Repetition priming and frequency attenuation in lexical access
01 Oct 1984-Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition (American Psychological Association)-Vol. 10, Iss: 4, pp 680-698
TL;DR: The authors showed that the frequency attenuation effect is a product of the involvement of the episodic memory system in the lexical decision process, which is supported by the demonstration of constant repetition effects for high and low-frequency words when the priming stimulus is masked; the masking is assumed to minimize the influence of any possible episodic trace of the prime.
Abstract: Repetition priming effects in lexical decision tasks are stronger for low-frequency words than for high-frequency words. This frequency attenuation effect creates problems for frequency-ordered search models that assume a relatively stable frequency effect. The suggestion is made that frequency attenuation is a product of the involvement of the episodic memory system in the lexical decision process. This hypothesis is supported by the demonstration of constant repetition effects for high- and low-frequency words when the priming stimulus is masked; the masking is assumed to minimize the influence of any possible episodic trace of the prime. It is further shown that long-term repetition effects are much less reliable when the subject is not required to make a lexical decision response to the prime. When a response is required, the expected frequency attenuation effect is restored. It is concluded that normal repetition effects consist of two components: a very brief lexical effect that is independent of frequency and a long-term episodic effect that is sensitive to frequency. There has been much recent interest in the fact that in a lexical decision experiment, where subjects are required to classify letter strings as words or nonwords, there is a substantial increase in both the speed and the accuracy of classificatio n for words that are presented more than once during the experiment, even though considerable time may have elapsed between successive presen
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TL;DR: A survey of implicit memory and its relation to explicit memory can be found in this paper, where the authors present an historical survey of observations concerning implicit memory, reviews the findings of contemporary experimental research, and delineates the strengths and weaknesses of alternative theoretical accounts of implicit memories.
Abstract: Memory for a recent event can be expressed explicitly, as conscious recollection, or implicitly, as a facilitation of test performance without conscious recollection. A growing number of recent studies have been concerned with implicit memory and its relation to explicit memory. This article presents an historical survey of observations concerning implicit memory, reviews the findings of contemporary experimental research, and delineates the strengths and weaknesses of alternative theoretical accounts of implicit memory. It is argued that dissociations between implicit and explicit memory have been documented across numerous tasks and subject populations, represent an important challenge for research and theory, and should be viewed in the context of other dissociations between implicit and explicit expressions of knowledge that have been documented in recent cognitive and neuropsychological research. Psychological studies of memory have traditionally relied on tests such as free recall, cued recall, and recognition. A prominent feature of these tests is that they make explicit reference to, and require conscious recollection of, a specific learning episode. During the past several years, however, increasing attention has been paid to experimental situations in which information that was encoded during a particular episode is subsequently expressed without conscious or deliberate recollection. Instead of being asked to try to remember recently presented information, subjects are simply required to perform a task, such as completing a graphemic fragment of a word, indicating
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Cites background from "Repetition priming and frequency at..."
...…other situations, however, priming of word-stem completion (Graf & Mandler, 1984; Graf et aL, 1984; Shimamura & Squire, 1984) and lexical decision (Forster & Davis, 1984) has proved to be a relatively transient phenomenon, decaying across delays of minutes and hours over which explicit…...
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...…and nonwords, and have generally found that nonwords show either no priming or smaller amounts of priming than real words (Forbach et al., 1974; Forster & Davis, 1984; Kirsner & Smith, 1974; Scarborough, Cortese, & Scarborough, 1977), although robust priming of nonwords has been observed under…...
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...…that automatic, relatively short-lived priming effects depend on activation of preexisting representations, whereas longer lasting, elaboration-dependent effects may be based on specific components of newly created episodic representations (see also Schacter & Graf, 1986a; Forster & Davis, 1984)....
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...However, the meaning of rapid decay varies widely, from seconds or minutes in some lexical decision paradigms (e.g., Forster & Davis, 1984) to several hours in stemcompletion paradigms (e.g., Diamond & Rozin, 1984; Graf & Mandler, 1984)....
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TL;DR: Within the areas associated with conscious reading, masked words activated left extrastriate, fusiform and precentral areas and reduced the amount of activation evoked by a subsequent conscious presentation of the same word.
Abstract: We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and event-related potentials (ERPs) to visualize the cerebral processing of unseen masked words. Within the areas associated with conscious reading, masked words activated left extrastriate, fusiform and precentral areas. Furthermore, masked words reduced the amount of activation evoked by a subsequent conscious presentation of the same word. In the left fusiform gyrus, this repetition suppression phenomenon was independent of whether the prime and target shared the same case, indicating that case-independent information about letter strings was extracted unconsciously. In comparison to an unmasked situation, however, the activation evoked by masked words was drastically reduced and was undetectable in prefrontal and parietal areas, correlating with participants' inability to report the masked words.
1,171 citations
TL;DR: The idea that a sensory input can give rise to semantic activation without concomitant conscious identification was the central thesis of the controversial research in subliminal perception as discussed by the authors, which can be demonstrated by the ability of a person to perform discriminations on the basis of the meaning of the stimulus.
