Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy:
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Cites background from "Returning Practice to the Linguisti..."
...…by contrast, emphasizes tacit learning, a cog- 136+ Mérand 2008, 134+ 137+ Cross 2007+ On the contingency of the diplomatic practice, see also Neumann 2002a, 2005, and 2007+ 138+ Checkel 2005+ nitive mechanism that accounts for the transmission of practices without explicit teaching or…...
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...…See March and Olsen 1998; and Risse 2000+ 3+ Checkel 2005+ 4+ Watson 1991, 52+ See also Kissinger 1994+ 5+ See Nicolson 1963, 43; and Satow 1979, 3+ 6+ See Neumann 2002a, 2005, and 2007+ 7+ Schatzki, Knorr Cetina, and von Savigny 2001+ stratum+”8 Against the representational bias that…...
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...We can know more than we can tell+1 Most theories of social action focus on what agents think about at the expense of what they think from+ In International Relations ~IR!, rational choice theorists primarily emphasize representations and reflexive knowledge in explaining political action+ In the rationalist equation ~desire belief action!, ideas factor in an individual calculation informed by intentionality+ Agents deliberately reflect on what are the most efficient means to achieve their ends+ For their part, several constructivists theorize that norms and collective identities reflexively inform action+ Intersubjective representations of reality, morality, or individuality determine socially embedded cognition and action+ In a related fashion, Habermasian constructivists concentrate on collective deliberation and truth-seeking as a form For helpful comments on earlier versions of this article, many thanks to Emanuel Adler, Janice Bially Mattern, Raymond Duvall, Stefano Guzzini, Jef Huysmans, Markus Kornprobst, Jennifer Mitzen, Iver Neumann, Daniel Nexon, David Welch,Alexander Wendt, and Michael Williams, as well as the journal’s reviewers+ 1+ Polanyi 1983, 4+ International Organization 62, Spring 2008, pp+ 257–88 © 2008 by The IO Foundation+ doi: 10+10170S0020818308080090 of communicative action+ Overall, the three logics of social action that have the most currency in contemporary IR theory—the logics of consequences, of appropriateness, and of arguing2—all suffer from a similar bias toward representational knowledge+ Conscious representations are emphasized to the detriment of background knowledge—the inarticulate know-how from which reflexive and intentional deliberation becomes possible+ In and of itself, this focus on representational knowledge is not necessarily a problem: the logics of consequences, appropriateness, and arguing cover a wide array of social action, as a special issue of IO about socialization in Europe recently demonstrated+3 The problem rests with the many practices that neither rational choice nor rule-based and communicative action theories can explain properly+ Take the case of diplomacy, arguably the most fundamental practice in international politics+ For most IR theorists, diplomacy is primarily about strategic action, instrumental rationality, and cost-benefit calculations+ Yet this scholarly understanding is at odds with that of practitioners, who rather emphasize the very practical and inarticulate nature of diplomacy+ A former diplomat turned professor argues that diplomacy is “not a matter of mathematical calculation; it is not an exact science; it remains a matter of human skills and judgments+”4 In fact, seasoned diplomats are at pains to explain their craft in abstract, social scientific terms: Nicolson contends that “commonsense” is the essence of diplomacy, while Satow defines it as “the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states+”5 Clearly, commonsense, intelligence, and tact cannot be learned in books through formal schemes; nor are they strictly the result of conscious deliberation or reflection+ The diplomatic skills identified by practitioners and which constitute the social fabric of international politics are background dispositions acquired in and through practice+6 This article starts from the premise that most of what people do, in world politics as in any other social field, does not derive from conscious deliberation or thoughtful reflection—instrumental, rule-based, communicative, or otherwise+ Instead, practices are the result of inarticulate, practical knowledge that makes what is to be done appear “self-evident” or commonsensical+ This is the logic of practicality, a fundamental feature of social life that is often