Review Paper Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal-Principal Perspective
01 Jan 2008-
TL;DR: A review and synthesis of recent research from strategy, finance, and economics on principal-principal conflicts with an emphasis on their institutional antecedents and organizational consequences is presented in this article.
Abstract: Instead of traditional principal-agent conflicts espoused in most research dealing with developed economies, principal-principal conflicts have been identified as a major concern of corporate governance in emerging economies. Principal-principal conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders result from concentrated ownership, extensive family ownership and control, business group structures, and weak legal protection of minority shareholders. Such principal-principal conflicts alter the dynamics of the corporate governance process and, in turn, require remedies different from those that deal with principal-agent conflicts. This article reviews and synthesizes recent research from strategy, finance, and economics on principal-principal conflicts with an emphasis on their institutional antecedents and organizational consequences. The resulting integration provides a foundation upon which future research can continue to build.
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2,927 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that an institution-based view of international business strategy has emerged and is positioned as one leg that helps sustain the "strategy tripod" (the other two legs consisting of the industry- and resource-based views).
Abstract: Leveraging the recent research interest in emerging economies, this Perspective paper argues that an institution-based view of international business (IB) strategy has emerged. It is positioned as one leg that helps sustain the “strategy tripod” (the other two legs consisting of the industry- and resource-based views). We then review four diverse areas of substantive research: (1) antidumping as entry barriers; (2) competing in and out of India; (3) growing the firm in China; and (4) governing the corporation in emerging economies. Overall, we argue that an institution-based view of IB strategy, in combination with industry- and resource-based views, will not only help sustain a strategy tripod, but also shed significant light on the most fundamental questions confronting IB, such as “What drives firm strategy and performance in IB?”
2,675 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the impact of market-supporting institutions on business strategies by analyzing the entry strategies of foreign investors entering emerging economies and show how resource-seeking strategies are pursued using different entry modes in different institutional contexts.
Abstract: We investigate the impact of market-supporting institutions on business strategies by analyzing the entry strategies of foreign investors entering emerging economies. We apply and advance the institution-based view of strategy by integrating it with resource-based considerations. In particular, we show how resource-seeking strategies are pursued using different entry modes in different institutional contexts. Alternative modes of entry—greenfield, acquisition, and joint venture (JV)—allow firms to overcome different kinds of market inefficiencies related to both characteristics of the resources and to the institutional context. In a weaker institutional framework, JVs are used to access many resources, but in a stronger institutional framework, JVs become less important while acquisitions can play a more important role in accessing resources that are intangible and organizationally embedded. Combining survey and archival data from four emerging economies, India, Vietnam, South Africa, and Egypt, we provide empirical support for our hypotheses.
1,626 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify the emergence of the institution-based view as a third leading perspective in strategic management (the first two being the industry-based and resource-based views).
Abstract: This article identifies the emergence of the institution-based view as a third leading perspective in strategic management (the first two being the industry-based and resource-based views). We (a) review the roots of the institution-based view, (b) articulate its two core propositions, and (c) outline how this view contributes to the four fundamental questions in strategy. Overall, we suggest that the institution-based view represents the third leg of a strategy tripod, overcomes the long-standing criticisms of the industry-based and resource-based views' lack of attention to contexts, and contributes significant new insights as part of the broader intellectual movement centered on new institutionalism.
1,268 citations
01 Jan 1892
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore a hypothesis, based on acIcumulating evidence, regarding the character of inventions likely to issue from the research laboratories of the large industrial corporations.
