Dissertation•
Rethinking rationality : theological anthropology in light of profound cognitive impairment, relationality, embodiment and personhood
01 Jan 2012-
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the belief that there is a polar opposition between body and soul (mind) is a category mistake, and propose an alternative to the rationality-relationality turn by following Karl Barth and argue that most theories of justice are also culpable of marginalizing intellectually impaired individuals.
Abstract: The aim of this thesis is to rethink the question of rationality as the defining mark of what it is to be human in light of profoundly cognitively impaired individuals We attempt to hold a conversation between theologians who traditionally emphasized rationality, and those who stress relationality as the sine qua non of human beings in order to demonstrate that both have traditionally marginalized individuals who are cognitively impaired Finally following Karl Barth, we attempt to retrieve the theme of embodiment to augment relationality in theological anthropology In Part I (chapter 2 and 3) we analyse the historical understanding of the imago Dei from a Christian West perspective We trace the tradition from Joseph Fletcher back to Irenaeus through Aquinas and Augustine, and examine how their notions of the imago Dei have traditionally marginalized intellectually impaired persons By equating the imago with ‘rational souls’, the tradition perpetuates the exclusion and stigmatization of cognitively impaired persons Chapter 3 analyses the rationality-relationality turn, ie, the effort by Christian theology to overcome the traditional overemphasis of rationality Here we engage with Eastern Orthodox theologians John Zizioulas and Christos Yannaras who can be considered paradigmatic examples for a relational anthropology and thus are of particular importance in the popularization of the ‘relational turn’ In Part II (chapter 4, 5 and 6), we offer an alternative to the rationality-relationality turn by following Karl Barth Here we push against a Cartesian dualistic ‘criterion of personhood’, and argue that the belief there is a polar opposition between body and soul (mind) is a category mistake Thus we attempt to retrieve the theme of embodiment in light of profound cognitive impairment In chapter 5, we engage with John Rawls and Martha Nussbaum to show that most theories of justice are also culpable of marginalizing intellectually impaired individuals Here we attempt to show why secular theories of justice do not work, and so finally suggest a theistic grounding of justice Chapter 6 examines the practical issue of care for fellow human beings who are cognitively impaired
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Journal Article•
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TL;DR: The Law of Peoples as discussed by the authors is an ideal normative framework for international law that accommodates a measure of realism and rejects the idea of a world-state, but it is not a model for the realistic utopia sketched in The Law of Nations.
Abstract: The Law of Peoples John Rawls Harvard 1999 John Rawls, the great political philosopher, has turned his reflections to questions of international justice, much as his philosophical ancestor Kant did toward the end of his career. Indeed, Kant's conception of a "pacific federation" of states in Perpetual Peace is Rawls's acknowledged model for the "realistic utopia" sketched in The Law of Peoples, which expands upon his 1993 essay by the same title (without, however, revising its basic argument). Despite differing philosophical constraints and geopolitical conditions, both Kant and Rawls aim to develop an ideal normative framework for international law that accommodates a measure of realism and rejects the idea of a world-state. Unfortunately, in its uncritical acceptance of so-called "decent hierarchical societies" even at the level of ideal theory, the normative claim of Rawls's Law of Peoples is undermined. This philosophical appeasement, meant to secure perpetual peace in our time through a moderately demanding Law of Peoples that liberal and "decent" hierarchical societies alike can endorse, departs fundamentally from Kant's cosmopolitanism. For Kant, the "First Definitive Article of a Perpetual Peace-as opposed to a temporary interruption of hostilities-is that each member state of the foedus pacif cum must have a republican form of government, which is partly founded upon "the principle of legal equality for everyone (as citizens)." By contrast, Rawls weakens his ideal of international justice to buy the assent of hierarchical societies, which by definition lack equality among citizens, at the price of sacrificing a theoretical basis for justifying reforms of the practices and institutions of these hierarchical societies above a minimal level of decency. Rawls's complex argument begins by extending the original position, in which principles of justice for the basic structure of society are chosen under epistemic constraints that ensure fairness, from a single liberal society to what he calls the Society of Liberal Peoples. In a second step, though still within ideal theory, he argues that the substantive principles comprising the Law of Peoples are also acceptable to decent hierarchical societies, which possess decent consultation hierarchies and common good conceptions of justice. Despite being inegalitarian, decent hierarchical societies do respect basic human rights, allow some dissent, and at least consult with representatives of groups whose members are denied full citizenship rights. …
1,137 citations
465 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1933
TL;DR: The Nature and Destiny of Man as mentioned in this paper is a collection of Gifford lectures published by Reinhold Niebuhr in the early nineteen nineties, with a focus on the nature and nature of man.
