Social Cognition, joint attention and communicative Competence from 9 to 15 months of age
01 Jan 1998-Monographs of The Society for Research in Child Development (University of Chicago Press)-Vol. 63, Iss: 4, pp 1-143
TL;DR: It was found that two measures--the amount of time infants spent in joint engagement with their mothers and the degree to which mothers used language that followed into their infant's focus of attention--predicted infants' earliest skills of gestural and linguistic communication.
Abstract: At around 1 year of age, human infants display a number of new behaviors that seem to indicate a newly emerging understanding of other persons as intentional beings whose attention to outside objects may be shared, followed into, and directed in various ways. These behaviors have mostly been studied separately. In the current study, we investigated the most important of these behaviors together as they emerged in a single group of 24 infants between 9 and 15 months of age. At each of seven monthly visits, we measured joint attentional engagement, gaze and point following, imitation of two different kinds of actions on objects, imperative and declarative gestures, and comprehension and production of language. We also measured several nonsocial-cognitive skills as a point of comparison. We report two studies. The focus of the first study was the initial emergence of infants' social-cognitive skills and how these skills are related to one another developmentally. We found a reliable pattern of emergence: Infants progressed from sharing to following to directing others' attention and behavior. The nonsocial skills did not emerge predictably in this developmental sequence. Furthermore, correlational analyses showed that the ages of emergence of all pairs of the social-cognitive skills or their components were inter-related. The focus of the second study was the social interaction of infants and their mothers, especially with regard to their skills of joint attentional engagement (including mothers' use of language to follow into or direct infants' attention) and how these skills related to infants' early communicative competence. Our measures of communicative competence included not only language production, as in previous studies, but also language comprehension and gesture production. It was found that two measures--the amount of time infants spent in joint engagement with their mothers and the degree to which mothers used language that followed into their infant's focus of attention--predicted infants' earliest skills of gestural and linguistic communication. Results of the two studies are discussed in terms of their implications for theories of social-cognitive development, for theories of language development, and for theories of the process by means of which human children become fully participating members of the cultural activities and processes into which they are born.
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TL;DR: It is argued and present evidence that great apes understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality), and children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life.
Abstract: We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with oth- ers and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The develop- mental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.
3,660 citations
Cites background from "Social Cognition, joint attention a..."
...Shared intentionality, sometimes called “we” intentionality, refers to collaborative interactions in which participants have a shared goal (shared commitment) and coordinated action roles for pursuing that shared goal (Gilbert 1989; Searle 1995; Tuomela 1995)....
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...Relatedly, Carpenter et al. (1998a) found that 14- to 18- month-old infants chose to imitate purposeful but not accidental actions....
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...Infants of this same age also look to an adult’s face when he teases her with a toy or obstructs her play with a toy (Carpenter et al. 1998b; Phillips et al. 1992) – perhaps suggesting that infants are seeking information about the adult’s goal by trying to discern where he is looking or his…...
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TL;DR: The Perception-Action Model (PAM), together with an understanding of how representations change with experience, can explain the major empirical effects in the literature and can also predict a variety of empathy disorders.
Abstract: There is disagreement in the literature about the exact nature of the phenomenon of empathy. There are emotional, cogni- tive, and conditioning views, applying in varying degrees across species. An adequate description of the ultimate and proximate mecha- nism can integrate these views. Proximately, the perception of an object's state activates the subject's corresponding representations, which in turn activate somatic and autonomic responses. This mechanism supports basic behaviors (e.g., alarm, social facilitation, vicar- iousness of emotions, mother-infant responsiveness, and the modeling of competitors and predators) that are crucial for the reproduc- tive success of animals living in groups. The Perception-Action Model (PAM), together with an understanding of how representations change with experience, can explain the major empirical effects in the literature (similarity, familiarity, past experience, explicit teach- ing, and salience). It can also predict a variety of empathy disorders. The interaction between the PAM and prefrontal functioning can also explain different levels of empathy across species and age groups. This view can advance our evolutionary understanding of empa- thy beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism and can explain different levels of empathy across individuals, species, stages of de- velopment, and situations.
3,350 citations
TL;DR: The mentalizing (theory of mind) system of the brain is probably in operation from 18 months of age, allowing implicit attribution of intentions and other mental states, and from this age children are able to explain the misleading reasons that have given rise to a false belief.
