Risk as feelings.
01 Mar 2001-Psychological Bulletin (American Psychological Association)-Vol. 127, Iss: 2, pp 267-286
TL;DR: This article proposed the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, which highlights the role of affect experienced at the moment of decision making, and showed that emotional reactions to risky situations often diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks.
Abstract: Virtually all current theories of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. They assume that people assess the desirability and likelihood of possible outcomes of choice alternatives and integrate this information through some type of expectation-based calculus to arrive at a decision. The authors propose an alternative theoretical perspective, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, that highlights the role of affect experienced at the moment of decision making. Drawing on research from clinical, physiological, and other subfields of psychology, they show that emotional reactions to risky situations often diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks. When such divergence occurs, emotional reactions often drive behavior. The risk-as-feelings hypothesis is shown to explain a wide range of phenomena that have resisted interpretation in cognitive-consequentialist terms.
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TL;DR: The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached.
Abstract: Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology.
6,080 citations
TL;DR: This paper reviewed the literature on gender differences in economic experiments and identified robust differences in risk preferences, social (other-regarding) preferences, and competitive preferences, speculating on the source of these differences and their implications.
Abstract: This paper reviews the literature on gender differences in economic experiments. In the three main sections, we identify robust differences in risk preferences, social (other-regarding) preferences, and competitive preferences. We also speculate on the source of these differences, as well as on their implications. Our hope is that this article will serve as a resource for those seeking to understand gender differences and to use as a starting point to illuminate the debate on gender-specific outcomes in the labor and goods markets.
4,864 citations
TL;DR: Determinants and consequences of accessibility help explain the central results of prospect theory, framing effects, the heuristic process of attribute substitution, and the characteristic biases that result from the substitution of nonextensional for extensional attributes.
Abstract: Early studies of intuitive judgment and decision making conducted with the late Amos Tversky are reviewed in the context of two related concepts: an analysis of accessibility, the ease with which thoughts come to mind; a distinction between effortless intuition and deliberate reasoning. Intuitive thoughts, like percepts, are highly accessible. Determinants and consequences of accessibility help explain the central results of prospect theory, framing effects, the heuristic process of attribute substitution, and the characteristic biases that result from the substitution of nonextensional for extensional attributes. Variations in the accessibility of rules explain the occasional corrections of intuitive judgments. The study of biases is compatible with a view of intuitive thinking and decision making as generally skilled and successful.
4,802 citations
TL;DR: Kahneman as mentioned in this paper made a statement based on worked out together with Shane Federik the quirkiness of human judgment, which was later used in his speech at the Nobel Prize in economics.
Abstract: Daniel Kahneman received the Nobel Prize in economics sciences in 2002, December 8, Stockholm, Sweden. This article is the edited version of his Nobel Prize lecture. The author comes back to the problems he has studied with the late Amos Tversky and to debates conducting for several decades already. The statement is based on worked out together with Shane Federik the quirkiness of human judgment. Language: ru
4,462 citations
Book•
01 Jul 2002TL;DR: In this article, a review is presented of the book "Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman".
Abstract: A review is presented of the book “Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,” edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman.
3,642 citations
References
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision making under risk, and develop an alternative model, called prospect theory, in which value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets and in which probabilities are replaced by decision weights.