Abstract: Theologians abroad have been known to express concern at the apparent lack of interest in contemporary American Protestant thought, which Catholics on this side of the ocean display. If there were this lack of interest, the reasons for it would not be hard to find. American Protestants depend so much on German thinkers that one might as well read the Germans, especially since their theological work has a freshness which the Americans never quite seem to achieve. But there are more radical reasons. In the more important works published in America, profound metaphysical speculation is too frequently marred by a pervasive carelessness about the precise definition and meaning of abstract terms. Even fellow Protestant theologians, as one can gather from the reviews of such books, find it necessary to confess that the author's precise meaning in many points escapes them. The prevailing accent upon novelty and originality in speculation does not improve the situation. A cognate difficulty is the immense patience which the Catholic theologian must exercise with the Protestant theologian's misunderstanding and misstatement of Catholic doctrines about which there is no lack of clarity whatsoever. The Catholic knows the great cost, in terms of intellectual discipline, with which the precision and clarity of his theology are achieved and maintained. He finds it difficult to approach with sympathy any work which evades a similar intellectual discipline both in the precision of the author's own thinking and in the meticulous care with which contrary positions are presented. Both of these difficulties are encountered in The Nature and Destiny of Man, in which Professor Reinhold Niebuhr publishes his series of Gifford lectures. Even to Protestants who are more familiar with him, Niebuhr makes hard reading. He is much more difficult for a Catholic. Morever, he not unfrequently, however unwittingly, misstates the Catholic position. Yet it must be recognized that Niebuhr is a man of reputation amongst our Protestant brethren. He is known as the author of a series of books which have stamped him as a thinker "who is going politically to the Left and theologically to the Right." He has been for a number of years professor at Union Theological Seminary in New York. These lectures were given at the University of Edinburgh in a chair which has been occupied by Archbishop Temple and Sir Charles Sherrington, discussing the same subject matter. He was chosen, therefore, to represent American Protestant theology in a very distinguished setting. These facts may justify the present attempt to set forth some of the salient ideas of Professor Niebuhr's two volumes. Because of the difficulty alluded to above, there is a not inconsiderable danger that this review may in some instances fail of perfect accuracy in representing Niebuhr's views. To minimize this danger we shall, so far as possible, let the
232 citations
Journal Article•
197 citations
References
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Book•
01 Jan 1999
TL;DR: In this paper, Amartya Sen quotes the eighteenth century poet William Cowper on freedom: Freedom has a thousand charms to show, That slaves howe'er contented, never know.
Abstract: In Development as Freedom Amartya Sen quotes the eighteenth century poet William Cowper on freedom: Freedom has a thousand charms to show, That slaves howe'er contented, never know. Sen explains how in a world of unprecedented increase in overall opulence, millions of people living in rich and poor countries are still unfree. Even if they are not technically slaves, they are denied elementary freedom and remain imprisoned in one way or another by economic poverty, social deprivation, political tyranny or cultural authoritarianism. The main purpose of development is to spread freedom and its 'thousand charms' to the unfree citizens. Freedom, Sen persuasively argues, is at once the ultimate goal of social and economic arrangements and the most efficient means of realizing general welfare. Social institutions like markets, political parties, legislatures, the judiciary, and the media contribute to development by enhancing individual freedom and are in turn sustained by social values. Values, institutions, development, and freedom are all closely interrelated, and Sen links them together in an elegant analytical framework. By asking "What is the relation between our collective economic wealth and our individual ability to live as we would like?" and by incorporating individual freedom as a social commitment into his analysis, Sen allows economics once again, as it did in the time of Adam Smith, to address the social basis of individual well-being and freedom.
