Related party transactions and corporate governance
01 Dec 2004-Vol. 9, pp 1-27
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore two alternative perspectives of related party transactions: the view that such transactions are conflicts of interest which compromise management's agency responsibility to shareholders as well as directors' monitoring functions; and a view that these transactions are efficient transactions that fulfill rational economic demands of a firm such as the need for service providers with in-depth firm-specific knowledge.
Abstract: Transactions between a firm and its own managers, directors, principal owners or affiliates are known as related party transactions. Such transactions, which are diverse and often complex, represent a corporate governance challenge. This paper initiates research in finance on related party transactions, which have implications for agency literature. We first explore two alternative perspectives of related party transactions: the view that such transactions are conflicts of interest which compromise management’s agency responsibility to shareholders as well as directors’ monitoring functions; and the view that such transactions are efficient transactions that fulfill rational economic demands of a firm such as the need for service providers with in-depth firm-specific knowledge. We describe related party transactions for a sample of 112 publicly-traded companies, including the types of transactions and parties involved. This paper provides a starting point in related party transactions research.
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01 Jan 2010TL;DR: In this article, the authors introduce an original framework that can be used to estimate the quality of corporate governance among externally managed Asian REITs, which can be applied to define a corporate governance index of REIT stocks listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange (S-REITs).
Abstract: As the REIT regime has been expanding globally, corporate governance practices in emerging REIT markets have become a major concern for domestic and international investors alike. Idiosyncrasies stemming from the ownership models applied in Asian economies and the fact Asian REITs are often externally managed “captive entities” make issues pertaining to corporate governance of the listed real estate sector in Asia all the more important. To address these issues, the paper introduces an original framework that can be used to estimate the quality of corporate governance among externally managed Asian REITs. As a pilot study, the framework is applied to define a corporate governance index of REITs listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange (S-REITs). The index called R-Index enables the ranking of S-REITs’ corporate governance practices. It is then used to examine the relationship between corporate governance and performance of S-REITs. The empirical tests based on several performance-related metrics provide evidence supporting a positive correlation between corporate governance practices identified in the R-Index and stock performances. However, we find no positive correlation with operating performance proxied by accounting measures. In other words, S-REITs with higher corporate governance tend to register better risk-adjusted returns but do not outperform operationally. To test for market efficiency, the study shows that S-REITs with the best corporate governance practices also have less information asymmetry.
7 citations
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TL;DR: Li et al. as discussed by the authors test the relation between large shareholders and firm value using a recent reform in China's equity market and find that large shareholders expropriate less through related party transactions after the reform when the discrepancy between their voting rights and cash flow rights prior to the reform was larger.
Abstract: This paper tests the relation between large shareholders and firm value using a recent reform in China's equity market. The reform strengthened large shareholders' cash-flow rights relative to voting rights. The paper finds that large shareholders expropriate less through related party transactions after the reform when the discrepancy between their voting rights and cash-flow rights prior to the reform was larger. It also finds that minority shareholders gain from the reform: firms earn higher excess returns around the reform announcements when the discrepancy was larger. Finally, it provides the evidence of efficiency gains associated with the reform. The paper concludes that the discrepancy between large shareholders' voting rights and cash-flow rights can lead to efficiency losses.
7 citations
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14 Sep 2020TL;DR: Sampel penelitian as discussed by the authors bertujuan untuk menguji pengaruh related party transction terhadap nilai perusahaan dengan and tanpa menggunakan variabel kontrol.
Abstract: Peneltian ini bertujuan untuk menguji pengaruh related party transction terhadap nilai perusahaan dengan dan tanpa menggunakan variabel kontrol. Variabel related party transaction diukur dengan sales of related party transaction (SRPT), purchase of related party transaction (PRPT), account receivable of related party transaction (ARRPT), dan account payable of related party transaction (APRPT). Variabel kontrol terdiri dari ukuran perusahaan dan corporate governance, sedangkan variabel dependen adalah nilai perusahaan yang diukur dengan menggunakan Tobin's Q. Sampel penelitian adalah perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) pada periode penelitian 2010-2017. Sampel dipilih dengan menggunakan metode purposive sampling dan diperoleh sebanyak 42 perusahaan untuk dijadikan sampel. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode regresi data panel. Hasil peneltian menunjukkan SRPT, PRPT, ARRPT, APRPT tidak berpengaruh signifikan terhadap nilai perusahaan tanpa dan dengan menggunakan variabel kontrol.
