvious and natural: the structure of human experience itself. In what follows I open my proposal by briefly examining the current debate about consciousness in the light of Chalmers' hard problem. Next, I outline the (neuro)pheno- menological strategy. I conclude by discussing some of the main difficulties and conse- quences of this strategy.
1,022 citations