19,080 citations
Book•
15 Apr 1996
TL;DR: The Cultural Work of American Freak Shows, 1835-19404 as mentioned in this paper, discusses disability, identity, and representation: an Introduction and Acknowledgments, and theorizing disability.
Abstract: Preface and AcknowledgmentsPart 1. Politicizing Bodily Differences1. Disability, Identity, and Representation: An Introduction2. Theorizing DisabilityPart 2. Constructing Disabled Figures: Cultural and Literary Sites3. The Cultural Work of American Freak Shows, 1835-19404. Benevolent Maternalism and the Disabled Women in Stowe, Davis and Phelps5. Disabled Women as Powerful Women in Petry, Morrison, and LordeConclusion: From Pathology to IdentityNotesBibliographyIndex
1,540 citations
Journal Article•
[...]
TL;DR: The Law of Peoples as discussed by the authors is an ideal normative framework for international law that accommodates a measure of realism and rejects the idea of a world-state, but it is not a model for the realistic utopia sketched in The Law of Nations.
Abstract: The Law of Peoples John Rawls Harvard 1999 John Rawls, the great political philosopher, has turned his reflections to questions of international justice, much as his philosophical ancestor Kant did toward the end of his career. Indeed, Kant's conception of a "pacific federation" of states in Perpetual Peace is Rawls's acknowledged model for the "realistic utopia" sketched in The Law of Peoples, which expands upon his 1993 essay by the same title (without, however, revising its basic argument). Despite differing philosophical constraints and geopolitical conditions, both Kant and Rawls aim to develop an ideal normative framework for international law that accommodates a measure of realism and rejects the idea of a world-state. Unfortunately, in its uncritical acceptance of so-called "decent hierarchical societies" even at the level of ideal theory, the normative claim of Rawls's Law of Peoples is undermined. This philosophical appeasement, meant to secure perpetual peace in our time through a moderately demanding Law of Peoples that liberal and "decent" hierarchical societies alike can endorse, departs fundamentally from Kant's cosmopolitanism. For Kant, the "First Definitive Article of a Perpetual Peace-as opposed to a temporary interruption of hostilities-is that each member state of the foedus pacif cum must have a republican form of government, which is partly founded upon "the principle of legal equality for everyone (as citizens)." By contrast, Rawls weakens his ideal of international justice to buy the assent of hierarchical societies, which by definition lack equality among citizens, at the price of sacrificing a theoretical basis for justifying reforms of the practices and institutions of these hierarchical societies above a minimal level of decency. Rawls's complex argument begins by extending the original position, in which principles of justice for the basic structure of society are chosen under epistemic constraints that ensure fairness, from a single liberal society to what he calls the Society of Liberal Peoples. In a second step, though still within ideal theory, he argues that the substantive principles comprising the Law of Peoples are also acceptable to decent hierarchical societies, which possess decent consultation hierarchies and common good conceptions of justice. Despite being inegalitarian, decent hierarchical societies do respect basic human rights, allow some dissent, and at least consult with representatives of groups whose members are denied full citizenship rights. …
1,137 citations
"Rethinking rationality : theologica..." refers background in this paper
...10 See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). (Hereafter LP). 11 Rawls, PL, 21. 12 Ibid. 13 Nussbaum, FJ, see also Brian Barry, Theories of Justice, vol. 1, A Treatise on Social Justice (London: HarvesterWheatsheaf, 1989). See also Christine Hartley, ‘Justice for the Disabled: A Contractualist Approach’, Journal of Social Philosophy 40 (2009): 17-36; Cynthia Stark, ‘How to Include the Severely Disabled in a Contractarian Theory of Justice’, Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (2007): 125-7....
