Right hemispheric self-awareness: a critical assessment.

TL;DR: This commentary evaluates the claim made by Keenan et al. that since self-recognition results from right hemispheric activity, self-awareness too is likely to be produced by the activity of the same hemisphere and presents two views that challenge this rationale.

About: This article is published in Consciousness and Cognition.The article was published on 2002-09-01 and is currently open access. It has received 40 citations till now.

Summary

Summary

• This reasoning is based on the assumption that self-recognition represents a valid operationalization of self-awareness; I present two views that challenge this rationale.
• The team of researchers first presented a series of pictures to a group of patients undergoing an intracarotid amobarbital (WADA) test.
• S1053-8100(02)00009-0 patient s own face, and participants were asked to remember what picture was shown during selective anaesthesia of the right and the left hemispheres, also known as PII.
• In a second study normal participants exhibited significantly greater right hemispheric activity (as measured by evoked potentials induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation) while presented with pictures containing elements of their own face, as opposed to images of a famous person.
• Self-recognition has been repeatedly used to determine the presence or absence of self-awareness in primates (see Gallup, 1968, 1985, 1998) and young children (see Amsterdam, 1972).
• They both believe that self-recognition is actually associated with an unsophisticated self-concept and does not require introspection.
• The only awareness the organism would have of itself before self-recognition is a kinesthetic sense of its body—not a ‘‘full-blown,’’ mature awareness of its subjective experience.

Frequently asked questions

Q1. What contributions have the authors mentioned in the paper "Pii: s1053-8100(02)00009-0" ?

In this commentary I evaluate the claim made by Keenan, Nelson, O Connor, and Pascual-Leone ( 2001 ) that since self-recognition results from right hemispheric activity, self-awareness too is likely to be produced by the activity of the same hemisphere. In a second study normal participants exhibited significantly greater right hemispheric activity ( as measured by evoked potentials induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation ) while presented with pictures containing elements of their own face, as opposed to images of a famous person. The fact that the right hemisphere seems to be involved in self-recognition is both intriguing and informative ; but then the authors go on to suggest that ‘ ‘ neural substrates of the right hemisphere may selectively participate in processes linked to self-awareness ’ ’ ( Keenan et al., 2001, p. 305 ) —a problematic claim I wish to closely examine here. It is very difficult to determine the exact meaning of ‘ ‘ self-awareness ’ ’ in the Keenan et al. ( 2001 ) article since the authors do not explicitly define this notion. Finally, recent research suggests that inner speech ( which is associated with left hemispheric activity ) is linked to self-awareness—an observation that further casts doubt on the existence of a right hemispheric self-awareness. In a widely publicized communication published in Nature, Keenan et al. ( 2001 ) report data suggesting that self-recognition would be the result of right hemispheric activity. The basic hypothesis states that to recognize oneself one must first know who one is—one must possess a ‘ ‘ self-concept, ’ ’ which presupposes selfobservation ; furthermore, exhibiting self-directed behaviors in front of a mirror would indicate that one is capable of becoming the object of one s attention, which is the very definition of self-awareness ( Duval & Wicklund, 1972 ; Mead, 1934 ). More precisely, Gallup ( e. g., 1983 ) maintains that some primates are selfaware not only because they show self-recognition, but also because they emit behaviors in their natural environment ( deception, altruism, empathy, etc. ) that strongly suggest an ability to ponder potential intentions and emotions in others— behaviors that presuppose an access to their own mental states.