Role of rules in behavior: Toward an operational definition of what (rule) is learned.
About: This article is published in Psychological Review.The article was published on 1970-11-01. It has received 74 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Experiential learning & Verbal learning.
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01 Jan 1964
TL;DR: In this paper, the notion of a collective unconscious was introduced as a theory of remembering in social psychology, and a study of remembering as a study in Social Psychology was carried out.
Abstract: Part I. Experimental Studies: 2. Experiment in psychology 3. Experiments on perceiving III Experiments on imaging 4-8. Experiments on remembering: (a) The method of description (b) The method of repeated reproduction (c) The method of picture writing (d) The method of serial reproduction (e) The method of serial reproduction picture material 9. Perceiving, recognizing, remembering 10. A theory of remembering 11. Images and their functions 12. Meaning Part II. Remembering as a Study in Social Psychology: 13. Social psychology 14. Social psychology and the matter of recall 15. Social psychology and the manner of recall 16. Conventionalism 17. The notion of a collective unconscious 18. The basis of social recall 19. A summary and some conclusions.
5,690 citations
TL;DR: The authors examines current thinking about learning within the framework of cognitive psychology and how a new, cognitive conception of learning can guide future research on both learning and instruction, along with issues such as the active (rather than passive) nature of learning, the concern for understanding (i.e., comprehension), the role of prior knowledge, the cumulative nature of most forms of human learning, and the role played by cognitive analyses of performance.
Abstract: Although cognitive psychology currently represents the mainstream of psychological and educational thinking, it is only recently that much concern has been shown for learning as such — that is, concern for the factors and/or variables that influence changes in human performance, knowledge structures, and/or conceptions. This article examines current thinking about learning within the framework of cognitive psychology and how a new, cognitive conception of learning can guide future research on both learning and instruction. Similarities and, differences between behavioral and cognitive conceptions of learning are discussed, along with issues such as the active (rather than passive) nature of learning, the concern for understanding (i.e., comprehension), the role of prior knowledge, the cumulative nature of most forms of human learning, and the role played by cognitive analyses of performance. Several cognitive theories of learning are presented as examples of how cognitive psychology has influenced researc...
1,120 citations
Cites background from "Role of rules in behavior: Toward a..."
...For example, both Scandura (1970, 1977) and Siegler (1983) have suggested that rules are useful units for characterizing what people learn....
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...Likewise, within the context of cognitive development, Siegler (1983) and Siegler and Klahr (1982), among others, have emphasized the importance of prior knowledge (especially the rules used to perform various tasks) in determining when children are ready to learn new material....
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TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown that there is no compelling support for Piaget's hypothesis that cognitive stages do more than describe age-related changes in behavior, and they cannot be regarded as unique to the given stages for which they are posited.
Abstract: The term “stage” appears to be used in three general senses in theories of behavioral development: (a) as a metaphor: (b) as a description of behaviors that undergo age change; (c) as an explanation of age-related changes in behavior. Although most existing stage models are purely descriptive, a few of them purport to have explanatory power. One such model, Piaget's stages of cognitive development, is considered in this paper.To be viewed as potentially explanatory, a stage model must describe some behaviors that undergo age change, posit antecedent variables believed to cause the changes, and provide procedures whereby the behavioral changes and the antecedent variables can be independently measured. Piaget's stages seem to satisfy some but not all of these requirements. Piaget's stages describe many agerelated changes in behavior, and some antecedent variables have been proposed. However, procedures do not exist for measuring the two factors independently. In lieu of such procedures, Piaget has outlined a “program” of five empirical criteria whereby the reality of his stages can ostensibly be verified. Some objections to these criteria are considered.The five criteria in Piaget's program are invariant sequence, cognitive structure, integration, consolidation, and equilibration. Three of the criteria (invariant sequence, integration, and consolidation) lead to the same sorts of empirical predictions (culturally universal sequences in the acquisition of certain behaviors). Such predictions are subject to the objection that Piagetian invariant sequences are often measurement sequences. A measurement sequence is said to occur when some late-appearing behavior consists of some earlier-appearing behavior plus additional things. The cognitive structure criterion is subject to at least three criticisms: First, it yields, at most, descriptions of behavior; second, these are often nothing more than descriptions of task structure; third, they cannot be regarded as unique to the given stages for which they are posited. The fifth criterion, equilibration, generates some predictions that might be considered as prima facie evidence for the existence of stages. However, these predictions conflict with the current data base on Piaget's stages.It is concluded that there is no compelling support for Piaget's hypothesis that his cognitive stages do more than describe age-related changes in behavior. Since explanatory statements involving stages appear with some regularity in Piagetian and neo-Piagetian writings, there are grounds for supposing this conclusion to be nontrivial.
