Book ChapterDOI
Related party transactions and corporate governance
Elizabeth A. Gordon,Elaine Henry,Darius Palia +2 more
- Vol. 9, pp 1-27
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TLDR
In this paper, the authors explore two alternative perspectives of related party transactions: the view that such transactions are conflicts of interest which compromise management's agency responsibility to shareholders as well as directors' monitoring functions; and a view that these transactions are efficient transactions that fulfill rational economic demands of a firm such as the need for service providers with in-depth firm-specific knowledge.Citations
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Are executive directors paid enough? Evidence from conflicting related-party transactions
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the association between types (packages) of executive director remuneration and conflicting related-party transactions (RPT-conflict) among listed companies in Malaysia.
Prejudicial related-party transactions of listed companies in China: evidence of motivating and enabling influences
TL;DR: There is emerging corporate governance research on the problem of conflict of interest between shareholders (i.e., the principal-principal problem), which concerns the phenomenon of the ultimate controlling shareholder expropriating (Tunneling) or
Book ChapterDOI
The Association Between Corporate Governance and Audit Quality: Evidence from Taiwan
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined whether and how audit quality is associated with related-party transactions and CEO duality and found that for publicly held companies in environments with stronger capital market discipline, which causes greater reputation concerns and litigation risks, a CEO who is also the board chair does not hinder auditor independence.
Journal ArticleDOI
Accounting Irregularities in Related Party Transactions
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the theoretical link between RPTs and accounting irregularities and review evidence on accounting irregularities involving RPT and suggest that future research should work towards identifying the background of RPT that served as expropriation mechanism.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
Journal ArticleDOI
Separation of ownership and control
Eugene F. Fama,Michael C. Jensen +1 more
TL;DR: The authors argue that the separation of decision and risk-bearing functions observed in large corporations is common to other organizations such as large professional partnerships, financial mutuals, and nonprofits. But they do not consider the role of decision agents in these organizations.
Book
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
TL;DR: Weidenbaum and Jensen as mentioned in this paper reviewed the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation.
Journal ArticleDOI
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization, and set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense.
Journal ArticleDOI
Industry costs of equity
Eugene F. Fama,Kenneth R. French +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that standard errors of more than 3.0% per year are typical for both the CAPM and the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), and these large standard errors are the result of uncertainty about true factor risk premiums and imprecise estimates of the loadings of industries on the risk factors.