Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the impact of firms' financial roadmaps (e.g., pre-planned exit strategies such as IPOs or acquisitions), external certification (awards, government grants and patents), internal governance (such as board structure), and risk factors ( such as amount of equity offered and the presence of disclaimers) on fundraising success.
Abstract: This paper presents an initial empirical examination of which start-up signals will induce small investors to commit financial resources in an equity crowdfunding context. We examine the impact of firms’ financial roadmaps (e.g., preplanned exit strategies such as IPOs or acquisitions), external certification (awards, government grants and patents), internal governance (such as board structure), and risk factors (such as amount of equity offered and the presence of disclaimers) on fundraising success. Our data highlight the importance of financial roadmaps and risk factors, as well as internal governance, for successful equity crowdfunding. External certification, by contrast, has little or no impact on success. We also discuss the implications for successful policy design.
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01 Jan 2008
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them, and describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative.
Abstract: What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.
2,134 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors compare two forms of crowdfunding: entrepreneurs solicit individuals either to pre-order the product or to advance a fixed amount of money in exchange for a share of future profits (or equity).
1,573 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compare two forms of crowdfunding: entrepreneurs solicit individuals either to pre-order the product or to advance a fixed amount of money in exchange for a share of future profits (or equity).
Abstract: With crowdfunding, an entrepreneur raises external financing from a large audience (the "crowd"), in which each individual provides a very small amount, instead of soliciting a small group of sophisticated investors. This article compares two forms of crowdfunding: entrepreneurs solicit individuals either to pre-order the product or to advance a fixed amount of money in exchange for a share of future profits (or equity). In either case, we assume that "crowdfunders" enjoy "community benefits" that increase their utility. Using a unified model, we show that the entrepreneur prefers pre-ordering if the initial capital requirement is relatively small compared with market size and prefers profit sharing otherwise. Our conclusions have implications for managerial decisions in the early development stage of firms, when the entrepreneur needs to build a community of individuals with whom he or she must interact. We also offer extensions on the impact of quality uncertainty and information asymmetry.
1,400 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide a preliminary exploration of the underlying economics of nonequity crowdfunding and highlight the extent to which economic theory, in particular transaction costs, reputation, and market design, can explain the rise of crowdfunding and offer a framework for speculating on how eq...
Abstract: Executive SummaryIt is not surprising that the financing of early-stage creative projects and ventures is typically geographically localized since these types of funding decisions are usually predicated on personal relationships and due diligence requiring face-to-face interactions in response to high levels of risk, uncertainty, and information asymmetry. So, to economists, the recent rise of crowdfunding—raising capital from many people through an online platform—which offers little opportunity for careful due diligence and involves not only friends and family but also many strangers from near and far, is initially startling. On the eve of launching equity-based crowdfunding, a new market for early-stage finance in the United States, we provide a preliminary exploration of its underlying economics. We highlight the extent to which economic theory, in particular transaction costs, reputation, and market design, can explain the rise of nonequity crowdfunding and offer a framework for speculating on how eq...
863 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the internal social capital that proponents may develop inside the crowdfunding community provides crucial assistance in igniting a self-reinforcing mechanism, and they show that the effect of these internal social networks on the success of a campaign is fully mediated by the capital and backers collected in the campaign's early days.
Abstract: The nascent crowdfunding literature has highlighted the existence of a self-reinforcing pattern whereby contributions received in the early days of a campaign accelerate its success. After discussing what sustains this pattern, we maintain that the internal social capital that proponents may develop inside the crowdfunding community provides crucial assistance in igniting a self-reinforcing mechanism. Results of an econometric analysis of a sample of 669 Kickstarter projects are consistent with this view. Moreover, the effect of internal social capital on the success of a campaign is fully mediated by the capital and backers collected in the campaign's early days.
779 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, it is argued that the degree of overlap of two individuals' friendship networks varies directly with the strength of their tie to one another, and the impact of this principle on diffusion of influence and information, mobility opportunity, and community organization is explored.