476 citations
TL;DR: The distinction between contingency-shaped behavior and rule-governed behavior has been made by as discussed by the authors, who define a set of rules that are derived from the contingencies, which specify discriminative stimuli, responses, and consequences.
Abstract: Behavior that solves a problem is distinguished by the fact that it changes another part of the solver's behavior and is strengthened when it does so. Problem solving typically involves the construction of discriminative stimuli. Verbal responses produce especially useful stimuli, because they affect other people. As a culture formulates maxims, laws, grammar, and science, its members behave more effectively without direct or prolonged contact with the contingencies thus formulated. The culture solves problems for its members, and does so by transmitting the verbal discriminative stimuli called rules. Induction, deduction, and the construction of models are ways of producing rules. Behavior that solves a problem may result from direct shaping by contingencies or from rules constructed either by the problem solver or by others. Because different controlling variables are involved, contingency-shaped behavior is never exactly like rule-governed behavior. The distinction must take account of (1) a system which establishes certain contingencies of reinforcement, such as some part of the natural environment, a piece of equipment, or a verbal community; (2) the behavior shaped and maintained by these contingencies; (3) rules, derived from the contingencies, which specify discriminative stimuli, responses, and consequences, and (4) the behavior occasioned by the rules.
408 citations
Cites background from "Role of rules in behavior: Toward a..."
...…rarely (if ever) gets around to explaining why humans routinely learn simultaneously to perform entire classes of totally different responses (e.g. Scandura 1970; see Scandura 1976 for a series of early papers on the relative merits of using associations versus rules as the basic unit of…...
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...Skinner's distinction between first- and second-order rules is also more than just a bit reminiscent of my own distinction between higher- and lower-order rules (e.g. Roughead & Scandura 1968; Scandura 1970; 1971; 1973, pp. 205-13)....
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors suggest that the effects of instruction may be explained by taking into account the processing of various forms of instruction by the learner, the first results of which are the acquisition of particular kinds of new memory structures.
Abstract: Two general categories of learning outcomes-retention and transfer of learning-continue to command the attention of investigators of human learning, as well as of practitioners of instructional design and delivery. Relations between instructional variables and these learning outcomes have been studied over many years. Although some forms of learning theory support the formulation of hypotheses in terms of a two-element paradigm such as Instruction -> Learning Outcome, cognitive theorists have tended to consider such a construction unacceptably simple. Modern learning theories of the "information-processing" variety have given new emphasis and meaning to the latter view (Estes, 1975). These theories support the basic notion that the effects of instruction may best be understood by exploring the three-term relation Instruction -* Memory Structure -* Learning Outcome. In other words, the suggestion is made that the effects of instruction may be explained by taking into account the processing of various forms of instruction by the learner, the first results of which are the acquisition of particular kinds of new memory structures. The latter structures, in turn, are the antecedents that enable the human learner to display retention and transfer in terms of new performances.
183 citations
References
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Journal Article•
TL;DR: The theory of information as discussed by the authors provides a yardstick for calibrating our stimulus materials and for measuring the performance of our subjects and provides a quantitative way of getting at some of these questions.