Abstract: The mentalizing (theory of mind) system of the brain is probably in operation from ca. 18 months of age, allowing implicit attribution of intentions and other mental states. Between the ages of 4 and 6 years explicit mentalizing becomes possible, and from this age children are able to explain the misleading reasons that have given rise to a false belief. Neuroimaging studies of mentalizing have so far only been carried out in adults. They reveal a system with three components consistently activated during both implicit and explicit mentalizing tasks: medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), temporal poles and posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS). The functions of these components can be elucidated, to some extent, from their role in other tasks used in neuroimaging studies. Thus, the MPFC region is probably the basis of the decoupling mechanism that distinguishes mental state representations from physical state representations; the STS region is probably the basis of the detection of agency, and the temporal poles might be involved in access to social knowledge in the form of scripts. The activation of these components in concert appears to be critical to mentalizing.
2,110 citations
Cites background from "Social Cognition, joint attention a..."
...In this example, the appropriate answer to the question, ‘Why did the alarm go off?’ would be because some animal had triggered it....
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...The development of joint attention between 14 and 24 months has been shown to have an orderly progression by Carpenter et al. (1998) and to be correlated with other significant developments in social competence....
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TL;DR: The authors reported evidence regarding the nature of those environmental requirements, the ways in which the varied social contexts in which children live meet those requirements, and the effects of environmental variability in meeting those requirements on the course of language development.
1,456 citations
Cites background from "Social Cognition, joint attention a..."
...…is associated with maternal input that follows the child’s attentional focus, rather than input that attempts to redirect the child’s attentional focus (Akhtar, Dunham, & Dunham, 1991; Harris, Jones, Brookes, & Grant, 1986; Tomasello & Farrar, 1986, & see Carpenter et al., 1998, for a summary)....
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...Differences among mother–child dyads in the time they spend in joint attention when the children are under 18 months predict subsequent vocabulary growth (Carpenter et al., 1998; Laakso, Poikkeus, Katajamaki, & Lyytinen, 1999)....
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TL;DR: The medial prefrontal cortex and the superior temporal sulcus as mentioned in this paper show altered activity during the performance of social cognitive tasks, such as face recognition and mental-state attribution, during adolescence.
Abstract: The term 'social brain' refers to the network of brain regions that are involved in understanding others. Behaviour that is related to social cognition changes dramatically during human adolescence. This is paralleled by functional changes that occur in the social brain during this time, in particular in the medial prefrontal cortex and the superior temporal sulcus, which show altered activity during the performance of social cognitive tasks, such as face recognition and mental-state attribution. Research also indicates that, in humans, these parts of the social brain undergo structural development, including synaptic reorganization, during adolescence. Bringing together two relatively new and rapidly expanding areas of neuroscience--social neuroscience and the study of brain development during adolescence--will increase our understanding of how the social brain develops during adolescence.
1,402 citations
References
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Book•
01 Jan 1978
TL;DR: In this paper, Cole and Scribner discuss the role of play in children's development and play as a tool and symbol in the development of perception and attention in a prehistory of written language.
Abstract: Introduction Michael Cole and Sylvia Scribner Biographical Note on L S Vygotsky Basic Theory and Data 1 Tool and Symbol in Child Development 2 The Development of Perception and Attention 3 Mastery of Memory and Thinking 4 Internalization of Higher Psychological Functions 5 Problems of Method Educational Implications 6 Interaction between Learning and Development 7 The Role of Play in Development 8 The Prehistory of Written Language Afterword Vera John-Steiner and Ellen Souberman Notes Vygotsky's Works Index
32,902 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1997
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the importance of biology for human development and the role of the human brain in the development of human cognition and behavior, and propose a model of human development based on the Bioecological Model of Human Development.
