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Journal ArticleDOI

Semiconductor Manufacturers' Efforts to Improve Trust in the Electronic Part Supply Chain

TL;DR: In this paper, the role of part manufacturers in building trust in the supply chain is identified and part manufacturers, as the brand owners and trademark holders, play a critical role in enhancing trust in electronic part supply chain.
Abstract: One of the major problem areas in the electronic part supply chain is the issue of counterfeit electronic parts and the risks associated with them. Guidelines are needed for detecting, avoiding, and preventing the use of counterfeits in order to mitigate the risks associated with such parts. As part of this effort, we have identified the role of part manufacturers in building trust in the supply chain. Part manufacturers, as the brand owners and trademark holders, play a critical role in enhancing trust in the electronic part supply chain.
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
18 Jul 2014
TL;DR: This paper systematizes the current knowledge in this emerging field, including a classification of threat models, state-of-the-art defenses, and evaluation metrics for important hardware-based attacks.
Abstract: The multinational, distributed, and multistep nature of integrated circuit (IC) production supply chain has introduced hardware-based vulnerabilities. Existing literature in hardware security assumes ad hoc threat models, defenses, and metrics for evaluation, making it difficult to analyze and compare alternate solutions. This paper systematizes the current knowledge in this emerging field, including a classification of threat models, state-of-the-art defenses, and evaluation metrics for important hardware-based attacks.

514 citations


Cites background from "Semiconductor Manufacturers' Effort..."

  • ...3) Device Aging Models/Sensors: IC lifetime is influenced by a variety of phenomena [11], [42], [107], [108], such as negative temperature bias instability (NBTI), hot carrier injection, and electromagnetic migration....

    [...]

Journal ArticleDOI
15 Jul 2014
TL;DR: This tutorial will provide a review of some of the existing counterfeit detection and avoidance methods, and discuss the challenges ahead for implementing these methods, as well as the development of new Detection and avoidance mechanisms.
Abstract: As the electronic component supply chain grows more complex due to globalization, with parts coming from a diverse set of suppliers, counterfeit electronics have become a major challenge that calls for immediate solutions. Currently, there are a few standards and programs available that address the testing for such counterfeit parts. However, not enough research has yet addressed the detection and avoidance of all counterfeit partsVrecycled, remarked, overproduced, cloned, out-of-spec/defective, and forged documentationVcurrently infiltrating the electronic component supply chain. Even if they work initially, all these parts may have reduced lifetime and pose reliability risks. In this tutorial, we will provide a review of some of the existing counterfeit detection and avoidance methods. We will also discuss the challenges ahead for im- plementing these methods, as well as the development of new detection and avoidance mechanisms.

424 citations


Cites background from "Semiconductor Manufacturers' Effort..."

  • ...Similarly, part authentication tools [22] consist of providing an encrypted number for each device by a radio-frequency identification (RFID) tag in production....

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A comprehensive description of the first known active hardware metering method is provided and new formal security proofs are introduced and an automatic synthesis method for low overhead hardware implementation is devised.
Abstract: In the horizontal semiconductor business model where the designer's intellectual property (IP) is transparent to foundry and to other entities on the production chain, integrated circuits (ICs) overbuilding and IP piracy are prevalent problems. Active metering is a suite of methods enabling the designers to control their chips postfabrication. We provide a comprehensive description of the first known active hardware metering method and introduce new formal security proofs. The active metering method uniquely and automatically locks each IC upon manufacturing, such that the IP rights owner is the only entity that can provide the specific key to unlock or otherwise control each chip. The IC control mechanism exploits: 1) the functional description of the design, and 2) unique and unclonable IC identifiers. The locks are embedded by modifying the structure of the hardware computation model, in the form of a finite state machine (FSM). We show that for each IC hiding the locking states within the modified FSM structure can be constructed as an instance of a general output multipoint function that can be provably efficiently obfuscated. The hidden locks within the FSM may also be used for remote enabling and disabling of chips by the IP rights owner during the IC's normal operation. An automatic synthesis method for low overhead hardware implementation is devised. Attacks and countermeasures are addressed. Experimental evaluations demonstrate the low overhead of the method. Proof-of-concept implementation on the H.264 MPEG decoder automatically synthesized on a Xilinix Virtex-5 field-programmable gate array (FPGA) further shows the practicality, security, and the low overhead of the new method.

172 citations


Cites background from "Semiconductor Manufacturers' Effort..."

  • ...The other important factor to consider is stability of PUF responses and its vulnerability to operational and temperature conditions....

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Proceedings ArticleDOI
18 Nov 2013
TL;DR: The threat models outlined in this paper enables one to understand the attacks and help defenders to build stronger countermeasures and evaluate them against other protection techniques using the metrics.
Abstract: The globalized semiconductor supply chain is vulnerable to hardware attacks including: Trojans, piracy of intellectual properties (IPs) and/or overbuilding of integrated circuits (ICs), reverse engineering, side-channels, and counterfeiting. In this paper, we explain the threat models, the state-of-the-art defenses, and the metrics used to evaluate the defenses. The threat models outlined in this paper enables one to understand the attacks. Defenses and metrics can help defenders to build stronger countermeasures and evaluate them against other protection techniques using the metrics.

