Book ChapterDOI
Related party transactions and corporate governance
Elizabeth A. Gordon,Elaine Henry,Darius Palia +2 more
- Vol. 9, pp 1-27
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TLDR
In this paper, the authors explore two alternative perspectives of related party transactions: the view that such transactions are conflicts of interest which compromise management's agency responsibility to shareholders as well as directors' monitoring functions; and a view that these transactions are efficient transactions that fulfill rational economic demands of a firm such as the need for service providers with in-depth firm-specific knowledge.Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
Not All Related Party Transactions (RPTs) Are the Same: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post RPTs
Michael D. Ryngaert,Shawn Thomas +1 more
TL;DR: Related party transactions (RPTs) are potential means for insiders to expropriate outside shareholders via self-dealing as mentioned in this paper, however, the overall volume of disclosed RPTs is generally not significantly associated with shareholder wealth as measured by operating profitability or Tobin's Q.
Journal ArticleDOI
Political connections, corporate governance and preferential bank loans
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated how political connections are related to preferential bank loans, how the entrenched position of the ruling party affects the types of preferential bank loan, and how corporate governance is related to preference bank loans.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Role of Related Party Transactions in Fraudulent Financial Reporting
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined 83 SEC enforcement actions involving both fraud and related party transactions and found that the most frequent types of transactions in the enforcement actions were loans to related parties, payments to company officers for services that were either unapproved or non-existent, and sales of goods or services to related entities in which the existence of the relationship was not disclosed.
Journal ArticleDOI
Related party transactions under a contingency perspective
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine two theories of conflict of interests and efficient transaction hypothesis in the context of related party transactions (RPTs) through a deductive approach, and also on the basis of their economic rationale.
Posted Content
Does Corporate Governance Matter? Evidence from Related Party Transactions in Malaysia
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the moderating effect of corporate governance on the related party transactions-performance relationship and found evidence that related transactions are detrimental to shareholders and thus reducing firm performance, but the negative effect is mitigated with the presence of good governance namely level of board independence and executive remuneration.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
Journal ArticleDOI
Separation of ownership and control
Eugene F. Fama,Michael C. Jensen +1 more
TL;DR: The authors argue that the separation of decision and risk-bearing functions observed in large corporations is common to other organizations such as large professional partnerships, financial mutuals, and nonprofits. But they do not consider the role of decision agents in these organizations.
Book
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
TL;DR: Weidenbaum and Jensen as mentioned in this paper reviewed the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation.
Journal ArticleDOI
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization, and set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense.
Journal ArticleDOI
Industry costs of equity
Eugene F. Fama,Kenneth R. French +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that standard errors of more than 3.0% per year are typical for both the CAPM and the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), and these large standard errors are the result of uncertainty about true factor risk premiums and imprecise estimates of the loadings of industries on the risk factors.