Abstract: VOLUME 1. 1. Developmental Science, Developmental Systems, and Contemporary Theories of Human Development (Richard M. Lerner). 2. Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology (Willis F. Overton). 3. The Making of Developmental Psychology (Robert B. Cairns and Beverley D. Cairns). 4. Developmental Epistemology and Implications for Methodology (Jaan Valsiner). 5. The Significance of Biology for Human Development: A Developmental Psychobiological Systems Views (Gilbert Gottlieb, Douglas Wahlsten and Robert Lickliter). 6. Dynamic Systems Theories (Esther Thelen and Linda B. Smith). 7. Dynamic Development of Action and Thought (Kurt W Fischer and Thomas R. Bidell). 8. The Person in Context: A Holistic-Interactionistic Approach (David Magnusson and Hakan Stattin). 9. The Developing Person: An Experiential Perspective (Kevin Rathunde and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi). 10. Action Perspectives on Human Development (J. Brandstadter). 11. Life Span Theory in Developmental Psychology (Paul B. Baltes, Ulman Lindenberger and Ursula M. Staudinger). 12. The Life Course and Human Development (Glen H. Elder and Michael J. Shanahan). 13. The Cultural Psychology of Development: One Mind, Many Mentalities (Richard A. Shweder, Jacqueline J. Goodnow, Giyoo Hatano, Robert A. Levine, Hazel R. Markus and Peggy J. Miller). 14. The Bioecological Model of Human Development (Urie Bronfenbrenner and Pamela A. Morris). 15. Phenomenologitcal and Ecological Systems Theory: Development of Diverse Groups (Margaret Beale Spencer). 16. Positive Youth Development: Theory, Research, and Applications (Peter L. Benson, Peter C. Scales, Stephen F. Hamilton and Arturo Sesma). 17. Religious and Spiritual Development Throughout the Life Span (Fritz K. Oser, W. George Scarlett and Anton Bucher). Author Index. Subject Index. VOLUME 2. SECTION ONE: FOUNDATIONS. 1. Neural Bases of Cognitive Development (Charles A. Nelson, Kathleen M. Thomas and Michelle de Haan). 2. The Infant's Auditory World: Hearing, Speech, and the Beginnings of Language (Jenny R. Saffran, Janet F. Werker and Lynne A. Werner). 3. Infant Visual Perception (Philip J. Kellman and Martha E. Arterberry). 4. Motor Development (Karen E. Adolph and& Sarah E. Berger). 5. Infant Cognition (Leslie B. Cohen and Cara H. Cashon). SECTION TWO: COGNITION AND COMMUNICATION 6. Acquiring Linguistic Constructions (Michael Tomasello). 7. Early Word Learning (Sandra R. Waxman and Jeffrey L. Lidz). 8. Nonverbal Communication: The Hand's Role in Talking and Thinking (Susan Goldin-Meadow). SECTION THREE: COGNITIVE PROCESSES. 9. Event Memory (Patricia J. Bauer). 10. Information Processing Approaches to Development (Yuko Munakata). 11. Microgenetic Analysis of Learning (Robert S. Siegler). 12. Cognitive Strategies Michael Pressley and Katherine Hilden). 13. Reasoning and Problem Solving (Graeme S. Halford and Glenda Andrews). 14. Cognitive Science and Cognitive Development (Frank Keil). 15. Culture and Cognitive Development in Phylogenetic, Historical, and Ontogenetic Perspective (Michael Cole). SECTION FOUR: CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND ACHIEVMENTS. 16. Conceptual Development (Susan A. Gelman and Charles W. Kalish). 17. Development of Spatial Cognition (Nora S. Newcombe and Janellen Huttenlocher). 18. Development of Mathematical Understanding (David C. Geary). 19. Social Cognition (Paul L. Harris). 20. Development in the Arts: Drawing and Music (Ellen Winner). 21. Extraordinary Achievements: A Developmental and Systems Analysis (Seana Moran and Howard Gardner). SECTION FIVE: THE PERSPECTIVE BEYOND CHILDHOOD. 22. The Second Decade: What Develops (and how) (Deanna Kuhn and Sam Franklin). Author Index. Subject Index. VOLUME 3. 1. Introduction (Nancy Eisenberg). 2. The Development of the Person: Social Understanding, Relationships, Conscience, Self (Rosa A. Thompson). 3. Temperament (Mary K. Rothbart and John E. Bates). 4. Biology, Culture, and Temperamental Biases (Jerome Kagan and Nathan A. Fox). 5. Emotional Development: Action, Communication, and Understanding (Carolyn Saarni, Joseph J. Campos, Linda A. Camras and David Witherington). 6. Personality Development (Avshalom Caspi) and Rebecca L. Shiner. 7. Socialization Processes (Daphne Blunt Bugental and Joan E. Grusec). 8. Socialization in the Family: Etnnic and Ecological Perspectives (Ross D. Parke and Raymond Buriel). 9. The Self (Susan Harter). 