Secure Firmware Updates over the Air in Intelligent Vehicles
19 May 2008-pp 380-384
TL;DR: This paper presents a protocol for secure firmware updates over the air, which provides data integrity, data authentication, data confidentiality, and freshness, and is well suited to the limited hardware resources in the wireless vehicle environment.
Abstract: Modern intelligent vehicles have electronic control units containing firmware that enables various functions in the vehicle. New firmware versions are constantly developed to remove bugs and improve functionality. Automobile manufacturers have traditionally performed firmware updates over cables but in the near future they are aiming at conducting firmware updates over the air, which would allow faster updates and improved safety for the driver. In this paper, we present a protocol for secure firmware updates over the air. The protocol provides data integrity, data authentication, data confidentiality, and freshness. In our protocol, a hash chain is created of the firmware, and the first packet is signed by a trusted source, thus authenticating the whole chain. Moreover, the packets are encrypted using symmetric keys. We discuss the practical considerations that exist for implementing our protocol and show that the protocol is computationally efficient, has low memory overhead, and is suitable for wireless communication. Therefore, it is well suited to the limited hardware resources in the wireless vehicle environment.
Citations
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TL;DR: It is shown that a long-range wireless attack is physically possible using a real vehicle and malicious smartphone application in a connected car environment and a security protocol for CAN is proposed as a countermeasure designed in accordance with current CAN specifications.
Abstract: Vehicle-IT convergence technology is a rapidly rising paradigm of modern vehicles, in which an electronic control unit (ECU) is used to control the vehicle electrical systems, and the controller area network (CAN), an in-vehicle network, is commonly used to construct an efficient network of ECUs. Unfortunately, security issues have not been treated properly in CAN, although CAN control messages could be life-critical. With the appearance of the connected car environment, in-vehicle networks (e.g., CAN) are now connected to external networks (e.g., 3G/4G mobile networks), enabling an adversary to perform a long-range wireless attack using CAN vulnerabilities. In this paper we show that a long-range wireless attack is physically possible using a real vehicle and malicious smartphone application in a connected car environment. We also propose a security protocol for CAN as a countermeasure designed in accordance with current CAN specifications. We evaluate the feasibility of the proposed security protocol using CANoe software and a DSP-F28335 microcontroller. Our results show that the proposed security protocol is more efficient than existing security protocols with respect to authentication delay and communication load.
370 citations
Patent•
13 Oct 2010
TL;DR: In this article, a network device stores a mapping of application operation modes to vehicle conditions such as a first condition of vehicle powered but not moving and a second condition of the vehicle moving.
Abstract: In one example, a network device stores a mapping of application operation modes to vehicle conditions such as a first condition of the vehicle powered but not moving and a second condition of the vehicle moving. The network device receives a wirelessly transmitted request for a particular application to utilize an interface powered by the vehicle. The network device compares an application identifier specified by the received request to the mapping. The network device then identifies a portion of the vehicle interface according to the comparison and signals control software on the vehicle to grant the particular application access to only the identified portion of the vehicle interface itself. The application can reside on the mobile device and utilize the vehicle interface as an extended interface, or the application can reside on the vehicle.
266 citations
TL;DR: This column presents the latest insights on the technical challenges and opportunities associated with the security of autonomous systems from an embedded computing and sensors perspective.
Abstract: Embedded computing and sensor systems are increasingly becoming an integral part of today's infrastructure. From jet engines to vending machines, our society relies on embedded computing and sensor systems to support numerous applications seamlessly and reliably. This is especially true with respect to autonomous systems such as unmanned aircraft, unmanned ground vehicles, robotics, medical operations, and industrial automation. However, given society's increasing reliance on embedded computing and sensor systems as well as the applications they support, this introduces a new form of vulnerability into this critical infrastructure that is only now beginning to be recognized as a significant threat with potentially serious consequences. This column presents the latest insights on the technical challenges and opportunities associated with the security of autonomous systems from an embedded computing and sensors perspective.
112 citations
01 Nov 2008
TL;DR: This work presents a framework for self-verification of firmware updates over the air, which allows the ECU itself to perform self-Verification and can thus ensure the successful flashing of the firmware.
Abstract: An upcoming trend for automobile manufacturers is to provide firmware updates over the air (FOTA) as a service. Since the firmware controls the functionality of a vehicle, security is important. To this end, several secure FOTA protocols have been developed. However, the secure FOTA protocols only solve the security for the transmission of the firmware binary. Once the firmware is downloaded, an attacker could potentially modify its contents before it is flashed to the corresponding ECU'S ROM. Thus, there is a need to extend the flashing procedure to also verify that the correct firmware has been flashed to the ECU. We present a framework for self-verification of firmware updates over the air. We include a verification code in the transmission to the vehicle, and after the firmware has been flashed, the integrity of the memory contents can be verified using the verification code. The verification procedure entails only simple hash functions and is thus suitable for the limited resources in the vehicle. Virtualization techniques are employed to establish a trusted computing base in the ECU, which is then used to perform the verification. The proposed framework allows the ECU itself to perform self-verification and can thus ensure the successful flashing of the firmware.
99 citations
Cites background or methods from "Secure Firmware Updates over the Ai..."
...In short, the binary is verified as it is downloaded using a secure protocol [2, 3]....
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...Protocols for secure download exist [2, 3] but ensuring proper firmware installation and memory verification is lacking....