Abstract: r 9HE purpose of this paper is to explore a hypothesis, based on acIcumulating evidence, regarding the character of inventions likely to issue from the research laboratories of the large industrial corporations. Simply put, this hypothesis may be stated as follows: with few exceptions, the large industrial laboratories are likely to be minor sources of major (radically new and commercially or militarily important) inventions; rather they are likely to be major sources of essentially "improvement" inventions. Put more precisely, the hypothesis states that the proportion of all minor inventions originating in the large industrial laboratories is likely to exceed the proportion of all major inventions originating in these laboratories. Note that the stress on the relative importance of these laboratories as sources of improvement inventions is not necessarily a denigration of the economic importance of this contribution. The cumulative effect of these improvement inventions may be, and often has been, of substantial importance over long periods of time for advancing technology, investment opportunities, and economic growth. The stress on improvement inventions as the principal product of the research laboratories of the large industrial corporations is meant simply to emphasize that, whatever the importance of their contributions, most of the latter is not likely to involve radically new inventive activity. I cannot claim originality for this hypothesis. After it suggested itself in the course of my investigations, I discovered that others, some of them in the most unlikely positions,2 had earlier said much the same thing. But, apart from occasional remarks, I can find no discussions attempting to explain or justify it. And because, if reasonably accurate, it has numerous ramifications, I have felt the need to set down an extended analysis of 1 I wish to thank members of the Seminar on Law and Technology, sponsored by the University of Wisconsin Law School under the auspices of the Ford Foundation, for their many helpful comments on this paper. Especially do I wish to thank Professors Jacob Schmookler, Robert Merrill, John Stedman, Harrison White, and John Heath. 2 See particularly the statement quoted below (p. 114) of D)r. Frank Jewett, former president of Bell Laboratories.
689 citations
References
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
49,666 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1990TL;DR: Douglass C. North as discussed by the authors developed an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and over time.
Abstract: Continuing his groundbreaking analysis of economic structures, Douglass North develops an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and over time. Institutions exist, he argues, due to the uncertainties involved in human interaction; they are the constraints devised to structure that interaction. Yet, institutions vary widely in their consequences for economic performance; some economies develop institutions that produce growth and development, while others develop institutions that produce stagnation. North first explores the nature of institutions and explains the role of transaction and production costs in their development. The second part of the book deals with institutional change. Institutions create the incentive structure in an economy, and organisations will be created to take advantage of the opportunities provided within a given institutional framework. North argues that the kinds of skills and knowledge fostered by the structure of an economy will shape the direction of change and gradually alter the institutional framework. He then explains how institutional development may lead to a path-dependent pattern of development. In the final part of the book, North explains the implications of this analysis for economic theory and economic history. He indicates how institutional analysis must be incorporated into neo-classical theory and explores the potential for the construction of a dynamic theory of long-term economic change. Douglass C. North is Director of the Center of Political Economy and Professor of Economics and History at Washington University in St. Louis. He is a past president of the Economic History Association and Western Economics Association and a Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has written over sixty articles for a variety of journals and is the author of The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (CUP, 1973, with R.P. Thomas) and Structure and Change in Economic History (Norton, 1981). Professor North is included in Great Economists Since Keynes edited by M. Blaug (CUP, 1988 paperback ed.)
27,080 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the role that institutions, defined as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, play in economic performance and how those institutions change and how a model of dynamic institutions explains the differential performance of economies through time.
Abstract: Examines the role that institutions, defined as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, play in economic performance and how those institutions change and how a model of dynamic institutions explains the differential performance of economies through time. Institutions are separate from organizations, which are assemblages of people directed to strategically operating within institutional constraints. Institutions affect the economy by influencing, together with technology, transaction and production costs. They do this by reducing uncertainty in human interaction, albeit not always efficiently. Entrepreneurs accomplish incremental changes in institutions by perceiving opportunities to do better through altering the institutional framework of political and economic organizations. Importantly, the ability to perceive these opportunities depends on both the completeness of information and the mental constructs used to process that information. Thus, institutions and entrepreneurs stand in a symbiotic relationship where each gives feedback to the other. Neoclassical economics suggests that inefficient institutions ought to be rapidly replaced. This symbiotic relationship helps explain why this theoretical consequence is often not observed: while this relationship allows growth, it also allows inefficient institutions to persist. The author identifies changes in relative prices and prevailing ideas as the source of institutional alterations. Transaction costs, however, may keep relative price changes from being fully exploited. Transaction costs are influenced by institutions and institutional development is accordingly path-dependent. (CAR)
26,011 citations
TL;DR: The Economic Institutions of Capitalism as mentioned in this paper is a seminal work in the field of economic institutions of capitalism. Journal of Economic Issues: Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 528-530.
Abstract: (1987). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Journal of Economic Issues: Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 528-530.
16,767 citations
Posted Content•
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TL;DR: This paper examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries and found that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors.
Abstract: This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors, with German and Scandinavian civil law countries located in the middle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negatively related to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified shareholders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights.
14,563 citations