10. Peer Interactions, Relationships, and Groups (Kenneth H. Rubin, William M. Bulkowski and Jeffrey G. Parker). 11. Prosocial Development (Nany Eisenberg, Richard A. Fabes and Tracy L. Spinrad). 12. Aggression and Antisocial Behavior in Youth (Kenneth A. Dodge, John D. Coie and Donald Lynam). 13. The Development of Morality (Elliot Turiel). 14. Gender Development (Diane N. Ruble, Carol Lynn martin and Sheri A. Berebaum). 15. Development of Achievement Motivation (Allan Wigfield, Jacquelynne S. Eccles, Ulrich Schiefele, Robert W. Rosser and Pamela Davis-Kean). 16. Adolescent Development in Interpersonal Context (W. Andrew Collins and Laurence Steinberg). Author Index. Subject Index. VOLUME 4. PART I: INTRODUCTION. Applying Research to Practice (K. Renninger & I. Sigel). PART II: RESEARCH ADVANCED AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE IN EDUCATION. 1. Early Childhood Development and Education (M. Hyson, et al.). 2. Assessments of Early Reading (S. Paris & A. Paris). 3. Becoming Bilingual, Biliterate, and Bicultural (C. Snow & J. Kang). 4. Mathematical Thinking and Learning (E. De Corte & L. Verschaffel). 5. Scientific Thinking and Science Literacy (R. Lehrer & L. Schauble). 6. Character Education (D. Lapsley & D. Narvaez). 7. Learning Environments (P. Blumenfeld, et al.). PART III: RESEARCH ADVANCED AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CLINICAL APPLICATIONS. 8. Self-REgulations and Effort Investment (M. Boekaerts). 9. Risk and Prevention (R. Selman & A. Dray). 10. Learning Disabilities (V. Berninger). 11. Mental Retardation (R. Hodapp & E. Dykens). 12. Developmental Psychopathology and Preventive Intervention (D. Cicchetti & S. Toth). 13. Families and Early Childhood Interventions (D. Powell). 14. School-based Social and Emotional Learning Programs (J. Kress & M. Elias). PART IV: RESEARCH ADVANCED AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL POLICY AND SOCIAL ACTION. 15. Cultural Pathways Through Human Development (P. Greenfield, et al.). 16. Children and War Trauma (A. Klingman). 17. The Child and them Law (M. Bruck, et al.). 18. Media and Popular Culture (G. Comstock & E. Scharrer). 19. Children's Health and Education (C. Ramey, et al.). 20. Parenting Science and Practice (M. Bornstein). 21. Nonparental Child Care (M. Lamb & L. Ahnert). 22. Research to Practice Redefined (I. Sigel). Afterword.
9,880 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1872
TL;DR: The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals Introduction to the First Edition and Discussion Index, by Phillip Prodger and Paul Ekman.
Abstract: Acknowledgments List of Illustrations Figures Plates Preface to the Anniversary Edition by Paul Ekman Preface to the Third Edition by Paul Ekman Preface to the Second Edition by Francis Darwin Introduction to the Third Edition by Paul Ekman The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals Introduction to the First Edition 1. General Principles of Expression 2. General Principles of Expression -- continued 3. General Principles of Expression -- continued 4. Means of Expression in Animals 5. Special Expressions of Animals 6. Special Expressions of Man: Suffering and Weeping 7. Low Spirits, Anxiety, Grief, Dejection, Despair 8. Joy, High Spirits, Love, Tender Feelings, Devotion 9. Reflection - Meditation - Ill-temper - Sulkiness - Determination 10. Hatred and Anger 11. Disdain - Contempt - Disgust - Guilt - Pride, Etc. - Helplessness - Patience - Affirmation and Negation 12. Surprise - Astonishment - Fear - Horror 13. Self-attention - Shame - Shyness - Modesty: Blushing 14. Concluding Remarks and Summary Afterword, by Paul Ekman APPENDIX I: Charles Darwin's Obituary, by T. H. Huxley APPENDIX II: Changes to the Text, by Paul Ekman APPENDIX III: Photography and The Expression of the Emotions, by Phillip Prodger APPENDIX IV: A Note on the Orientation of the Plates, by Phillip Prodger and Paul Ekman APPENDIX V: Concordance of Illustrations, by Phillip Prodger APPENDIX VI: List of Head Words from the Index to the First Edition NOTES NOTES TO THE COMMENTARIES INDEX
9,342 citations
Book•
01 Jan 19716,416 citations
"Social Cognition, joint attention a..." refers background or methods in this paper
...In Piaget's (1952) fc mulation, infants begin down this path when they begin removing obstacles and performing other acts whose function it is to enable other acts (see also Frye, 1991, and the current findings with regard tv the physical obstacle task)....
