




Abstract: This paper looks at the compatibility of EU anti-crisis measures with some key elements of the EU legal system. In particular, it focuses on the financial assistance programmes devised to rescue some EU Member States that, due to their unsustainably high public debts, came under severe pressure from the financial markets. In all these cases, recipient States have been invariably required to adopt draconian austerity measures in order to have access to the financial help. This paper argues that some of the conditions attached to the assistance packages raise doubts as to their compatibility with a number of basic social principles and objectives that represent the foundations of the EU social dimension. This is the case with regard to the social objectives enshrined in the Treaties, the allocation of competences between the EU and Member States in the social field and, lastly, some of the social rights contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
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...…Fund, the EU and European Central Bank subject to strict conditionality, also entailing drastic changes in social security, such as cuts in pension payments or lower minimum wages (Balamoti, 2014; Doherty, 2014; Kilpatrick and de Witte, 2014; Costamagna, 2012, Clauwaert and Schömann, 2012)....
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...For reviews on the impact on the social dimension of programme countries see for instance Kilpatrick and de Witte 2014, Doherty 2014, Balamoti 2014, Costamagna, 2012....
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the decision of decoupling the social sphere, leaving the former firmly in Members States’ hands, from the economic one, which was opened to the intervention of the then EEC,40 rested on the assumption that the benefits accruing from an integrated market would have strengthened States’ capacity to carry out its redistributive duties.
38 The main example being the conferral to the Council of the power to adopt legislative measures for the coordination of national social security systems, so to facilitate the free movement of workers.
Secondly and, to some extents, more importantly, it also proposed to grant to the Commission the power to approve the programme, as the Council would only have the possibility to repeal this decision by qualified majority within ten days.
The Commission—together with the ECB and, “wherever possible”, the IMF—is also entrusted with the task of regularly monitoring compliance with the conditions detailed by the MoU, on which it depends the release of subsequent instalments.
44 Indeed, despite the CJEU efforts to find a workable balance between economic and social interests, it was clear that the European integration process could be a destabilizing force in this regard,45 trying to open up systems that rest on a logic closure.
EU institutions and, as far as the implementation of EU law is concerned, national authorities are called upon to fully respect this right, avoiding, as a minimum, the adoption of measures that can make access to basic health care services too burdensome, especially for the most vulnerable parts of the population.
Joerges and Rödl contended that this reference stands in a vacuum, as the EU has not the capacity to intervene in fields—such as taxation and social policy—that are key for the implementation of the model.
In particular, they contended that the measures adopted under the excessive deficit procedure “cannot be prescribed specifically, explicitly and without room for deviation, since that competence is not conferred upon the Council by the Treaties”.