Recognition of mental state terms. Clinical findings in children with autism and a functional neuroimaging study of normal adults.
TL;DR: This simple mental state recognition task appears to relate to theory of mind, in that both the orbito-frontal cortex and the frontal-polar region are impaired in autism.
Abstract: BACKGROUND The mind's ability to think about the mind has attracted substantial research interest in cognitive science in recent decades, as 'theory of mind' No research has attempted to identify the brain basis of this ability, probably because it involves several separate processes As a first step, we investigated one component process-the ability to recognise mental state terms
METHOD In Experiment 1, we tested a group of children with autism (known to have theory of mind deficits) and a control group of children with mental handicap, for their ability to recognise mental state terms in a word list This was to test if the mental state recognition task was related to traditional theory of mind tests In Experiment 2, we investigated if in the normal brain, recognition of mental state terms might be localised The procedure employed single photon emission computerised tomography (SPECT) in normal adult volunteers We tested the prediction (based on available neurological and animal lesion studies) that there would be increased activation in the orbito-frontal cortex during this task, relative to a control condition, and relative to an adjacent frontal area (frontal-polar cortex)
RESULTS In Experiment 1, the group with autism performed significantly worse than the group without autism In Experiment 2, there was increased cerebral blood flow during the mental state recognition task in the right orbito-frontal cortex relative to the left frontal-polar region
CONCLUSIONS This simple mental state recognition task appears to relate to theory of mind, in that both are impaired in autism The SPECT results implicate the orbito-frontal cortex as the basis of this ability
Citations
More filters
TL;DR: The Perception-Action Model (PAM), together with an understanding of how representations change with experience, can explain the major empirical effects in the literature and can also predict a variety of empathy disorders.
Abstract: There is disagreement in the literature about the exact nature of the phenomenon of empathy. There are emotional, cogni- tive, and conditioning views, applying in varying degrees across species. An adequate description of the ultimate and proximate mecha- nism can integrate these views. Proximately, the perception of an object's state activates the subject's corresponding representations, which in turn activate somatic and autonomic responses. This mechanism supports basic behaviors (e.g., alarm, social facilitation, vicar- iousness of emotions, mother-infant responsiveness, and the modeling of competitors and predators) that are crucial for the reproduc- tive success of animals living in groups. The Perception-Action Model (PAM), together with an understanding of how representations change with experience, can explain the major empirical effects in the literature (similarity, familiarity, past experience, explicit teach- ing, and salience). It can also predict a variety of empathy disorders. The interaction between the PAM and prefrontal functioning can also explain different levels of empathy across species and age groups. This view can advance our evolutionary understanding of empa- thy beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism and can explain different levels of empathy across individuals, species, stages of de- velopment, and situations.
3,350 citations
TL;DR: Three areas are consistently activated in association with theory of mind: the anterior paracingulate cortex, the superior temporal sulci and the temporal poles bilaterally.
1,931 citations
TL;DR: It is suggested that IC may be a crucial enabling factor for ToM development, possibly affecting both the emergence and expression of mental state knowledge.
Abstract: This research examined the relation between individual differences in inhibitory control (IC; a central component of executive functioning) and theory-of-mind (ToM) performance in preschool-age children. Across two sessions, 3- and 4-year-old children ( N � 107) were given multitask batteries measuring IC and ToM. Inhibitory control was strongly related to ToM, r � .66, p � .001. This relation remained significant controlling for age, gender, verbal ability, motor sequencing, family size, and performance on pretend-action and mental state control tasks. Inhibitory tasks requiring a novel response in the face of a conflicting prepotent response (Conflict scale) and those requiring the delay of a prepotent response (Delay scale) were significantly related to ToM. The Conflict scale, however, significantly predicted ToM performance over and above the Delay scale and control measures, whereas the Delay scale was not significant in a corresponding analysis. These findings suggest that IC may be a crucial enabling factor for ToM development, possibly affecting both the emergence and expression of mental state knowledge. The implications of the findings for a variety of executive accounts of ToM are discussed.
1,829 citations
Cites background from "Recognition of mental state terms. ..."
...Second, as with IC, evidence from brain-imaging studies implicates the frontal lobes as the seat of ToM abilities (Baron-Cohen et al., 1994; Fletcher et al., 1995; Goel, Grafman, Sadato, & Hallett, 1995; Sabbagh & Taylor, 2000)....
[...]
TL;DR: Very high functioning adults with autism or Asperger Syndrome are reported on an adult test of theory of mind ability, providing evidence for subtle mindreading deficits in very high functioning individuals on the autistic continuum.
