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Science of Science and Reflexivity

01 Jan 2004-
TL;DR: Bourdieu's "Science of Science and Reflexivity" as mentioned in this paper argues that science is in danger of becoming a handmaiden to biotechnology, medicine, genetic engineering, and military research that it risks falling under the control of industrial corporations that seek to exploit it for monopolies and profit.
Abstract: Over the last four decades, the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu produced one of the most imaginative and subtle bodies of social theory of the postwar era. When he died in 2002, he was considered to be a thinker on a par with Foucault, Barthes, and Lacan a public intellectual as influential to his generation as Sartre was to his. "Science of Science and Reflexivity" will be welcomed as a companion volume to Bourdieu's now seminal "An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology." In this posthumous work, Bourdieu declares that science is in danger of becoming a handmaiden to biotechnology, medicine, genetic engineering, and military research that it risks falling under the control of industrial corporations that seek to exploit it for monopolies and profit. Science thus endangered can become detrimental to mankind. The line between pure and applied science, therefore, must be subjected to intense theoretical scrutiny. Bourdieu's goals in "Science of Science and Reflexivity" are to identify the social conditions in which science develops in order to reclaim its objectivity and to rescue it from relativism and the forces that might exploit it. In the grand tradition of scientific reflections on science, Bourdieu provides a sociological analysis of the discipline as something capable of producing transhistorical truths; he presents an incisive critique of the main currents in the study of science throughout the past half century; and he offers a spirited defense of science against encroaching political and economic forces. A masterful summation of the principles underlying Bourdieu's oeuvre and a memoir of his own scientific journey, "Science of Science and Reflexivity" is a capstone to one of the most important and prodigious careers in the field of sociology."
Citations
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01 May 2011

3 citations


Cites background from "Science of Science and Reflexivity"

  • ...…that his own criticism was unfair in that Merton was himself part of a struggle within the academic field and that his Sociology of Science was part of a process of legitimation for the Social Sciences – which, though, has no influence on the abstract theoretical critique (Bourdieu, 2004:13)....

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  • ...The new policy also, although this issue did not concern the scientists interviewed as much, had numerous goals of linking the UI more deeply with local businesses, which also runs the risk of decreasing academic autonomy and freedom (Bourdieu, 2004)....

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  • ...There are many well-kept open secrets within the academic field (Bourdieu, 2004: 24-37), one being the academic apartheid discussed in another chapter, another being that the UI scientists are not fully supportive of their own official policy per se, but only supportive if it´s effective purpose of…...

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Journal ArticleDOI
04 Jun 2021-Poetics
TL;DR: This article analyzed the evolution of the interdisciplinary field of climate change research based on 30,228 scientific abstracts from 2000 to 2019 and concluded that interdisciplinarity does not erode boundaries, but instead operates within a highly structured and constrained space of probables.

3 citations

01 Jan 2010
TL;DR: In this paper, a normative dilemma was formulated: ''how to write or speak about security, when security knowledge risks the production of what one tries to avoid, what one criticizes: that is, the securitization of migration, drugs, and so forth''.
Abstract: The end of the cold war saw several security analysts pose the question of whether academic security analysis was ―actually part of the solution or part of the problem‖, contributing more to the manufacturing of insecurity and threats than it did to ‗de-securitizing‘ contemporary politics. A normative dilemma was formulated: ―how to write or speak about security, when security knowledge risks the production of what one tries to avoid, what one criticizes: that is, the securitization of migration, drugs, and so forth". Analysts have shown, for instance, how the discipline of strategic studies helped construct the language of nuclear politics and define its universe of the thinkable. 1990s constructivists sought to show that the end of the cold war was influenced by the proliferation of new strategic thought, and contemporary empirical studies stress how security professionals manufacture insecurity. Given this evidence it seems a dangerous business to do security research. The sharp distinction between theory and practice - which left theory in an ivory tower detached from the world of practice - is replaced by a ‗field of power‘ encompassing theory-practice-policy. In this field, questions of the potential political role of the analyst become central. But, how to be a security expert in the face of the ‗normative dilemma‘? Answers to this question have been almost absent from debates. Problematizations of the role of the analyst have become widespread, but solutions have been scarce. This paper tries to fill this gap by developing three positions/practices available to the security analyst ‗after securitization‘. These are; first, the notion of the ‗organic intellectual‘ based on (Neo-) Gramscian thought; second, the concept of the ‗collective intellectual‘ developed from the work of Bourdieu; and third, the vision of an ‗ironist‘ inspired by the work of Richard Rorty and John Dewey . The paper introduces the core dilemmas analysts face, and proceeds to discuss the different answers the three ideal types suggest. Equipped with these ideal types, the security intellectual will have tools to contemplate his/her position towards the world of practice and un-intended securitization may be minimized.

3 citations


Cites background from "Science of Science and Reflexivity"

  • ...Instead, he created collectives which contributed to cumulative research - e.g. the Centre de Sociologie Européenne (Bourdieu 2004: 108)22....

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  • ...While an author can establish himself as an authority for a certain type of knowledge within what has been called the scientific field (Bourdieu 2004), the further the knowledge travels, enters new fields, the less the author and his community will be able to maintain authority and thus steer the…...

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  • ...Overall, expert status is produced in a specific field according to Bourdieu (Bourdieu 2004)....

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  • ...(Pierre Bourdieu 2004: 91) Following from the discussion in this paper and Bourdieu‘s call for an institutionalisation of practical reflexivity, we would like to end this paper with a set of questions for the critical security scholar....

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  • ...(Bourdieu, 2004: 90) 5 Giddens argued that a process of structuration whereby actors are both structured by – and help reconstruct – the structure of social life, lay at the heart of modernity....

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Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 2014
TL;DR: It is argued that for history of philosophy to play the role envisaged by Brenner, it should be genuinely historical, unlike most mainstream versions, and less dissimilar from history of science.
Abstract: I focus on two central issues that emerge from Anastasios Brenner’s “Epistemology historicised”. The first is the relation between history and philosophy. Their integration is a worthwhile and indeed necessary goal, but it is even more complex than it seems: even in “classic” historical epistemology it was far more problematic and imperfect than it appears. The second question concerns history of philosophy. I agree with Brenner that philosophers of science need history of philosophy of science to locate their own work. I also agree that history of philosophy of science plays, or should play, an important pedagogical and political role. However, I argue that for history of philosophy to play the role envisaged by Brenner, it should be genuinely historical, unlike most mainstream versions, and less dissimilar from history of science. I shall conclude by raising some problems with the historical approach to philosophy that I advocate, and by briefly proposing some ways in which we may be able to address them.

3 citations