Related party transactions and corporate governance
01 Dec 2004-Vol. 9, pp 1-27
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore two alternative perspectives of related party transactions: the view that such transactions are conflicts of interest which compromise management's agency responsibility to shareholders as well as directors' monitoring functions; and a view that these transactions are efficient transactions that fulfill rational economic demands of a firm such as the need for service providers with in-depth firm-specific knowledge.
Abstract: Transactions between a firm and its own managers, directors, principal owners or affiliates are known as related party transactions. Such transactions, which are diverse and often complex, represent a corporate governance challenge. This paper initiates research in finance on related party transactions, which have implications for agency literature. We first explore two alternative perspectives of related party transactions: the view that such transactions are conflicts of interest which compromise management’s agency responsibility to shareholders as well as directors’ monitoring functions; and the view that such transactions are efficient transactions that fulfill rational economic demands of a firm such as the need for service providers with in-depth firm-specific knowledge. We describe related party transactions for a sample of 112 publicly-traded companies, including the types of transactions and parties involved. This paper provides a starting point in related party transactions research.
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TL;DR: In this paper , the authors examined the relationship between Related Party Transactions (RPTs) and dividend payouts and found that the magnitude of RPTs, measured by the number of transactions, is positively associated with the dividend yield.
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the role of related party transactions from the perspective of company's corporate governance environment and analyze the way the companies follow the requirements of transparency of a related party transaction.
Abstract: The objective of this work is to offer contributions to improve the understanding of related party transactions. Our goal is to explore the role of related party transactions from the perspective of company’s corporate governance environment. Even though there is a growing interest in related party transactions, there is little academic literature to understand the nature of related party transactions and their economic consequences. Our study was conducted on a sample of 40 companies listed companies on Bucharest Stock Exchange activating in manuafacuring sector. Our objective was to analyse the way the companies follow the requirements of transparency of related party transaction. Based on our observations on companies’ financial reports and companies web-sites, the level of transparency between these companies was reflected by an index estimated from producers’ scores on Likert-type scales (one to five) that showed to what extent they disclose or not disclose information such as relationship between parents and subsidiaries, key management personnel compensation, the value of transactions with related parties or separate disclosure for the group entities.
1 citations
Cites background or methods from "Related party transactions and corp..."
...According to efficient transactions view, related party transactions satisfy the economic needs of company between parties who have built up trust and shared private information [5]....
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...The main methods of privatization that caused the emergence of private sector in Romania were MEBO, mass privatization program and selling stakes to investors across companies [5]....
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01 Jan 2013
TL;DR: In Espana, en Espana se ha producido cierto debate sobre the consideracion de las operaciones de la cooperativa con sus socios dentro de sus fine sociales (activida sociales).
Abstract: Resumen es: En Espana se ha producido cierto debate sobre la consideracion de las operaciones de la cooperativa con sus socios dentro de sus fines sociales (activida...
1 citations
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TL;DR: In this article , the authors employed data from all manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) to provide empirical evidence for whether the RPT of related party loans in manufacturing companies in Indonesia is an opportunistic transaction or an efficient transaction, and provided evidence for differences in company perspectives before and during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Abstract: Related party transactions (RPT) are a common transaction conducted among companies and are the focus of the business world today. The purpose of this study is twofold, as follows: first, to provide empirical evidence for whether the RPT of related party loans in manufacturing companies in Indonesia is an opportunistic transaction or an efficient transaction, and second, to provide evidence for whether there are differences in company perspectives before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. This study employs data from all manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). The data analysis techniques include descriptive statistical and hypothesis testing. The results of this study in the period 2018–2021 show that RPT has a positive effect on company value. During this period, that is, the years prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, RPT had a negative effect on company value. In contrast, the 2020–2021 period (during the COVID-19 pandemic) shows the opposite result: RPT has a positive effect on company value. The results of this study suggest that in the 2018–2021 and the pandemic period (2020–2021), companies conducted RPT for efficiency purposes, while prior to the pandemic (2018–2019) RPT was conducted for opportunistic purposes.
1 citations
References
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
49,666 citations
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TL;DR: The authors argue that the separation of decision and risk-bearing functions observed in large corporations is common to other organizations such as large professional partnerships, financial mutuals, and nonprofits. But they do not consider the role of decision agents in these organizations.
Abstract: ABSENT fiat, the form of organization that survives in an activity is the one that delivers the product demanded by customers at the lowest price while covering costs.1 Our goal is to explain the survival of organizations characterized by separation of "ownership" and "control"-a problem that has bothered students of corporations from Adam Smith to Berle and Means and Jensen and Meckling.2 In more precise language, we are concerned with the survival of organizations in which important decision agents do not bear a substantial share of the wealth effects of their decisions. We argue that the separation of decision and risk-bearing functions observed in large corporations is common to other organizations such as large professional partnerships, financial mutuals, and nonprofits. We contend that separation of decision and risk-bearing functions survives in these organizations in part because of the benefits of specialization of
14,045 citations
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01 Jan 1932TL;DR: Weidenbaum and Jensen as mentioned in this paper reviewed the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation.
Abstract: This monumental work on the corporation is one of those enduring classics that many cite but few have read. Graced with a new introduction by Weidenbaum and Jensen, this new edition makes this classic available to a new generation. Written in the early 1930s, The Modern Corporation and Private Property remains the fundamental introduction to the internal organization of the corporation in modern society. Combining the analytical skills of an attorney with those of an economist, Berle and Means raise the central questions, even when their answers have been superseded by changing circumstances. The book's most enduring theme is the separation of ownership from control of the modern corporation and its consequences. Berle and Means display keen awareness of the divergent interests of directors and managers, and of each from owners of the firm. Among their predictions are the characteristic increase in size of the modem corporation and concentration of the economy. The authors view stock exchanges and stock markets as essential by-products of the rise of the modem corporation, and explore how these function. They address the difficult questions of whether corporations operate for the benefit of owners or managers, and explore what motivates managers to make effective use of corporate assets. Finally, they examine the role of the corporation as the prevailing form of organizing the production and distribution of goods and services. In their new introduction, Weidenbaum and Jensen, co-directors of the Center for the Study of American Business at Washington University, critically assess the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation. They note the authors' prescient observations, including the complex role of and motivating influences on professional managers, and the significance of inside information on stock markets. As they note, The Modern Corporation and Private Property remains of central value to all those concerned with the evolution of this major social institution of the twentieth century. Scholar and practitioner alike will find it of enduring significance.
10,159 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization, and set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense.
Abstract: This paper attempts to explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization. We first set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense. The entrepreneur is also laid to rest, at least for the purposes of the large modern corporation. The two functions usually attributed to the entrepreneur--management and risk bearing--are treated as naturally separate factors within the set of contracts called a firm. The firm is disciplined by competition from other firms, which forces the evolution of devides for efficiently monitoring the performance of the entire team and of its individual members. Individual participants in the firm, and in particular its managers, face both the discipline and opportunities provided by the markets for their services, both within and outside the firm.
8,222 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that standard errors of more than 3.0% per year are typical for both the CAPM and the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), and these large standard errors are the result of uncertainty about true factor risk premiums and imprecise estimates of the loadings of industries on the risk factors.
6,064 citations
"Related party transactions and corp..." refers methods in this paper
...We define industries following Fama and French (1997)....
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