Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality
TL;DR: Lawler as mentioned in this paper argued that being for the freeze means that one is not for disarmament, which is hardly a rational position in the sense that it is suspect if not immoral, in the eyes of some.
Abstract: that a plurality of the American Catholic bishops endorse a nuclear freeze (p. 4), saying that they are thus "taking their stance with Moscow,55 which is for a freeze, and not with the Vatican, which "is still in favor of disarmament?not a freeze.55 To make any sense at all, Mr. Lawler must mean that being for the freeze means that one is not for disarmament? hardly a rational position. One recalls here the arguments, during the 19305s and 19405s, that being for racial justice in the United States was suspect if not immoral, in the eyes of some, because the communists also favored it.
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TL;DR: The authors examines material taught in undergraduate courses and graduate seminars on democratic theory and examines how these courses are put together to reflect what instructors hope to achieve and the state of debate among scholars in the subfield.
Abstract: Democratic theory is an exciting field today, both in its rich, textured, abundant research and in the varied courses taught at American colleges and universities. We use its subject matter as a benchmark to judge the politics of the United States as well as that of other countries. The scope of research in this subfield has expanded debates about the meanings, purposes, and reach of democracy, and it raises questions for instructors about what to teach. This essay examines material taught in undergraduate courses and graduate seminars on democratic theory. How these courses are put together reflects what instructors hope to achieve and—on a larger scale—the state of debate among scholars in the subfield.
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TL;DR: The Amsterdam Treaty bolsters Union Citizenship in order to bring the European Union closer to the citizens of Europe. Inadvertently, this strategy gives citizens of non-EU states an inferior status in the EU, even though they may be semi-permanent residents in a Member State as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The Amsterdam Treaty bolsters Union Citizenship in order to bring the European Union closer to the citizens of Europe . Inadvertently, this strategy gives citizens of non-EU states an inferior status in the European Union, even though they may be semi-permanent residents in a Member State. Union Citizenship increases the social and political exclusion of third country nationals, in violation of the basic democratic principle that those affected by social institutions should also enjoy political levers of influence. The paper first briefly sketches a Liberal Contractualist defense for awarding this group full citizenship in the relevant Member State, arguing in particular for three somewhat contested issues, that: a) third country nationals should not only enjoy Union Citizenship, but also be given national citizenship in the Member State of residence. b) Member states may impose conditions, oaths etc. on such prospective citizens.c) Member States may withhold some privileges from those resident third country nationals who refuse to be naturalised.The paper goes on to present and discuss, only to dismiss, the most plausible arguments offered in defence of current practice within the context of a Europe of open borders for Member State citizens. These arguments seek to deny citizenship to third country nationals in order:a) To protect national and locally endorsed values ensuring social homogeneity of the community;b) To exclude people with non-liberal values;c) To ensure commitment to a shared future which warrants democratic rights in the first place;d) To avoid instability caused by citizens with conflicting multiple loyalties;e) To ensure and foster the ideal of active political participation, impossible for dual citizens;f) To avoid backlash problems among current EU citizens which threaten the stability of welfare policies of Member States and the EU.
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TL;DR: In Carr's ethics, there is a link between the rise of the socialised nation and the crisis of laissez faire due to its loss of legitimacy among the lesser privileged.
Abstract: In Carr’s ethics, there is a link between the rise of the socialised nation and the crisis of laissez faire due to its loss of legitimacy among the lesser privileged. How far is this link in Carr’s...
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Cites background from "Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pl..."
...Statists, for example, reject the framework of rights and obligations that is centred on the individual rather than the nations (Miller, 2007; Nagel, 2005; Walzer, 1983) and/or the peoples (Eckert, 2015; Rawls, 1999; Tong, 2017)....
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TL;DR: This paper argued that equality of opportunity is not capable of standing in as an overarching normative principle for egalitarian politics, and argued that the ideal can only play a limited role within an egalitarian project.
Abstract: Within recent egalitarian theory, the ideal of equal opportunity holds considerable sway. Liberal egalitarians increasingly concentrate on refining this ideal, as do a number of Marxist theorists. At the same time many radical critics are unhappy with various aspects of this hegemony of equality of opportunity, and this article examines the reasons for their unhappiness, as well as two possible solutions. The first would be to reject equal opportunities in favour of another conception of equality, or to argue that the ideal can only play a limited role within an egalitarian project. Another would be to try to radicalise the idea of equal opportunities: to argue that equality of opportunity can be a transformative ideal if it is interpreted sufficiently broadly or deeply. We can identify Anne Phillips with the first approach, and Iris Young with the second. On the question of whether equality of opportunity can provide an overarching normative framework for egalitarian politics, Young's response is in the positive, whereas Phillips' is in the negative. The article critically addresses this dilemma, and concludes by siding with Phillips, by arguing that equality of opportunity is not capable of standing in as an overarching normative principle for egalitarian politics.
14 citations
Cites background from "Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pl..."
...These arguments are salutary, and restore a concern with institutional hierarchy that has been lacking in mainstream accounts of economic justice (for exceptions to this rule, though, see Shapiro, 1999;Walzer, 1983)....
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TL;DR: The separation between theory and policy has been discussed in the literature of equality since the late 1970s as discussed by the authors, with a focus on the one restrictive context of American race relations, but without any apparent application.
Abstract: Since the publication of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice in 1971, the presumably controversial notion that under ordinary circumstances no person should possess more useful goods than any other person has been more freely propagated, and more respectfully received, than ever before. Yet except in the one restrictive context of American race relations, the literature of equality seems barely to have made contact with political and social possibility in the late twentieth century. Explicit egalitarian proposals, such as for wage supplements (Jencks et al., 1972) or “fair shares” (Ryan, 1981), enter the realm of policy devoid of serious philosophical justification, whereas philosophical justifications of equality enter that same realm devoid of any apparent application. To paraphrase an earlier egalitarian, I cannot make this separation between theory and policy legitimate; but I think I can explain how it came about.
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