Abstract: When the stored representation of the meaning of a stimulus is accessed through the processing of a sensory input it is maintained in an activated state for a certain amount of time that allows for further processing. This semantic activation is generally accompanied by conscious identification, which can be demonstrated by the ability of a person to perform discriminations on the basis of the meaning of the stimulus. The idea that a sensory input can give rise to semantic activation without concomitant conscious identification was the central thesis of the controversial research in subliminal perception. Recently, new claims for the existence of such phenomena have arisen from studies in dichotic listening, parafoveal vision, and visual pattern masking. Because of the fundamental role played by these types of experiments in cognitive psychology, the new assertions have raised widespread interest.The purpose of this paper is to show that this enthusiasm may be premature. Analysis of the three new lines of evidence for semantic activation without conscious identification leads to the following conclusions. (1) Dichotic listening cannot provide the conditions needed to demonstrate the phenomenon. These conditions are better fulfilled in parafoveal vision and are realized ideally in pattern masking. (2) Evidence for the phenomenon is very scanty for parafoveal vision, but several tentative demonstrations have been reported for pattern masking. It can be shown, however, that none of these studies has included the requisite controls to ensure that semantic activation was not accompanied by conscious identification of the stimulus at the time of presentation. (3) On the basis of current evidence it is most likely that these stimuli were indeed consciously identified.
1,143 citations
TL;DR: A model of orthographic processing is described that postulates read-out from different information dimensions, determined by variable response criteria set on these dimensions, that unifies results obtained in response-limited and data-limited paradigms and helps resolve a number of inconsistencies in the experimental literature.
Abstract: A model of orthographic processing is described that postulates read-out from different information dimensions, determined by variable response criteria set on these dimensions. Performance in a perceptual identification task is simulated as the percentage of trials on which a noisy criterion set on the dimension of single word detector activity is reached. Two additional criteria set on the dimensions of total lexical activity and time from stimulus onset are hypothesized to be operational in the lexical decision task. These additional criteria flexibly adjust to changes in stimulus material and task demands, thus accounting for strategic influences on performance in this task. The model unifies results obtained in response-limited and data-limited paradigms and helps resolve a number of inconsistencies in the experimental literature that cannot be accommodated by other current models of visual word recognition.
1,062 citations
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TL;DR: In neuroscience, modularity of systems is the rule rather than the exception: if one accepts a straightforward relationship between brain systems and cogni- tive systems, the hypothesis of multiple memory systems is a logical exten- sion of current knowledge as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: ionist Positions Abstractionist positions view implicit memory as reflecting modification of the state of abstract lexical, semantic, or procedural knowledge structures; byionist positions view implicit memory as reflecting modification of the state of abstract lexical, semantic, or procedural knowledge structures; by contrast, explicit memory is assumed to depend on formation and retrieval of memory traces representing specific experiences. Abstractionists are often neuroscientifically oriented, using brain lesion data to constrain their theories. Of particular interest are findings that amnesic patients are selectively im paired on direct tests of memory but show normal learning as measured by some indirect tests (reviewed below). These deficits are ascribed to an impairment of the system responsible for memory of specific experiences. In neuroscience, modularity of systems is the rule rather than the exception: If one accepts a straightforward relationship between brain systems and cogni tive systems, the hypothesis of multiple memory systems is a logical exten sion of current knowledge (Cohen 1984; Oakley 1983; for discussion, see Cohen 1 985; Olton 1985; Schacter 1986) . Tu1ving's (1972) heuristic distinction between episodic and semantic forms of memory was later developed into a multiple-system theory (Schacter & Tulving 1982a, b; Tulving 1983, 1984a) . Episodic memory "deals with unique, concrete, personal, temporally dated events," while semantic mem ory "involves general, abstract, timeless knowledge that a person shares with others" ( 1986, p. 307). In recent versions of the theory (Tulving 1984b,c; 486 RICHARDSON-KLA VEHN & BJORK 1985a,b,c; 1986) episodic memory is viewed as a specialized subsystem of semantic memory, with both systems embedded within a procedural memory, an arrangement Tulving terms monohierarchical. This position was designed to facilitate conceptualization of Tulving's (1983) hypothesis of the phylogenetic evolution of episodic from semantic memory, and to account for recent arguments that whereas indirect memory measures reveal evidence of memory early in human ontogeny, the capacity to perfonn direct memory tasks first emerges only at 8-9 months of age (Schacter & Moscovitch 1984) . There are a number of other multiple-system formulations that are some what analogous to the episodic-semantic distinction (e.g. Halgren 1984; Johnson 1983 ; Oakley 1983 ; O'Keefe & Nadel 1978; Olton et al 1979; Schacter & Moscovitch 1984; Warrington & Weiskrantz 1982) . One of these deserves special note: Morton's (1969, 1970, 1979, 1981) mUltisystem theory differs from Tulving's in that conceptual and factual knowledge, as well as personal or episodic memories, are dealt with by the same system (the cognitive system); a separate system contains abstract representations for words (logogens) that are responsible for lexical access. Other theorists regard the distinction between procedural and declarative (or propositional) memories (accepted by Tulving) as sufficient