107 citations


Cites background from "Semiconductor Manufacturers' Effort..."

  • ...Mislabeled chips can be detected by visual inspection, depackaging, or X-ray photography of the packages [65]....

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  • ...2), and sensors to determine IC aging are the used at the design phase to enable counterfeit detection [64, 61, 65]....

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01 Jan 2014
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a classification of threat models, state-of-the-art defenses, and evaluation metrics for important hardware-based attacks, including hardware intrusion detection.
Abstract: The multinational, distributed, and multistep na- ture of integrated circuit (IC) production supply chain has intro- duced hardware-based vulnerabilities. Existing literature in hardwaresecurityassumesadhocthreatmodels,defenses,and metrics for evaluation, making it difficult to analyze and com- pare alternate solutions. This paper systematizes the current knowledge in this emerging field, including a classification of threat models, state-of-the-art defenses, and evaluation metrics for important hardware-based attacks.

99 citations

References
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the growing concern over the counterfeiting of electronics components and systems and identify three key factors as the root cause of this problem: the shift of manufacturing to China where intellectual property laws are not strictly enforced and supply chains are convoluted; the growing sophistication of technology that enables cheaper and more convincing fakes.
Abstract: This paper discusses the growing concern over the counterfeiting of electronics components and systems. Three key factors are identified as the root cause of this problem: the shift of manufacturing to China where intellectual property laws are not strictly enforced and supply chains are convoluted; the growing sophistication of technology that enables cheaper and more convincing fakes; and the rise of the Internet as a marketplace, allowing buyers and sellers make fast trades without ever meeting face to face. As many companies are learning the hard way, counterfeiting requires a constant, deliberate, and multifaceted effort, vigorous monitoring of potential trouble spots, and judicious use of anticounterfeiting technologies.

157 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors make recommendations to ensure that trusted supply chains are available for policy decisions of the DoD: 1) The DoD and DoD contractors must buy direct from manufacturers or authorized distributors only.
Abstract: The DoD is concerned about having trusted sources for manufacturing leading-edge new microchips. It is just as important, if not more so, to maintain high quality standards and traceability of all microchips, including legacy chips, which form the backbone of our fighting and defensive hardware in all the services. The business models for brokers are not compatible with the need for a trusted supply chain for national security applications. Not all brokers are unscrupulous or offer substandard or counterfeit parts. However, it is impossible for the DoD to make an a priori judgment of the parts bought through brokers. It is too risky to include brokers in the supply chain. Some recommendations follow to ensure that trusted supply chains are available for policy decisions of the DoD: 1) The DoD and DoD contractors must buy direct from manufacturers or authorized distributors only. 2) Rules need to be implemented that force the DKSP to only list manufacturers and distributors who exhibit proper authorizations and certifications. 3) Action must be taken to insure government agencies and contractors buy certified parts from certified suppliers for quality, traceability, and safety reasons. 4) All requirements must be removed that demand part purchases from small, disadvantaged businesses when they are not authorized by an original manufacturer. 5) All unauthorized brokers must be excluded from attending and marketing at government sponsored conferences. Following these policies will help in mitigating the risk on inclusion of counterfeit and other substandard parts in the national security systems at the system integrator level. To tackle the problem of counterfeiting at the sources, other parallel technical, legislative, law enforcement, and logistical measures need to be undertaken

71 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
H. Livingston1
TL;DR: The most effective approach to avoiding counterfeit electronic components is to purchase product directly from the original component manufacturer, or from a distributor, reseller or aftermarket supplier who is franchised or authorized by the original manufacturer.
Abstract: In today's supply chain environment, electronic equipment manufacturers and Government users must be vigilant in order to avoid counterfeit electronic components. The vast majority of counterfeit cases reported are associated with purchases through independent distributors. The most effective approach to avoiding counterfeit electronic components is to purchase product directly from the original component manufacturer, or from a distributor, reseller or aftermarket supplier who is franchised or authorized by the original manufacturer. Because many components needed to produce and support defense electronics are no longer in current production, independent distributors are often used to fill this gap. While independent distributors provide a necessary function within the electronic component supply chain, they are not all created equal. Electronic equipment manufacturers and Government users need to understand the independent distributor's operations and business processes. When considering purchases through independent distributors, electronic equipment manufacturers and Government users should also apply mitigation methods and strategic approaches, such as those discussed in this paper, to reduce the potential for acquiring counterfeit parts

43 citations

Trending Questions (1)
How can manufacturers of electronic components mitigate the impact of price volatility on their business?

The paper does not provide information on how manufacturers of electronic components can mitigate the impact of price volatility on their business.