7 citations
Cites background from "Related party transactions and corp..."
...Menurut Gordon et al. (2004), investor dan pengamat pasar berpikir transaksi dengan pihak berelasi berbahaya bagi pemgegang saham perusahaan....
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors compared the results of BPK's opinion on the financial statements of state institutions against the quality of implementation of the state institutions during 2012-2017 period.
Abstract: This study aims to compare the results of BPK's opinion on the financial statements of state institutions against the quality of implementation of state institutions during 2012-2017. The results showed that the quality of LKKL presentation had improved throughout the 2012-2017 period. Improving the quality of financial reporting of state institutions can be seen from the increasing number of entities that obtain Unqualified Opinion and the tendency to reduce the number of the institution that obtain Qualified Opinion and Disclaimer opinions. Improving the quality of financial reporting shows that local government entities have been able to present their financial reports correctly and in accordance with applicable principles. In addition, good financial reporting can also be an indication that the entity has a good performance in accordance with the target that has been committed.
7 citations
Cites background from "Related party transactions and corp..."
...Financial statements are prepared to provide relevant information about the financial position and all transactions carried out by a reporting entity during one reporting period cycle (Gordon et al., 2004)....
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TL;DR: In this article, a topic model based on latent Dirichlet allocation is proposed to analyze how the supreme audit institution monitors related party transactions (RPTs) in the Brazilian public sector.
Abstract: This paper aims to analyse how the supreme audit institution (SAI) monitors related party transactions (RPTs) in the Brazilian public sector. It considers definitions and disclosure policies of RPTs by international accounting and auditing standards and their evolution since 1980.,Based on archival research on international standards and using an interpretive approach, the authors investigated definitions and disclosure policies. Using a topic model based on latent Dirichlet allocation, the authors performed a content analysis on over 59,000 SAI decisions to assess how the SAI monitors RPTs.,The SAI investigates nepotism (a kind of RPT) and conflicts of interest up to eight times more frequently than related parties. Brazilian laws prevent nepotism and conflicts of interest, but not RPTs in general. Indeed, Brazilian public-sector accounting standards have not converged towards IPSAS 20, and ISSAI 1550 does not adjust auditing procedures to suit the public sector.,The SAI follows a legalistic auditing approach, indicating a need for regulation of related public-sector parties to improve surveillance. In addition to Brazil, other code law countries might face similar circumstances.,Public-sector RPTs are an under-investigated field, calling for attention by academics and standard-setters. Text mining and latent Dirichlet allocation, while mature techniques, are underexplored in accounting and auditing studies. Additionally, the Python script created to analyse the audit reports is available at Mendeley Data and may be used to perform similar analyses with minor adaptations.
6 citations
References
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
49,666 citations
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TL;DR: The authors argue that the separation of decision and risk-bearing functions observed in large corporations is common to other organizations such as large professional partnerships, financial mutuals, and nonprofits. But they do not consider the role of decision agents in these organizations.
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10,159 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization, and set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense.
Abstract: This paper attempts to explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization. We first set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense. The entrepreneur is also laid to rest, at least for the purposes of the large modern corporation. The two functions usually attributed to the entrepreneur--management and risk bearing--are treated as naturally separate factors within the set of contracts called a firm. The firm is disciplined by competition from other firms, which forces the evolution of devides for efficiently monitoring the performance of the entire team and of its individual members. Individual participants in the firm, and in particular its managers, face both the discipline and opportunities provided by the markets for their services, both within and outside the firm.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that standard errors of more than 3.0% per year are typical for both the CAPM and the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), and these large standard errors are the result of uncertainty about true factor risk premiums and imprecise estimates of the loadings of industries on the risk factors.
6,064 citations
"Related party transactions and corp..." refers methods in this paper
...We define industries following Fama and French (1997)....
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