Book ChapterDOI
Related party transactions and corporate governance
Elizabeth A. Gordon,Elaine Henry,Darius Palia +2 more
- Vol. 9, pp 1-27
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TLDR
In this paper, the authors explore two alternative perspectives of related party transactions: the view that such transactions are conflicts of interest which compromise management's agency responsibility to shareholders as well as directors' monitoring functions; and a view that these transactions are efficient transactions that fulfill rational economic demands of a firm such as the need for service providers with in-depth firm-specific knowledge.Citations
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
An Empirical Study on Cross-Border Related Party Transactions of China's Listed Companies
Songhua Hu,Guang Li +1 more
TL;DR: Li et al. as mentioned in this paper studied the relationship between internal governance factors and cross-border related party (CBRP) transactions of Chinese firms and found that the size of CBRP transactions is positively associated with concentrated ownership, imbalance of power among large shareholders, CEO duality and outside directors' compensation.
Journal ArticleDOI
Revenues from related Parties Transactions and UEFA Financial Fair Play. The Search for an Alternative Solution to Fair Value Measurement for the Break-even Result Assessment
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors suggest an alternative hypothesis with respect to fair value measurement of RPTs for the UEFA FFP, in which the need for specific individual decision on each case, with the consequent high risk of treating similar cases differently, is likely to undermine the effectiveness of the financial fair play rules.
Journal ArticleDOI
Exclusionary Effects of Internal Transactions of Large Business Groups
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors proposed a framework to regulate internal transactions by the owner and his family of a large business group in Korea based on the principle of Person with Special Interest (PSI).
Journal ArticleDOI
Do related party transactions affect the relationship between political connections and firm value? Evidence from Egypt
TL;DR: In this article , the authors investigate the impact of political connections and related party transactions on the firm value (FV), and test the moderating effect of RPTs on such relationship, while controlling for the firms' corporate governance mechanisms.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
Journal ArticleDOI
Separation of ownership and control
Eugene F. Fama,Michael C. Jensen +1 more
TL;DR: The authors argue that the separation of decision and risk-bearing functions observed in large corporations is common to other organizations such as large professional partnerships, financial mutuals, and nonprofits. But they do not consider the role of decision agents in these organizations.
Book
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
TL;DR: Weidenbaum and Jensen as mentioned in this paper reviewed the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation.
Journal ArticleDOI
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization, and set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense.
Journal ArticleDOI
Industry costs of equity
Eugene F. Fama,Kenneth R. French +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that standard errors of more than 3.0% per year are typical for both the CAPM and the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), and these large standard errors are the result of uncertainty about true factor risk premiums and imprecise estimates of the loadings of industries on the risk factors.