Abstract: Reduced Behavioral Flexibility in Autism Spectrum Disorders Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are characterized by pervasive disturbances in social interactions and communication, and by circumscribed interests and restricted and repetitive behaviors (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; 4th ed., text rev; DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Understanding of the latter symptom domain remains limited, despite it contributing significantly to clinical distress and behavioral problems (Bishop, Richler, Cain, & Lord, 2007; South, Ozonoff, & McMahon, 2005). Clarifying the cognitive bases of behavioral rigidity in ASD has the potential to provide clues as to its pathophysiology, improve its clinical assessment, and guide development of new treatments that can alleviate this core feature of ASD.
One possibility is that a specific impairment in the ability to transition away from preferred behaviors to new, more adaptive ones contributes to the occurrence of restrictive and repetitive behaviors. Some prior studies suggest that these behaviors are related to broad deficits in executive function and cognitive control in ASD (Lopez, Lincoln, Ozonoff, & Lai, 2005; Mosconi et al., 2009). However, results are inconsistent, and the specific cognitive impairments that may contribute to clinical manifestations of rigid behavior remain to be clarified. Studies have documented deficits in cognitive flexibility in ASD using the Wisconsin Card Sort Test and the CANTAB ID/ED set shifting task, showing that individuals with autism are impaired when learning to shift set to a new perceptual sorting category (Corbett, Constantine, Hendren, Rocke, & Ozonoff, 2009; Goldstein, Johnson, & Minshew, 2001; Hughes, Russell, & Robbins, 1994). It is of note that these tests place demands not only on behavioral flexibility but also on multiple higher-order cognitive processes that are known to be impaired in ASD, such as perceptual reasoning skills. Thus, it remains uncertain as to what degree previous findings reflect deficits in flexible behavioral control versus impaired cognition in other domains. Further, prior studies have not parsed apart different aspects of behavioral flexibility that are known to be supported by different cognitive and brain systems. For example, a behavioral flexibility deficit could result from the inability to initially inhibit a previously preferred choice pattern, or a deficit in maintaining a new choice pattern over time, which would point to impairments in frontal cortical and striatal functioning respectively (Dias, Robbins, & Roberts, 1996; Ragozzino, 2007; Robbins, 2007).
Reversal learning tasks provide a direct approach to examining flexible choice behavior. This methodology is widely used across species, and thus is useful for testing mechanistic biological models, and for translational studies that can facilitate drug development (Brown, Amodeo, Sweeney, & Ragozzino, 2012; Ghahremani, Monterosso, Jentsch, Bilder, & Poldrack, 2010; Glascher, Hampton, & O’Doherty, 2009; Ragozzino, Mohler, Prior, Palencia, & Rozman, 2009). In contrast to extradimensional shifting which is more dependent on prefrontal cortical functions, reversal learning is primarily dependent upon striatal circuitry (Robbins, 2007). Reversal learning tasks assess simple intradimensional shifts in behavior, e.g. shifting from choosing one spatial location to another, rather than shifting across dimensions, such as from the color to the shape of stimuli. This is accomplished by requiring subjects to acquire a behavioral response strategy using performance feedback, and then to reverse that response to an alternative option when the previously correct choice is no longer reinforced. Importantly, reversal learning tasks are designed to distinguish between deficits in disengaging from preferred behaviors versus maintaining new choice patterns.
Few studies have examined reversal learning in ASD. Most have used small samples of young children who showed alterations in the ability to learn an initial response pattern in addition to reversal deficits (Coldren & Halloran, 2003; Lionello-Denolf, McIlvane, Canovas, de Souza, & Barros, 2008). If initial acquisition of a response is impaired, that can confound the interpretation of problems in switching to a new response, because this could result from a generalized learning deficit rather than a specific impairment in response shifting. Reports from larger and primarily adolescent samples using intradimensional subtests of the CANTAB ID/ED task do not show deficits in reversal learning in ASD (Edgin & Pennington, 2005; Goldberg et al., 2005; Ozonoff et al., 2004; Ozonoff, South, & Miller, 2000). However, a number of important issues remain to be resolved. First, reversal learning studies to date have not clarified whether there are deficits in the specific processes of selecting or maintaining new responses; whether one or the other is selectively affected could indicate alterations in distinct cognitive and brain systems. Second, studies have not systematically examined whether reversal learning performance is related to clinical manifestations of behavioral rigidity. Third, because delayed maturation of behavioral flexibility in ASD may result in deficits that are more pronounced at younger ages, studies with older adolescents and young adults may have missed deficits evident in younger individuals.
Finally, critical to a comprehensive understanding of behavioral flexibility in ASD is an understanding of how dynamically changing consequences for choice behaviors support or disturb flexible behavioral control. Probabilistic reversal learning paradigms, in which accurate feedback or reinforcement for response choices is provided on only a proportion of trials, allow for an examination of the effect of inconsistent reinforcement on behavioral flexibility. The intermittent non-reinforcement used in probabilistic tasks increases the difficulty associated with establishing, maintaining, and reversing a behavioral set. For this reason, such tasks may be more sensitive to behavioral flexibility deficits, as misleading feedback might slow learning of new responses after reversal, or increase the likelihood of reverting back to a previously reinforced and preferred response choice. A psychometric advantage is that probabilistic paradigms may be less susceptible to ceiling effects in test performance that could contribute to the failure to identify deficits in prior studies in ASD, in which all correct responses were accurately reinforced. The unpredictable and inconsistent nature of reinforcement for choice behaviors used in probabilistic tasks also corresponds more closely to the behavioral flexibility demands of typical day-to-day life.
In the present study, individuals with ASD and matched controls performed a probabilistic reversal learning task. Performance at acquisition and at reversal was examined. The primary measures of interest were the number of trials required to learn a behavioral response and to shift to a new response when reinforcement contingencies changed, the number of errors made after reversal when sustaining a new response over a previously preferred choice, and the number of errors made following intermittent non-reinforcement. We evaluated test performance in relation to independently ascertained clinical measures of restricted and repetitive behaviors, and other clinical features of ASD. Given reports of altered cognitive development across the lifespan in ASD (Luna, Doll, Hegedus, Minshew, & Sweeney, 2007; Solomon, Ozonoff, Cummings, & Carter, 2008), in secondary analyses we examined performance across a broad age range to identify preliminary indications of an altered trajectory in the development of behavioral flexibility.