Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality
TL;DR: Lawler as mentioned in this paper argued that being for the freeze means that one is not for disarmament, which is hardly a rational position in the sense that it is suspect if not immoral, in the eyes of some.
Abstract: that a plurality of the American Catholic bishops endorse a nuclear freeze (p. 4), saying that they are thus "taking their stance with Moscow,55 which is for a freeze, and not with the Vatican, which "is still in favor of disarmament?not a freeze.55 To make any sense at all, Mr. Lawler must mean that being for the freeze means that one is not for disarmament? hardly a rational position. One recalls here the arguments, during the 19305s and 19405s, that being for racial justice in the United States was suspect if not immoral, in the eyes of some, because the communists also favored it.
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20 Jun 2022
TL;DR: This work presents the first comprehensive ethical defense of Affirmative PSPRA algorithms, based on fairness in terms of relational equality instead, and shows that equalizing accuracy is neither sufficient nor necessary for fairness based on relational equality.
Abstract: Many statistical fairness notions have been proposed for algorithmic decision-making systems, and especially public safety pretrial risk assessment (PSPRA) algorithms such as COMPAS. Most fairness notions equalize something between groups, whether it is false positive rates or accuracy. In fact, I demonstrate that most prominent notions have their basis in equalizing some form of accuracy. However, statistical fairness metrics often do not capture the substantive point of equality. I argue that equal accuracy is not only difficult to measure but also unsatisfactory for ensuring equal justice. In response, I introduce philosopher Elizabeth Anderson’s theory of relational equality as a fruitful alternative framework: to relate as equals, people need access to certain basic capabilities. I show that relational equality requires Affirmative PSPRA algorithms that lower risk scores for Black defendants. This is because fairness based on relational equality means considering the impact of PSPRA algorithms’ decisions on access to basic capabilities. This impact is racially asymmetric in an unjust society. I make three main contributions: (1) I illustrate the shortcomings of statistical fairness notions in their reliance on equalizing some form of accuracy; (2) I present the first comprehensive ethical defense of Affirmative PSPRA algorithms, based on fairness in terms of relational equality instead; and (3) I show that equalizing accuracy is neither sufficient nor necessary for fairness based on relational equality. Overall, this work serves narrowly as a reason to re-evaluate algorithmic fairness for PSPRA algorithms, and serves broadly as an example of how discussions of algorithmic fairness can benefit from egalitarian philosophical frameworks.
4 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors build on recent findings of experiments to give proof of the extent to which a general behavioural tendency towards equality is widespread among people, and highlight "desert" and "need" as the crucial criteria of just distribution.
Abstract: Abstract When we want to justify claims against one another, we discover that conceptual thought alone is not sufficient to legitimize property and income in the relative and proper proportions among members of a productive group. Instead, the basis for justification should also be seen in motivational states, validated less by rational thought than by an effective behaviour. To circumnavigate otherwise dangerously utopian claims to justice, the social sciences, and especially behavioural economics, are the most reliable basis for normative distributive justice. This article builds on recent findings of experiments, first of all in order to give proof of the extent to which a general behavioural tendency towards equality is widespread among people, and second of all in order to highlight ‘desert’ and ‘need’ as the crucial criteria of just distribution, which will then sum up to justified inequality in the economic sphere.
3 citations
Cites background from "Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pl..."
...10 Miller 1999, ch. 2 distinguishes three, Walzer 1983 nine or more spheres....
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23 Feb 2018
Abstract: In this article, the very essence of proportionality is assessed in light of a substantive theory of justice and rights. Despite the existence of the principle of proportionality, a theory that is “external” to the mechanics of proportionality is deemed necessary. One that facilitates the work of judges when assessing the normative issues when they adjudicate using the principle of proportionality. The steps and probabilities of proportionality are not enough in order to draw qualitative distinctions among rights or balance the abstract weight of the right’s limitation vis-à-vis the achievement of legitimate ends or the guarantee of other rights. Therefore, this article underscores the need of background substantive theories that underpin the application of the principle. Such theories should address, among other issues, the scope and enforcement of rights in the different spheres of social life, the horizontal effect of constitutional rights in the private domain, or the institutional consequences of the principle concerning the role of courts when exercising constitutional review.
3 citations
TL;DR: The authors look at a recent challenge to the liberal inclusivist view that everyone on the state's territory should have a path to citizenship and reject the idea that a voluntary choice to migrate can be taken as consent to an inferior status, since it requires them to treat their own unjust attitudes as an objective constraint.
Abstract: This paper looks at a recent challenge to the liberal inclusivist view that everyone on the state’s territory should have a path to citizenship. Economists have argued that giving immigrants an inferior legal status would persuade wealthy countries to admit more, with beneficial consequences for global justice. Whilst this trade-off might seem appealing from the impersonal perspective of the policymaker it generates incoherence from the perpective of the collective of democratic citizens, since it requires them to treat their own unjust attitudes as an objective constraint. The paper also rejects the idea that a voluntary choice to migrate can be taken as consent to an inferior status.
3 citations
Cites background from "Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pl..."
...Equality In an early contribution to the philosophical debate around migration and justice, Michael Walzer argued that temporary labour migration is anomalous and that such migrants, if their stay extends beyond some bare minimum, should be put on a path to full citizenship (Walzer 1983, pp. 56–61)....
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a new form of the exclusion argument against closed borders which escapes this "right to stay put" reply by describing a kind of exclusion that has not been discussed in depth.
Abstract: Supporters of open borders sometimes argue that the state has no pro tanto right to restrict immigration, because such a right would also entail a right to exclude existing citizens for whatever reasons justify excluding immigrants. These arguments can be defeated by suggesting that people have a right to stay put. I present a new form of the exclusion argument against closed borders which escapes this “right to stay put” reply. I do this by describing a kind of exclusion that has not been discussed in depth, which I call “territorial exclusion.” Territorial exclusion is the process according to which the group that wishes to exclude current citizens secedes from the territory in which those citizens reside. I argue that the wrongness of territorial exclusion explains why there is no pro tanto right for a state to exclude immigrants, because otherwise there would be a pro tanto right for the state to kick people out by seceding from the territory they inhabit. Because kicking people out like this is typically wrong, borders cannot be closed.
3 citations