Abstract: This paper presents a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision making under risk, and develops an alternative model, called prospect theory. Choices among risky prospects exhibit several pervasive effects that are inconsistent with the basic tenets of utility theory. In particular, people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty. This tendency, called the certainty effect, contributes to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains and to risk seeking in choices involving sure losses. In addition, people generally discard components that are shared by all prospects under consideration. This tendency, called the isolation effect, leads to inconsistent preferences when the same choice is presented in different forms. An alternative theory of choice is developed, in which value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets and in which probabilities are replaced by decision weights. The value function is normally concave for gains, commonly convex for losses, and is generally steeper for losses than for gains. Decision weights are generally lower than the corresponding probabilities, except in the range of low prob- abilities. Overweighting of low probabilities may contribute to the attractiveness of both insurance and gambling. EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY has dominated the analysis of decision making under risk. It has been generally accepted as a normative model of rational choice (24), and widely applied as a descriptive model of economic behavior, e.g. (15, 4). Thus, it is assumed that all reasonable people would wish to obey the axioms of the theory (47, 36), and that most people actually do, most of the time. The present paper describes several classes of choice problems in which preferences systematically violate the axioms of expected utility theory. In the light of these observations we argue that utility theory, as it is commonly interpreted and applied, is not an adequate descriptive model and we propose an alternative account of choice under risk. 2. CRITIQUE
35,067 citations
27,773 citations
Book•
17 Mar 1980
TL;DR: In this paper, the author explains "theory and reasoned action" model and then applies the model to various cases in attitude courses, such as self-defense and self-care.
Abstract: Core text in attitude courses. Explains "theory and reasoned action" model and then applies the model to various cases.
26,683 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1935
TL;DR: In this paper, Neuberg and Heine discuss the notion of belonging, acceptance, belonging, and belonging in the social world, and discuss the relationship between friendship, membership, status, power, and subordination.
Abstract: VOLUME 2. Part III: The Social World. 21. EVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Steven L. Neuberg, Douglas T. Kenrick, and Mark Schaller). 22. MORALITY (Jonathan Haidt and Selin Kesebir). 23. AGGRESSION (Brad J. Bushman and L. Rowell Huesmann). 24. AFFILIATION, ACCEPTANCE, AND BELONGING: THE PURSUIT OF INTERPERSONAL CONNECTION (Mark R. Leary). 25. CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS (Margaret S. Clark and Edward P. Lemay, Jr.). 26. INTERPERSONAL STRATIFICATION: STATUS, POWER, AND SUBORDINATION (Susan T. Fiske). 27. SOCIAL CONFLICT: THE EMERGENCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF STRUGGLE AND NEGOTIATION (Carsten K. W. De Dreu). 28. INTERGROUP RELATIONS 1(Vincent Yzerbyt and Stephanie Demoulin). 29. INTERGROUP BIAS (John F. Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaertner). 30. SOCIAL JUSTICE: HISTORY, THEORY, AND RESEARCH (John T. Jost and Aaron C. Kay). 31. INFLUENCE AND LEADERSHIP (Michael A. Hogg). 32. GROUP BEHAVIOR AND PERFORMANCE (J. Richard Hackman and Nancy Katz). 33. ORGANIZATIONAL PREFERENCES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES (Deborah H. Gruenfeld and Larissa Z. Tiedens). 34. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR (Jon A. Krosnick, Penny S. Visser, and Joshua Harder). 35. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW (Margaret Bull Kovera and Eugene Borgida). 36. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND LANGUAGE: WORDS, UTTERANCES, AND CONVERSATIONS (Thomas Holtgraves). 37. CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY (Steven J. Heine). AUTHOR INDEX. SUBJECT INDEX.
13,453 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1994
TL;DR: The authors argued that rational decisions are not the product of logic alone - they require the support of emotion and feeling, drawing on his experience with neurological patients affected with brain damage, Dr Damasio showed how absence of emotions and feelings can break down rationality.
Abstract: Descartes' Error offers the scientific basis for ending the division between mind and body. Antonio Damasio contends that rational decisions are not the product of logic alone - they require the support of emotion and feeling. Drawing on his experience with neurological patients affected with brain damage, Dr Damasio shows how absence of emotions and feelings can break down rationality. He also offers a new perspective on what emotions and feelings actually are: a direct view of our own body states; a link between the body and its survival-oriented regulation on the one hand, and consciousness on the other. Written as a conversation between the author and an imaginary listener, Descartes' Error leads us to conclude that human organisms are endowed from their very beginning with a spirited passion for making choices, which the social mind can then use to build rational behaviour.
9,648 citations