Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality
TL;DR: Lawler as mentioned in this paper argued that being for the freeze means that one is not for disarmament, which is hardly a rational position in the sense that it is suspect if not immoral, in the eyes of some.
Abstract: that a plurality of the American Catholic bishops endorse a nuclear freeze (p. 4), saying that they are thus "taking their stance with Moscow,55 which is for a freeze, and not with the Vatican, which "is still in favor of disarmament?not a freeze.55 To make any sense at all, Mr. Lawler must mean that being for the freeze means that one is not for disarmament? hardly a rational position. One recalls here the arguments, during the 19305s and 19405s, that being for racial justice in the United States was suspect if not immoral, in the eyes of some, because the communists also favored it.
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Journal Article•
TL;DR: The core argument of this essay is that a certain version of rational democratic deliberation is most likely to yield "just enough" rationing outcomes regarding these therapies, given that no philosophic theories of justice can yield a uniquely morally correct resolution to this rationing problem due to the "burdens of judgment" integral to such problems.
Abstract: What does it mean to be a just and caring society, or managed care plan, when we have only limited resources to meet virtually unlimited health care needs, and the need before us now is a person faced with death unless h/she has access to a very expensive medical intervention offering only a relatively small gain in life expectancy? This is the "last chance therapy" problem. Examples of such therapies would include Herceptin therapy for metastasized breast cancer, and the left-ventricular assist device or the totally implantable artificial heart for end-stage heart disease. Making rationing decisions with respect to such therapies is clearly morally challenging, but ultimately inescapable. Appeal to the Rule of Rescue to prevent such rationing decisions is not morally defensible, given the cost and ubiquity of such needed rescue efforts, not to mention the unjust distortions in meeting other health needs caused by the large resource demands associated with last chance therapies. Likewise, reliance on market mechanisms will not yield just access to these therapies. The core argument of this essay is that a certain version of rational democratic deliberation is most likely to yield "just enough" rationing outcomes regarding these therapies, given that no philosophic theories of justice can yield a uniquely morally correct resolution to this rationing problem due to the "burdens of judgment" integral to such problems. The key moral virtue of such suitably structured deliberative conversations is that rationing decisions are freely self-imposed through a process of public reason-giving that is congruent with both our deepest liberal political commitments and our evolving complex considered judgments of health care justice. An additional virtue of this democratic deliberative approach is that it allows us to address effectively a number of other broad rationing problems, including the "fair chances/best outcomes," "ragged edge," and "priorities" problems.
11 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors focus on the relationship of housing wealth to neoclassical consumption theory, and in particular the degree to which homes can be treated collectively with other forms of "permanent income".
Abstract: The development of the permanent income/life cycle consumption hypothesis was a key blow to Keynesian and Kaleckian economics, and, according to George Akerlof, it "set the agenda" for modern neoclassical macroeconomics This paper focuses on the relationship of housing wealth to neoclassical consumption theory, and in particular, the degree to which homes can be treated collectively with other forms of "permanent income" The neoclassical analysis is evaluated as a partly normative and partly positive one, in recognition of the dual function of the neoclassical theory of rationality The paper rests its critique primarily on the distinctive role of homes in social life; theories that fail to recognize this role jeopardize the social and economic goods at stake Since many families do not own large amounts of assets other than their places of residence, these issues have important ramifications for the relevance of consumption theory as a whole
11 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: This paper argued that the ethics of honour, especially in the form it took in the works of Hume and Smith, can still be of value, exactly because it is less demanding, and argued that honour is important for both knowing what moral is and acting on it.
Abstract: Until fairly recently it was not uncommon for political theorists to hold the view that people cannot be expected to act in accordance with the public interest without some incentive. Authors such as Marcus Tullius Cicero, John Locke, David Hume and Adam Smith, for instance, held that people often act in accordance with the public interest, but more from a concern for their honour and reputation than from a concern for the greater good. Today, most authors take a more demanding view, maintaining that people are to be just solely from a love for justice, not from a fear of losing face. In this article today’s prevailing view, which sees honour as something obsolete and archaic and not as a legitimate motive, is contrasted with the older view that honour is important for both knowing what moral is and acting on it. Subsequently, it is argued that the ethics of honour, especially in the form it took in the works of Hume and Smith, can still be of value, exactly because it is less demanding.
11 citations
Cites background from "Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pl..."
...With today’s more egalitarian ordering, however, Michael Walzer for instance, deems such a redistribution of honour not only necessary but also realizable (although less so than a redistribution of money)....
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...See for instance Michael J. Sandel (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 43....
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...486 Michael Walzer (1983) Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality, p. 257....
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01 Jan 2005
11 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, a conceptual framework of how social interactions are affected by the need for social recognition is provided, and a heuristic tool for the analysis of the impact of social recognition on a variety of behavioral domains.
Abstract: Evidence shows that social recognition works as a motive for many of people’s behavior. Within sociology, a longstanding tradition has shown that this recognition motive produces social and symbolic boundaries, encompassing consumption patterns and different lifestyles, and that the need for social recognition can, for example, explain violent behavior. In this paper, I provide a conceptual framework of how social interactions are affected by the need for social recognition. A natural starting point to theorize about social interactions is Goffmanian Game Theory. However, Goffman excludes underlying motivations in his analyses. Therefore, I supplement the analysis with elements from rational choice theory; a theory that, in itself, scarcely bears attention to the internal structure of social interactions. This study results in an analytical scheme of the actors and factors that affect social recognition games. Also, it reveals the competition that is likely to occur within particular social recognition games. As a result, this framework allows a better understanding of how social recognition affects social interactions, and offers a heuristic tool for the analysis of the impact of social recognition on a variety of behavioral domains. Social recognition, social interactions, Goffmanian Game Theory approach
11 citations
Cites background from "Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pl..."
...“complex equality” (Walzer 1983), which holds that inequalities within one sphere...
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