to explain the observed dissociations between direct and indirect measures (e.g. Baddeley 1984; Cohen 1984; McKoon et al 1986; Squire & Cohen 1984) . The pro cedural/declarative distinction was originally formulated by workers in artifi cial intelligence as a distinction between types of knowledge (e .g . Barr & Feigenbaum 1981; Winograd 1975) , but it has been extended into a multiple system viewpoint (Cohen 1984; Squire & Cohen 1984) . Procedural memory involves "reorganization or other modification of existing processing struc tures or procedures ," whereas declarative memory "represents explicitly new data structures derived from the operation of any process or procedure" (Cohen 1984, pp. 96-97). Although procedural memory can be revealed only when a task reengages prior processing operations, it is abstract in the sense that it does not record the specific prior events that caused those processing operations to be modified. The declarative system is considered to be respon sible for conscious access to facts and past experiences; it is necessary for performance of direct memory tests, and is impaired in amnesia. An approach analogous to the procedural/declarative distinction is proposed by Mishkin (Mishkin et al 1984; Mishkin & Petri 1984) , who distinguishes between a memory system and a habit system. The distinction between activation and elaboration (Graf & Mandler 1984; Mandler 1980; Mandler et al 1986) is a process-oriented viewpoint; it differs from other abstractionist positions in being neutral with respect to the issue of memory systems. Activation of a preexisting mental representation "strength ens the relations among its components and increases its accessibility" (Graf MEASURES OF MEMORY 487 & Mandler 1 984, p. 553); elaborative processing is necessary in order to retain new relationships and relate stimuli to the context in which they were presented. Activation alone is sufficient to result in processing facilitation that is revealed in indirect memory tests, whereas elaboration is necessary for direct tests of memory . A similar concept of trace activation has been proposed by Diamond & Rozin (1 984; see also Mortensen 1980) . Nonabstractionist Positions Nonabstractionists are unified by their disagreement with the necessity to distinguish abstract representations from memory traces that preserve in formation from specific experiences. They are typically mainstream cognitive psychologists who concern themselves primarily with the behavior of normal human subjects. Kolers (e.g. 1979, 1 985; Kolers & Roediger 1984; Kolers & Smythe 1 984) has attacked the distinction between procedural and declarative (or proposi tional) knowledge, arguing that "statements or declarations . . . do not fail of procedural representation" (Kolers & Roediger 1984, p. 437). When a subject displays knowledge, he/she is assumed to be engaging in a form of skilled performance. Knowledge is regarded as being specific to the processes by which that knowledge is acquired: Rather than offering a "unitary" theory in opposition to multisystem approaches, Kolers suggests that mentation con sists of a multiplicity of processes whose properties are poorly correlated. Memory is revealed to the extent that processing operations at study and test overlap (the principle of transfer-appropriate processing, Bransford et al 1 979) . Dissociations between direct and indirect measures of retention are to be expected when members of the two classes of task make different process ing requirements , and not otherwise [see also Moscovitch et al ( 1986) for a similar viewpoint]. Jacoby ( 1983b) , Blaxton ( 1 985), and Roediger & Blaxton ( 1 987a,b) have used the terms conceptually driven and data-driven as a taxonomy of the processing demands of memory tests. Direct memory tests typically involve more conceptually driven than data-driven processing because the subject uses associative information to reconstruct the study episode mentally; in direct memory tests typically involve more data-driven than conceptually driven processes because the subject focusses on external stimuli (e.g. a fragment of a word) at test. Dissociations between data-driven and con ceptually driven memory tests would be expected as a function of the type of information (semantic-associative vs perceptual) encoded in a prior episode. Jacoby ( 1982, 1983a,b, 1984, 1 987; Jacoby & Brooks 1984; Jacoby & Dallas 198 1 ; Jacoby & Witherspoon 1982) argues that implicit and explicit memory are reflections of "different aspects of memory for whole prior processing episodes" ( 1 983a, p. 21) . The aware and unaware aspects of 488 RICHARDSON-KLA VEHN & BJORK memory for episodes are assumed to result from differences in information provided by test cues, and possibly accompanying differences in retrieval processes (see Whittlesea 1 987 for a similar position).
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TL;DR: This paper describes and evaluates explanations offered by these theories to account for the effect of extralist cuing, facilitation of recall of list items by nonlist items.
Abstract: Recent changes in prctheorclical orientation toward problems of human memory have brought with them a concern with retrieval processes, and a number of early versions of theories of retrieval have been constructed. This paper describes and evaluates explanations offered by these theories to account for the effect of extralist cuing, facilitation of recall of list items by nonlist items. Experiments designed to test the currently most popular theory of retrieval, the generation-recognition theory, yielded results incompatible not only with generation-recognition models, but most other theories as well: under certain conditions subjects consistently failed to recognize many recallable list words. Several tentative explanations of this phenomenon of recognition failure were subsumed under the encoding specificity principle according to which the memory trace of an event and hence the properties of effective retrieval cue are determined by the specific encoding operations performed by the system on the input stimuli.
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TL;DR: The experiments that are reported were designed to explore the relationship between the more aware autobiographical form of memory that is measured by a recognition memory test and the less aware form ofMemory that is expressed in perceptual learning.
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