overlooked by social scientists+ In so arguing, this article joins a larger trend advocating a “practice turn” in social theory+7 To simplify a bit, practice theorists seek “to do justice to the practical nature of action by rooting human activity in a nonrepresentational 2+ See March and Olsen 1998; and Risse 2000+ 3+ Checkel 2005+ 4+ Watson 1991, 52+ See also Kissinger 1994+ 5+ See Nicolson 1963, 43; and Satow 1979, 3+ 6+ See Neumann 2002a, 2005, and 2007+ 7+ Schatzki, Knorr Cetina, and von Savigny 2001+ stratum+”8 Against the representational bias that pervades most theories of social action, practice theory brings background knowledge to the foreground of analysis+ In IR, a few pioneering scholars are already part of this theoretical fray+ Neumann entices students of world politics to move away from the “armchair analysis” of discourse to study social action as enacted in and on the world+9 Hopf suggests that social identities ~and foreign policies! thrive on a “logic of habit” that generates unreflexive action+10 Adler uses the concept of “community of practice” to theorize the background knowledge that cements constellations of agents across borders+11 Williams takes inspiration from Bourdieu to reconceptualize security practices as cultural strategies in the international field+12 Mitzen emphasizes routine and unthinking action in the international drive for ontological security+13 Building on these works, I pursue two main objectives in this article+ First, I seek to bolster the practice turn in IR theory by offering an in-depth discussion of the logic of practicality+14 Second, I demonstrate the analytical pregnancy of the logic of practicality with a crucial case in world politics: international peace+ The argumentation unfolds as follows+ The first part levels a theoretical critique at the dominant strands of social and IR theory+ I argue that both rationalism and constructivism suffer from a representational bias whose epistemological roots run deep into Modernity+ The second section takes inspiration from other human and social sciences that have already taken the practice turn+ Insights from philosophy, psychology, and sociology not only reinforce the call for a practice turn in IR theory but also provide important clues as to how to conceptualize the logic of practicality in world politics+ In the third part of the article, I define practical knowledge and distinguish it from representational knowledge+ Using Bourdieu’s conceptual apparatus, I assert the ontological priority of the logic of practicality in relation to the mutually constitutive dynamics between agency and structure+ Overall, the relationship between practicality, consequences, appropriateness, and arguing is one of complementarity+ The fourth section seeks to illustrate this point with the case of security communities+ I argue that peace exists in and through practice when security officials’ practical sense makes diplomacy the self-evident way to solving interstate disputes+ Finally, the conclusion addresses the peculiar methodological challenges raised by the logic of practicality in world politics+ 8+ Schatzki 2005, 177+ 9+ Neumann 2002a+ 10+ Hopf 2002+ 11+ Adler 2005+ See also Wenger 1998+ 12+ Williams 2007+ 13+ Mitzen 2006+ 14+ Though inspired by Bourdieu’s “logic of practice,” the notion of practicality is meant to theorize a more specific dimension of social action, namely, nonrepresentational practices+ To Bourdieu, the “logic of practice” covers both representational and nonrepresentational action+ See Bourdieu 1990+...
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...…the importance of “topoi” or the “seat of argu- 41+ See below for an illustration with the diplomatic practice+ 42+ Hopf 2002, 11, fn+ 44+ 43+ Neumann 2002a+ 44+ See, for example, Ashley 1987+ 45+ Fierke 1998+ 46+ Hansen 2006+ ment+”47 These commonplaces are tacit in nature: one…...
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...…place” and of the others’ place+96 As Bourdieu explains: “What is ‘learned by body’ is not something that one has, like knowledge that can be brandished, but something that one is+”97 In this sense, 88+ Neumann 2002b, 23+ 89+ Bourdieu 1990, 56+ 90+ Bourdieu 2003, 231+ 91+ Bourdieu 2001, 285+ 92+…...
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Cites background from "Returning Practice to the Linguisti..."
...The practice turn also has reminded constructivist IR scholars that intersubjective reality is not just spoken into existence, but is acted into existence, too (Neumann, 2002)....
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