Abstract: First, the span of absolute judgment and the span of immediate memory impose severe limitations on the amount of information that we are able to receive, process, and remember. By organizing the stimulus input simultaneously into several dimensions and successively into a sequence or chunks, we manage to break (or at least stretch) this informational bottleneck. Second, the process of recoding is a very important one in human psychology and deserves much more explicit attention than it has received. In particular, the kind of linguistic recoding that people do seems to me to be the very lifeblood of the thought processes. Recoding procedures are a constant concern to clinicians, social psychologists, linguists, and anthropologists and yet, probably because recoding is less accessible to experimental manipulation than nonsense syllables or T mazes, the traditional experimental psychologist has contributed little or nothing to their analysis. Nevertheless, experimental techniques can be used, methods of recoding can be specified, behavioral indicants can be found. And I anticipate that we will find a very orderly set of relations describing what now seems an uncharted wilderness of individual differences. Third, the concepts and measures provided by the theory of information provide a quantitative way of getting at some of these questions. The theory provides us with a yardstick for calibrating our stimulus materials and for measuring the performance of our subjects. In the interests of communication I have suppressed the technical details of information measurement and have tried to express the ideas in more familiar terms; I hope this paraphrase will not lead you to think they are not useful in research. Informational concepts have already proved valuable in the study of discrimination and of language; they promise a great deal in the study of learning and memory; and it has even been proposed that they can be useful in the study of concept formation. A lot of questions that seemed fruitless twenty or thirty years ago may now be worth another look. In fact, I feel that my story here must stop just as it begins to get really interesting. And finally, what about the magical number seven? What about the seven wonders of the world, the seven seas, the seven deadly sins, the seven daughters of Atlas in the Pleiades, the seven ages of man, the seven levels of hell, the seven primary colors, the seven notes of the musical scale, and the seven days of the week? What about the seven-point rating scale, the seven categories for absolute judgment, the seven objects in the span of attention, and the seven digits in the span of immediate memory? For the present I propose to withhold judgment. Perhaps there is something deep and profound behind all these sevens, something just calling out for us to discover it. But I suspect that it is only a pernicious, Pythagorean coincidence.
19,835 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1956
TL;DR: The theory provides us with a yardstick for calibrating the authors' stimulus materials and for measuring the performance of their subjects, and the concepts and measures provided by the theory provide a quantitative way of getting at some of these questions.
Abstract: First, the span of absolute judgment and the span of immediate memory impose severe limitations on the amount of information that we are able to receive, process, and remember. By organizing the stimulus input simultaneously into several dimensions and successively into a sequence or chunks, we manage to break (or at least stretch) this informational bottleneck. Second, the process of recoding is a very important one in human psychology and deserves much more explicit attention than it has received. In particular, the kind of linguistic recoding that people do seems to me to be the very lifeblood of the thought processes. Recoding procedures are a constant concern to clinicians, social psychologists, linguists, and anthropologists and yet, probably because recoding is less accessible to experimental manipulation than nonsense syllables or T mazes, the traditional experimental psychologist has contributed little or nothing to their analysis. Nevertheless, experimental techniques can be used, methods of recoding can be specified, behavioral indicants can be found. And I anticipate that we will find a very orderly set of relations describing what now seems an uncharted wilderness of individual differences. Third, the concepts and measures provided by the theory of information provide a quantitative way of getting at some of these questions. The theory provides us with a yardstick for calibrating our stimulus materials and for measuring the performance of our subjects. In the interests of communication I have suppressed the technical details of information measurement and have tried to express the ideas in more familiar terms; I hope this paraphrase will not lead you to think they are not useful in research. Informational concepts have already proved valuable in the study of discrimination and of language; they promise a great deal in the study of learning and memory; and it has even been proposed that they can be useful in the study of concept formation. A lot of questions that seemed fruitless twenty or thirty years ago may now be worth another look. In fact, I feel that my story here must stop just as it begins to get really interesting. And finally, what about the magical number seven? What about the seven wonders of the world, the seven seas, the seven deadly sins, the seven daughters of Atlas in the Pleiades, the seven ages of man, the seven levels of hell, the seven primary colors, the seven notes of the musical scale, and the seven days of the week? What about the seven-point rating scale, the seven categories for absolute judgment, the seven objects in the span of attention, and the seven digits in the span of immediate memory? For the present I propose to withhold judgment. Perhaps there is something deep and profound behind all these sevens, something just calling out for us to discover it. But I suspect that it is only a pernicious, Pythagorean coincidence.
16,902 citations
01 Jan 1964
TL;DR: In this paper, the notion of a collective unconscious was introduced as a theory of remembering in social psychology, and a study of remembering as a study in Social Psychology was carried out.
Abstract: Part I. Experimental Studies: 2. Experiment in psychology 3. Experiments on perceiving III Experiments on imaging 4-8. Experiments on remembering: (a) The method of description (b) The method of repeated reproduction (c) The method of picture writing (d) The method of serial reproduction (e) The method of serial reproduction picture material 9. Perceiving, recognizing, remembering 10. A theory of remembering 11. Images and their functions 12. Meaning Part II. Remembering as a Study in Social Psychology: 13. Social psychology 14. Social psychology and the matter of recall 15. Social psychology and the manner of recall 16. Conventionalism 17. The notion of a collective unconscious 18. The basis of social recall 19. A summary and some conclusions.
5,690 citations
4,478 citations