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...None of the infants at Piaget's stage 4 of causal development (mean age = 9.7 months) showed any intentionally communicative behavior. Just over 70% of infants at stage 5 (mean age = 11.6 months), on the other hand, produced at least two vocal and/or gestural imperatives during the frustration episodes. Similarly, Perucchini and Camaioni (1993) also used procedures designed to elicit imperatives....
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...First, the physical obstacle task can be taken to be a measure of the infant's expression of his or her own intentionality in the sense of differentiating means and ends (Piaget, 1952)....
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...This issue is also an issue for the studies of Piaget (1962) and other researchers, such as Masur and Ritz (1984), McCall, Eichorn, and Hogarty (1977), and Rodgon and Kurdek (1977), all of whom report imitation of familiar actions on objects in the age range 7-10 months....
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Book•
21 Jan 1954
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors make a distinction between simple temporal displacements in extension due to the repetition of primitive processes on the occasion of new problems analogous to old ones, and the temporal displacement in comprehension due to a transition from one plane of activity to another; that is, from the plane of action to that of representation.
Abstract: class does not exist either, precisely since the relation between the two shadows compared is not a relation of simple comparison and common appurtenance to the same totality, but of substantial participation. The shadow perceived on the table is therefore no more an isolable object than is, on the sensorimotor plane, the watch which disappears under one cushion and which the child expects to see appear under another. But if there is thus an apparent return to the past it is for an opposite reason to that which obstructs objectification in sensorimotor intelligence; in the latter case the object is difficult to form in proportion as the child has difficulty in intercoordinating perceptual images, whereas on the plane of conceptual thought the object, already elaborated, again loses its identity to the extent that it is coordinated with other objects to construct a class or a relation. In conclusion, in the case of the object as in that of space, from the very beginnings of verbal reflection there is a return of the difficulties already overcome on the plane of action, and there is repetition, with temporal displacements, of the stages and process of adaptation defined by the transition from egocentrism to objectivity. And in both cases the phenomenon is due to the difficulties experienced by the child, after he has reached the social plane, in inserting his sensorimotor acquisitions in a framework of relationships of logical classes and deductive structures admitting of true generalisation, that is, taking into account the point of view of others and all possible points of view as well as his own. § 4. From Sensori-Motor Universe to Representation of the Child’s World II. Causality and Time The development of causality from the first months of life to the eleventh or twelfth year reveals the same graphic curve as that of space or object. The acquisition of causality seems to be completed with the formation of sensorimotor intelligence; in the measure that objectification and spatialisation of relations of cause and effect succeed the magico-phenomenalistic egocentrism of the primitive connections, a whole evolution resumes with the advent of speech and representative thought which seems to reproduce the preceding evolution before really extending it. But among the displacements to which this history of the concept of cause gives rise, distinction must again be made between the simple temporal displacements in extension due to the repetition of primitive processes on the occasion of new problems analogous to old ones, and the temporal displacements in comprehension due to the transition from one plane of activity to another; that is, from the plane of action to that of representation. It seems useless to us to emphasise the former. Nothing is more natural than the fact that belief in the efficacy of personal activity, a belief encouraged by chance comparisons through immediate or phenomenalistic experience, is again found throughout childhood in those moments of anxiety or of desire which characterise infantile magic. The second type of temporal displacements, however, raises questions which it is useful to mention here. During the first months of life the child does not dissociate the external world from his own activity. Perceptual images, not yet consolidated into objects or coordinated in a coherent space, seem to him to be governed by his desires and efforts, though these are not attributed to a self which is separate from the universe. Then gradually, as progress is made in the intelligence which elaborates objects and space by spinning a tight web of relations among these images, the child attributes an autonomous causality to things and persons and conceives of the existence of causal relations independent of himself, his own body becoming a source among other sources of effects integrated in this total system. What will happen when, through speech and representative thought, the subject succeeds not only in foreseeing the development of phenomena and in acting upon them but in evoking them apart from any action in order to try to explain them? It is here that the paradox of displacement in comprehension appears. By virtue of the "why" obsessing the child’s mind, as