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15 Apr 2019
TL;DR: In this paper, a distributed firmware update scheme for the AVs' subsystems, leveraging blockchain and smart contract technology, is proposed, where a consortium blockchain made of different AVs manufacturers is used to ensure the authenticity and integrity of firmware updates.
Abstract: Recently, Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) have gained extensive attention from both academia and industry. AVs are a complex system composed of many subsystems, making them a typical target for attackers. Therefore, the firmware of the different subsystems needs to be updated to the latest version by the manufacturer to fix bugs and introduce new features, e.g., using security patches. In this paper, we propose a distributed firmware update scheme for the AVs' subsystems, leveraging blockchain and smart contract technology. A consortium blockchain made of different AVs manufacturers is used to ensure the authenticity and integrity of firmware updates. Instead of depending on centralized third parties to distribute the new updates, we enable AVs, namely distributors, to participate in the distribution process and we take advantage of their mobility to guarantee high availability and fast delivery of the updates. To incentivize AVs to distribute the updates, a reward system is established that maintains a credit reputation for each distributor account in the blockchain. A zero-knowledge proof protocol is used to exchange the update in return for a proof of distribution in a trustless environment. Moreover, we use attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme to ensure that only authorized AVs will be able to download and use a new update. Our analysis indicates that the additional cryptography primitives and exchanged transactions do not affect the operation of the AVs network. Also, our security analysis demonstrates that our scheme is efficient and secure against different attacks.
92 citations
References
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TL;DR: Several models are formulated in which the security of protocols can be discussed precisely, and algorithms and characterizations that can be used to determine protocol security in these models are given.
Abstract: Recently the use of public key encryption to provide secure network communication has received considerable attention. Such public key systems are usually effective against passive eavesdroppers, who merely tap the lines and try to decipher the message. It has been pointed out, however, that an improperly designed protocol could be vulnerable to an active saboteur, one who may impersonate another user or alter the message being transmitted. Several models are formulated in which the security of protocols can be discussed precisely. Algorithms and characterizations that can be used to determine protocol security in these models are given.
5,145 citations
"Secure Firmware Updates over the Ai..." refers background in this paper
...model [12], where an attacker can eavesdrop, intercept, modify, or inject messages....
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TL;DR: The road to a successful introduction of vehicular communications has to pass through the analysis of potential security threats and the design of a robust security architecture able to cope with these threats.
Abstract: The road to a successful introduction of vehicular communications has to pass through the analysis of potential security threats and the design of a robust security architecture able to cope with these threats. In this article we undertake this challenge. In addition to providing a survey of related academic and industrial efforts, we also outline several open problems
690 citations
"Secure Firmware Updates over the Ai..." refers background in this paper
...A vehicle should use only one key at a time for a limited period of time, and the keys should be changed in way that an attacker cannot track the owner of the keys [17]....
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Patent•
16 Nov 1992TL;DR: A transceiver and additional memory are connected to the microprocessor in a vehicle so that all, or selected portions, of operating data is stored in the memory and periodically transmitted to a remote station as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: A transceiver and additional memory are connected to the microprocessor in a vehicle so that all, or selected portions, of operating data is stored in the memory and periodically transmitted to a remote station. The data is diagnosed at the remote station and, for minor repairs, a fix is transmitted back to the vehicle. The information for a large population of vehicles is used by the manufacturer to determine if a problem is generic to a specific model and to generate repairs and/or model changes.
471 citations
25 Apr 2007
TL;DR: A publicly available implementation of MiniSec is presented, one tailored for single-source communication, and another tailored for multi-source broadcast communication, that scales to large networks.
Abstract: Secure sensor network communication protocols need to provide three basic properties: data secrecy, authentication, and replay protection. Secure sensor network link layer protocols such as Tiny- Sec (C. Karlof et al., 2004) and ZigBee (2005) enjoy significant attention in the community. However, TinySec achieves low energy consumption by reducing the level of security provided. In contrast, ZigBee enjoys high security, but suffers from high energy consumption. MiniSec is a secure network layer that obtains the best of both worlds: low energy consumption and high security. MiniSec has two operating modes, one tailored for single-source communication, and another tailored for multi-source broadcast communication. The latter does not require per-sender state for replay protection and thus scales to large networks. We present a publicly available implementation of MiniSec for the Telos platform, and experimental results demonstrate our low energy utilization.
385 citations
"Secure Firmware Updates over the Ai..." refers methods in this paper
...We have therefore examined the software update process in such systems [8], [9]....
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19 Apr 2006
TL;DR: The solution to the secure programming problem leverages authenticated streams, is consistent with the limited resources of a typical sensor node, and can be used to secure existing network programming systems.
Abstract: A number of multi-hop, wireless, network programming systems have emerged for sensor network retasking but none of these systems support a cryptographically-strong, public-key-based system for source authentication and integrity verification. The traditional technique for authenticating a program binary, namely a digital signature of the program hash, is poorly suited to resource-contrained sensor nodes. Our solution to the secure programming problem leverages authenticated streams, is consistent with the limited resources of a typical sensor node, and can be used to secure existing network programming systems. Under our scheme, a program binary consists of several code and data segments that are mapped to a series of messages for transmission over the network. An advertisement, consisting of the program name, version number, and a hash of the very first message, is digitally signed and transmitted first. The advertisement authenticates the first message, which in turn contains a hash of the second message. Similarly, the second message contains a hash of the third message, and so on, binding each message to the one logically preceding it in the series through the hash chain. We augmented the Deluge network programming system with our protocol and evaluated the resulting system performance.
199 citations