Abstract: Analysis of social networks is suggested as a tool for linking micro and macro levels of sociological theory. The procedure is illustrated by elaboration of the macro implications of one aspect of small-scale interaction: the strength of dyadic ties. It is argued that the degree of overlap of two individuals' friendship networks varies directly with the strength of their tie to one another. The impact of this principle on diffusion of influence and information, mobility opportunity, and community organization is explored. Stress is laid on the cohesive power of weak ties. Most network models deal, implicitly, with strong ties, thus confining their applicability to small, well-defined groups. Emphasis on weak ties lends itself to discussion of relations between groups and to analysis of segments of social structure not easily defined in terms of primary groups.
37,560 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them, and describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative.
Abstract: What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.
32,981 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1936
TL;DR: In this article, a general theory of the rate of interest was proposed, and the subjective and objective factors of the propensity to consume and the multiplier were considered, as well as the psychological and business incentives to invest.
Abstract: Part I. Introduction: 1. The general theory 2. The postulates of the classical economics 3. The principle of effective demand Part II. Definitions and Ideas: 4. The choice of units 5. Expectation as determining output and employment 6. The definition of income, saving and investment 7. The meaning of saving and investment further considered Part III. The Propensity to Consume: 8. The propensity to consume - i. The objective factors 9. The propensity to consume - ii. The subjective factors 10. The marginal propensity to consume and the multiplier Part IV. The Inducement to Invest: 11. The marginal efficiency of capital 12. The state of long-term expectation 13. The general theory of the rate of interest 14. The classical theory of the rate of interest 15. The psychological and business incentives to liquidity 16. Sundry observations on the nature of capital 17. The essential properties of interest and money 18. The general theory of employment re-stated Part V. Money-wages and Prices: 19. Changes in money-wages 20. The employment function 21. The theory of prices Part VI. Short Notes Suggested by the General Theory: 22. Notes on the trade cycle 23. Notes on mercantilism, the usury laws, stamped money and theories of under-consumption 24. Concluding notes on the social philosophy towards which the general theory might lead.
15,146 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1959
TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied the role of large and small firms in a growing economy and found that large firms are more likely to acquire and merge smaller firms in order to increase their size.
Abstract: Introduction Preface 1. Introduction 2. The Firm in Theory 3. The Productive Opportunity of the Firm and the 'Entrepreneur' 4. Expansion Without Merger: The Receding Managerial Limit 5. 'Inherited' Resources and the Direction of Expansion 6. The Economies of Size and the Economies of Growth 7. The Economics of Diversification 8. Expansion Through Acquisition and Merger 9. The Rate of Growth of Firms Through Time 10. The Position of Large and Small Firms in a Growing Economy 11. Growing Firms in a Growing Economy: The Process of Industrial Concentration and the Pattern of Dominance
14,137 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a model in which signaling is implicitly defined and explains its usefulness, in which the employer is not sure of the productive capabilities of an individual at the time he/she hires him.
Abstract: Publisher Summary This chapter discusses job market signaling. The term market signaling is not exactly a part of the well-defined, technical vocabulary of the economist. The chapter presents a model in which signaling is implicitly defined and explains its usefulness. In most job markets, the employer is not sure of the productive capabilities of an individual at the time he hires him. The fact that it takes time to learn an individual's productive capabilities means that hiring is an investment decision. On the basis of previous experience in the market, the employer has conditional probability assessments over productive capacity with various combinations of signals and indices. This chapter presents an introduction to Spence's more extensive analysis of market signaling.
12,195 citations
"Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding" refers background or methods in this paper
...In a similar context, signaling theory (Spence, 1973) has been used to explain which types of information (board characteristics, top management team characteristics, gender, the presence of venture capitalists or angel investors, founder involvement, etc....
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...In a similar context, signaling theory (Spence, 1973) has been used to explain which types of information (board characteristics, top management team characteristics, gender, the presence of venture capitalists or angel investors, founder involvement, etc.) lead investors to invest in start-ups…...
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...Patents thus clearly fulfill the criteria of a signal as per Spence (1973), who claims that a signal must be costly and able to differentiate among competing projects/start-ups....
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...These may derive, for example, from the positive, unobservable qualities of the entrepreneurs (Busenitz et al., 2005; Spence, 1973, 2002)....
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