soon as his representation of the world can be detached without too much risk of error, one perceives that this universe, centred on the self, which seemed abolished because it was eliminated from practical action relating to the immediate environment, reappears on the plane of thought and impresses itself on the little child as the sole understandable conception of totality. Undoubtedly the child no longer behaves, as did the baby, as though he commanded everything and everybody. He knows that adults have their own will, that the rain, wind, clouds, stars, and all things are characterised by movements and effects he undergoes but cannot control. In short, on the practical plane, the objectification and spatialisation of causality remain acquired. But this does not at all prevent the child from representing the universe to himself as a large machine, organised exactly by whom he does not know, but organised with the help of adults and for the sake of the well-being of men and particularly of children. Just as in a house everything is arranged according to a plan, despite imperfections and partial failures, so also the raison d’être for everything in the physical universe is the function of a sort of order in the world, an order both material and moral, of which the child is the center. Adults are there "to take care of us," animals to do us service, the stars to warm us and give us light, plants to nourish us, rain to make the gardens grow, clouds to "make night," mountains to climb on, and lakes for boats, etc. Furthermore, to this more or less explicit and coherent artificialism there corresponds a latent animism which endows everything with the will to play its role and with just the force and awareness needed to act with regularity. Thus the causal egocentrism, which on the sensorimotor plane disappears gradually under the influence of spatialisation and objectification, reappears from the time of the beginnings of thought in almost as radical a form. Doubtless the child no longer attributes personal causality to others or to things, but while endowing objects with specific activities he centers all these activities on man and above all on himself. It seems clear that in this sense we may speak of temporal displacement from one plane to another and that the phenomenon is thus comparable to the phenomena which characterise the evolution of space and object. But it is in a still deeper sense that the primitive schemata of causality are again transposed in the child’s first reflective representations. If it is true that from the second year of life the child attributes causality to others and to objects instead of reserving a monopoly on them for his own activity, we have still to discover how he represents to himself the mechanism of these causal relations. We have just recalled that corresponding to the egocentric artificialism which makes the universe gravitate around man and child is an animism capable of explaining the activity of creatures and things in this sort of world. This example is precisely of a kind to help us understand the second kind of temporal displacement of which we now speak: if the child renounces considering his actions as the cause of every event, he nevertheless is unable to represent to himself the action of bodies except by means of schemata drawn from his own activity. An object animated by a "natural" movement like the wind which pushes clouds, or the moon which advances, thus seems endowed with purposefulness and finality, for the child is unable to conceive of an action without a conscious goal. Through lack of awareness, every process involving a relation of energies, such as the rising of the water level in a glass in which a pebble has been dropped, seems due to forces copied from the model of personal activity; the pebble "weighs" on the bottom of the water, it "forces" the water to rise, and if one held the pebble on a string midway of the column of the water the level would not change. In short, even though there is objectivity on the practical plane, causality may remain egocentric from the representative point of view to the extent that the first causal conceptions are drawn from the completely subjective consciousness of the activity of the self. With regard to spatialisation of the causal connection the same temporal displacement between representation and action is observable. Thus the child can acknowledge in practice the necessity for a spatial contact between cause and effect, but that does not make causality geometric or mechanical. For example, the parts of a bicycle all seem necessary to the child long before he thinks of establishing irreversible causal series among them. However, subsequent to these primitive stages of representation during which one sees reappear on the plane of thought forms of causality relative to those of the first sensorimotor stages and which seem surpassed by the causal structures of the final stages of sensorimotor intelligence, one witnesses a truly reflective objectification and spatialisation, whose progress is parallel to that which we have described on the plane of action. Thus it is that subsequent to the animism and dynamism we have just mentioned, we see a gradual "mechanism" taking form, correlative to the principles of conservation described in § 3 and to the elaboration of a relative space. Causality, like the other categories, therefore evolves on the plane of thought from an initial egocentrism to a combined objectivity and relativity, thus reproducing, in surpassing, its earlier sensorimotor evolution. With regard to time, concerning which we have tried to describe on the purely practical plane of the first two years of life the transformation from
5,878 citations