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Regulatory choices in global financial markets : restoring the role of aggregate utility in the shaping of market supervision
TL;DR: In this paper, the relation between public supervision and financial market development is investigated by focusing on major legislative features directing the supervisor and hence affecting market participant activities, and the results suggest that certain features of public supervision correlate with financial market developments.
Abstract: In financial market studies, public supervision has rarely been found to have any effects on financial market development. This is true, even though the primary objective of supervisory legislation is the limitation of market failures and externalities. Studies conducted by eg the World Bank and La Porta & al imply that whereas private enforcement contributes to financial market development, there is limited evidence that public supervision does the same. The objective of the paper is to empirically investigate the relation between public supervision and financial market development. This is done by focusing on major legislative features directing the supervisor and hence affecting market participant activities. The markets investigated comprise banks, investment firms, investment fund companies and listed companies in the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, Poland and Estonia for the years 1996 to 2005. The results suggest that certain features of public supervision correlate with financial market development. Strong legal obligations for the supervisor to develop legislation correlate significantly with higher company market values. Emphasizing economic aspects in the formulation of supervisory objectives corresponds with higher market profitability. Furthermore, severe monetary sanctions applicable to company directors correlate negatively with market growth. Unexpectedly, the same is true for a high degree of supervisory independence. The results imply links between public supervision and financial market development in a manner not always in line with previous research. Why this is the case, requires further investigation. One possible explanation may be methodological, based on the fact that in the present study legislative features are perceived in a conceptual rather than a technical manner. Keywords: financial institution, regulation, supervision, utility JEL classification numbers: G28, K23, O16
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TL;DR: In this paper, the interaction of private and public funding of innovative projects in the presence of adverse-selection based financing constraints is studied, and it is shown that under certain conditions, public R&D subsidies can reduce the financing constraints of technology-based entrepreneurial firms.
Abstract: We study the interaction of private and public funding of innovative projects in the presence of adverse-selection based financing constraints. Government programs allocating direct subsidies are based on ex ante screening of the subsidy applications. This selection scheme may yield valuable information to market-based financiers. We find that under certain conditions, public R&D subsidies can reduce the financing constraints of technology-based entrepreneurial firms. First, the subsidy itself reduces the capital costs related to the innovation projects by reducing the amount of market-based capital required. Second, the observation that an entrepreneur has received a subsidy for an innovation project provides an informative signal to the market-based financiers. We also find that public screening works more efficiently if it is accompanied with subsidy allocation.
210 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors revisited the issue from the vantage point of close to two decades of additional experience by examining a sample of foreign IPOs from both financially integrated and segmented markets in U.S. markets.
Abstract: While the signaling hypothesis has played a prominent role as the economic rationale associated with the initial public offering (IPO) underpricing puzzle (Welch (1989)), the empirical evidence on it has been mixed at best (Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch (1993), Michaely and Shaw (1994)). This paper revisits the issue from the vantage point of close to two decades of additional experience by examining a sample of foreign IPOs—firms from both financially integrated and segmented markets—in U.S. markets. The evidence indicates that signaling does matter in determining IPO underpricing, especially for firms domiciled in countries with segmented markets, which as a result face higher information asymmetry and lack access to external capital markets. We find a significant positive and robust relationship between the degree of IPO underpricing and segmented-market firms’ seasoned equity offering (SEO) activities. For firms from integrated markets, in contrast, the analyst-coverage purchase hypothesis appears to matter more in explaining IPO underpricing, and the aftermarket price appreciation explains these firms’ SEO activities. The evidence, therefore, clearly supports the notion that some firms are willing to leave money on the table voluntarily to get a more favorable price at seasoned offerings when they are substantially wealth constrained, a prediction embedded in the signaling hypothesis.
94 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the impact of bank competition on the use of collateral in loan contracts and show that the presence of collateral is more likely when bank competition is low.
Abstract: We investigate the impact of bank competition on the use of collateral in loan contracts. We analyze asymmetric information about the borrowers’ type in a Salop model in which banks choose between screening the borrower and asking for collateral. We show that the presence of collateral is more likely when bank competition is low. We then test this prediction empirically on a sample of bank loans from 70 countries. We perform logit regressions of the presence of collateral on bank competition, measured by the Lerner index. Our empirical tests corroborate the theoretical predictions that bank competition reduces the presence of collateral. These findings survive several robustness checks.
80 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors deal with optimal payment systems and present a short review of calculation methods and empirical results for a sample of countries, including Finland, which is to an extent one of the front-runners in payment technology and institutional design in payment systems.
Abstract: This paper deals with optimal payment systems. The issue boils down to how large are the costs of different payment media, which can be interpreted as a question of the efficiency of the means of payment. However, there are other qualifications related to the choice of payment media. Here, at least three issues can be distinguished. First is the question of optimal payment medium for each individual payment (size, location, EFTPOS etc.). This choice is not independent of the individual characteristics of the payer and payee. Secondly, there is the question of cost effectiveness of payments for different institutions and sectors. The final issue concerns the social optimum for each payment medium. These issues have been particularly controversial in the case of cash, which is still the dominant payment medium in most euro countries. Part of the controversy arises from the fact that the costs and benefits of different payment media affect different market participants in quite different ways, so that a possible social optimum might not correspond eg to the optima for different firms. The paper contains a short review of calculation methods and empirical results for a sample of countries. It also provides new evidence from Finland, which is to an extent one of the front-runners in payment technology and institutional design in payment systems. This shows up in relatively low overall costs of payments. Our estimate of total costs of payment media is 0.3 per cent of GDP, which is very low by international standards.
42 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors tackle the controversy over whether investment-cash flow sensitivity is a good indicator of financing constraints and cross-validate their analysis with both balance sheet and qualitative data on self-declared credit rationing and financing constraints.
Abstract: The controversy over whether investment-cash flow sensitivity is a good indicator of financing constraints is still unresolved. We tackle it from several different angles and cross-validate our analysis with both balance sheet and qualitative data on self-declared credit rationing and financing constraints. Our qualitative information shows that (self-declared) credit rationing is (weakly) related to both traditional a priori factors - such as firm size, age and location - and lenders' rational decisions based on their credit risk models. We use our qualitative information on firms that were denied credit to provide evidence relevant to the investment-cash flow sensitivity debate. Our results show that self-declared credit rationing significantly discriminates between firms that do and do not have such sensitivity, whereas a priori criteria do not. The same result does not apply when we consider the wider group of financially constrained firms (which do not seem to have a higher investment-cash flow sensitivity), which supports the more recent empirical evidence in this direction.
36 citations