scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question
Journal ArticleDOI

Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality

01 Jan 1985-The Philosophical Review (Basil Blackwell)-Vol. 83, Iss: 1, pp 142
TL;DR: Lawler as mentioned in this paper argued that being for the freeze means that one is not for disarmament, which is hardly a rational position in the sense that it is suspect if not immoral, in the eyes of some.
Abstract: that a plurality of the American Catholic bishops endorse a nuclear freeze (p. 4), saying that they are thus "taking their stance with Moscow,55 which is for a freeze, and not with the Vatican, which "is still in favor of disarmament?not a freeze.55 To make any sense at all, Mr. Lawler must mean that being for the freeze means that one is not for disarmament? hardly a rational position. One recalls here the arguments, during the 19305s and 19405s, that being for racial justice in the United States was suspect if not immoral, in the eyes of some, because the communists also favored it.
Citations
More filters
Journal Article
TL;DR: The authors examines the way in which arguments about equality and difference are used in Australian Indigenous affairs and examines two policy areas, income support and housing, over a forty or fifty year timeframe.
Abstract: This paper examines the way in which arguments about equality and difference are used in Australian Indigenous affairs. It examines two policy areas, income support and housing, over a forty or fifty year timeframe. The final section of the paper also reports on some original field research in a small roadside town in the Northern Territory to illustrate the deployment of equality and difference arguments in relation to Aboriginal housing and town camping.

14 citations


Cites background from "Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pl..."

  • ...Indeed relating equality and difference arguments to ideas of justice has long been a central concern of normative political theory ( Walzer 1983; Young 1989)....

    [...]

Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 2016
TL;DR: This contribution addresses the question whether and how Big Data driven research may undermine this “information framework” of informed consent using the Human Brain Project (HBP), and analyses the interrelation between effects of Big Data research and informed consent.
Abstract: Big Data research is usually explorative, meaning that not all possible hypotheses are known that one may wish to test when data is made available. For the case of biomedical data this poses a significant challenge, as the originators of the data – patients or research participants – have to provide informed consent for using their data. The typically obtained “closed” or “narrow consent”, i.e. consenting to use the data in a well-defined research project, is conceptually incompatible with the explorative nature of Big Data driven research. Therefore, “open” or “broad consent” is proposed as an alternative. Nevertheless, open consent cannot justify any type of data use, but requires an “information framework” that separates legitimate from illegitimate Big Data research. For example, consent is given associated with established disease categories: a patient diagnosed with early-onset Alzheimer’s disease may consent to his personal medical information being used for any research enhancing our understanding of this particular disease. In our contribution, we address the question whether and how Big Data driven research may undermine this “information framework” of informed consent using the example of the Human Brain Project (HBP). Within the HBP, a Big Data infrastructure is currently being developed to access a multitude of clinical data related to brain diseases based on the conviction that many neurological and psychiatric disorders and diseases are ill-defined in terms of underlying mechanisms. We analyse the interrelation between effects of Big Data research and informed consent and we evaluate ethical and practical consequences.

14 citations


Additional excerpts

  • ...Please provide citation for Walzer (1982)....

    [...]

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Within contemporary legal and political philosophy there is nothing more unpopular than defending a world state as mentioned in this paper, but it seems food for thought for writers like Huxley or Wells, but not a topic that des...
Abstract: Within contemporary legal and political philosophy there is nothing more unpopular than defending a world state. It seems food for thought for writers like Huxley or Wells, but not a topic that des...

14 citations


Cites background from "Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pl..."

  • ...According to this type of argument the identity of political communities depends on a form of ‘closure’ (Walzer, 1983: 39)....

    [...]

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the content and justification of action-guiding normative principles in political life should be responsive to social facts, and the authors answer this question by sketching a contextua...
Abstract: How should the content and justification of action-guiding normative ‘principles’ in political life be responsive to social ‘facts’? In this article, I answer this question by sketching a contextua...

14 citations

Dissertation
01 Oct 2013
TL;DR: Most punishment theories acknowledge neither the full extent of the harms which punishment risks, nor the caring practices which punishment entails as mentioned in this paper, and thus, punishment in most of its current conceptualizations is inconsistent with treating offenders as equals qua persons.
Abstract: Most punishment theories acknowledge neither the full extent of the harms which punishment risks, nor the caring practices which punishment entails Consequently, I shall argue, punishment in most of its current conceptualizations is inconsistent with treating offenders as equals qua persons The nature of criminal punishment, and of our interactions with offenders in punishment decision-making and delivery, risks causing harm to offenders Harm is normalized when central to definitions of punishment, desensitizing us to unintended harms and obscuring caring practices Offenders may be partially silenced and excluded by mainstream criminal justice practices which limit interaction between offenders and practitioners When we ignore significant harms, or silence and exclude, we treat others as passive nonsubjects This partially objectifies offenders, and is inconsistent with treatment as equals Penal theories employing harm-centred and harm-normalizing definitions of punishment can provide few resources to help practitioners either avoid, or recognize and respond to, harms Care ethics, by contrast, motivates the avoidance of harm, ongoing inclusive engagement, and respectful interaction with others I argue that defining punishment without presupposing harm facilitates the identification of morally problematic harms, and recognition of caring practices I offer a principled argument, and political and pragmatic supplementary arguments, for responding to offenders without intentional harm and with care Principles drawn from care ethics can help to strengthen mainstream criminal practices by structuring decision-making and action Bottom-up alternative criminal justice practices share some values with these proposed guiding principles, allowing a partial test of the principles I consider examples of restorative justice practices, therapeutic jurisprudence, community justice and other problem-solving court practices, in addition to considering how well mainstream punishment practices measure up to these principles My analysis illuminates the strengths and weaknesses of the principles, and how they might contribute to securing treatment as equals for offenders in mainstream practices

14 citations