Abstract: Previous studies have found a subgroup of people with autism or Asperger Syndrome who pass second-order tests of theory of mind. However, such tests have a ceiling in developmental terms corresponding to a mental age of about 6 years. It is therefore impossible to say if such individuals are intact or impaired in their theory of mind skills. We report the performance of very high functioning adults with autism or Asperger Syndrome on an adult test of theory of mind ability. The task involved inferring the mental state of a person just from the information in photographs of a person's eyes. Relative to age-matched normal controls and a clinical control group (adults with Tourette Syndrome), the group with autism and Asperger Syndrome were significantly impaired on this task. The autism and Asperger Syndrome sample was also impaired on Happe's strange stories tasks. In contrast, they were unimpaired on two control tasks: recognising gender from the eye region of the face, and recognising basic emotions from the whole face. This provides evidence for subtle mindreading deficits in very high functioning individuals on the autistic continuum.
1,738 citations
Cites background from "Recognition of mental state terms. ..."
...…both normal schooling, and normal peer relations; (iv) these disorders are also all postulated to involve frontal abnormalities (Bishop, 1992; BaronCohen, Robertson, & Moriarty, 1994; Baron-Cohen et al, 1994); (v) and all have a sizeable genetic aetiology (Robertson, 1994; Bolton & Rutter, 1990)....
[...]
TL;DR: The hypothesis that gaze following is "hard-wired" in the brain, and may be localized within a circuit linking the superior temporal sulcus, amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex is discussed.
1,714 citations
References
More filters
Book•
01 Jan 1988
TL;DR: Direct and Indirect Radiologic Localization Reference System: Basal Brain Line CA-CP Cerebral Structures in Three-Dimensional Space Practical Examples for the Use of the Atlas in Neuroradiologic Examinations Three- Dimensional Atlas of a Human Brain Nomenclature-Abbreviations Anatomic Index Conclusions.
Abstract: Direct and Indirect Radiologic Localization Reference System: Basal Brain Line CA-CP Cerebral Structures in Three-Dimensional Space Practical Examples for the Use of the Atlas in Neuroradiologic Examinations Three-Dimensional Atlas of a Human Brain Nomenclature-Abbreviations Anatomic Index Conclusions.
9,491 citations
TL;DR: A new model of metarepresentational development is used to predict a cognitive deficit which could explain a crucial component of the social impairment in childhood autism.
6,017 citations
"Recognition of mental state terms. ..." refers background in this paper
...These are all behaviours which are documented in clinical descriptions of autism (Wing, 1976; Frith, 1989; Baron-Cohen & Bolton, 1993)....
[...]
01 Jan 1985
TL;DR: In this paper, a new model of metarepresentational development was used to predict a cognitive deficit in children with autism, which could explain a crucial component of the social impairment in childhood autism.
Abstract: Abstract We use a new model of metarepresentational development to predict a cognitive deficit which could explain a crucial component of the social impairment in childhood autism. One of the manifestations of a basic metarepresentational capacity is a ‘theory of mind’. We have reason to believe that autistic children lack such a ‘theory’. If this were so, then they would be unable to impute beliefs to others and to predict their behaviour. This hypothesis was tested using Wimmer and Perner's puppet play paradigm. Normal children and those with Down's syndrome were used as controls for a group of autistic children. Even though the mental age of the autistic children was higher than that of the controls, they alone failed to impute beliefs to others. Thus the dysfunction we have postulated and demonstrated is independent of mental retardation and specific to autism.
6,007 citations
TL;DR: This paper showed an adult chimpanzee a series of videotaped scenes of a human actor struggling with a variety of problems, some of which were simple, such as bananas vertically or horizontally out of reach, behind a box, and so forth; others were more complex, involving an actor unable to extricate himself from a locked cage, shivering because of a malfunctioning heater, or unable to play a phonograph because it was unplugged.
Abstract: An individual has a theory of mind if he imputes mental states to himself and others. A system of inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory because such states are not directly observable, and the system can be used to make predictions about the behavior of others. As to the mental states the chimpanzee may infer, consider those inferred by our own species, for example, purpose or intention, as well as knowledge, belief, thinking, doubt, guessing, pretending, liking, and so forth. To determine whether or not the chimpanzee infers states of this kind, we showed an adult chimpanzee a series of videotaped scenes of a human actor struggling with a variety of problems. Some problems were simple, involving inaccessible food – bananas vertically or horizontally out of reach, behind a box, and so forth – as in the original Kohler problems; others were more complex, involving an actor unable to extricate himself from a locked cage, shivering because of a malfunctioning heater, or unable to play a phonograph because it was unplugged. With each videotape the chimpanzee was given several photographs, one a solution to the problem, such as a stick for the inaccessible bananas, a key for the locked up actor, a lit wick for the malfunctioning heater. The chimpanzee's consistent choice of the correct photographs can be understood by assuming that the animal recognized the videotape as representing a problem, understood the actor's purpose, and chose alternatives compatible with that purpose.
5,979 citations