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..., Georges Florovsky: Russian Intellectual, Orthodox Churchman (Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 1993), 287-340; Boris Gudziak, ‘Towards an Analysis of the Neo-partristic Synthesis of Georges Florovsky’, Logos 1(2000), 197-238; Andrew Louth, ‘The Patristic Revival and Its Protagonists’ in The Cambridge Companion to Orthodox Christian Theology. eds., Mary B. Cunningham and Elizabeth Theokritoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 16 Other than the ones mentioned above, Lucian Turcescu gives the most recent and, perhaps, sharpest expression of this critique. See idem, ‘“Person’” versus “Individual” and Other Modern Misreadings of Gregory of Nyssa’, Modern Theology 4 (2002), 97-109. See also John G. F. Wilks, ‘The Trinitarian Ontology of John Zizioulas’, Vox Evangelica 25 (1995), 63-8....
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...38 Annette Baier, Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 24. See generally chapter 2 ‘The Need for More than Justice’ (18-32). 39 Article 24 states that everybody has a right to periodic vacations with pay. How we implement it if some people are not working stands to be demonstrated. 40 Wolterstorff, Justice, 2-3. 41 See Stanley Hauerwas, ‘On the Right to be Tribal’, Christian Scholar’s Review 16 (1987), 238-39....
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..., Georges Florovsky: Russian Intellectual, Orthodox Churchman (Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 1993), 287-340; Boris Gudziak, ‘Towards an Analysis of the Neo-partristic Synthesis of Georges Florovsky’, Logos 1(2000), 197-238; Andrew Louth, ‘The Patristic Revival and Its Protagonists’ in The Cambridge Companion to Orthodox Christian Theology. eds., Mary B. Cunningham and Elizabeth Theokritoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 16 Other than the ones mentioned above, Lucian Turcescu gives the most recent and, perhaps, sharpest expression of this critique. See idem, ‘“Person’” versus “Individual” and Other Modern Misreadings of Gregory of Nyssa’, Modern Theology 4 (2002), 97-109....
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...143 For example euthanasia in infants has been proposed by philosophers for children with severe abnormalities and whose lives the philosophers think can be expected to be not worth living (see for example Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, Should the Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 143; See also Michael Tooley, ‘Abortion and Infanticide’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (1972), 37-65; Jonathan Gloover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977); Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); John Harris, ‘Ethical Problems in the Management of some Severely Handicapped Children’, Journal of Medical Ethics 7 (1981), 117-124....
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Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this article, Amartya Sen explains how in a world of unprecedented increase in overall opulence millions of people living in the Third World are still unfree, even if they are not technically slaves, they are denied elementary freedoms and remain imprisoned in one way or another by economic poverty, social deprivation, political tyranny or cultural authoritarianism.
Abstract: In Development as Freedom Amartya Sen explains how in a world of unprecedented increase in overall opulence millions of people living in the Third World are still unfree. Even if they are not technically slaves, they are denied elementary freedoms and remain imprisoned in one way or another by economic poverty, social deprivation, political tyranny or cultural authoritarianism. The main purpose of development is to spread freedom and its 'thousand charms' to the unfree citizens. Freedom, Sen persuasively argues, is at once the ultimate goal of social and economic arrangements and the most efficient means of realizing general welfare. Social institutions like markets, political parties, legislatures, the judiciary, and the media contribute to development by enhancing individual freedom and are in turn sustained by social values. Values, institutions, development, and freedom are all closely interrelated, and Sen links them together in an elegant analytical framework. By asking 'What is the relation between our collective economic wealth and our individual ability to live as we would like?' and by incorporating individual freedom as a social commitment into his analysis Sen allows economics once again, as it did in the time of Adam Smith, to address the social basis of individual well-being and freedom.
959 citations