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Journal ArticleDOI

Statistical physics of crime: A review

TL;DR: In this article, the authors review different approaches aimed at modeling and improving our understanding of crime, focusing on the nucleation of crime hotspots using partial differential equations, self-exciting point process and agent-based modeling, adversarial evolutionary games, and network science behind the formation of gangs and large-scale organized crime.
Abstract: Containing the spreading of crime in urban societies remains a major challenge. Empirical evidence suggests that, left unchecked, crimes may be recurrent and proliferate. On the other hand, eradicating a culture of crime may be difficult, especially under extreme social circumstances that impair the creation of a shared sense of social responsibility. Although our understanding of the mechanisms that drive the emergence and diffusion of crime is still incomplete, recent research highlights applied mathematics and methods of statistical physics as valuable theoretical resources that may help us better understand criminal activity. We review different approaches aimed at modeling and improving our understanding of crime, focusing on the nucleation of crime hotspots using partial differential equations, self-exciting point process and agent-based modeling, adversarial evolutionary games, and the network science behind the formation of gangs and large-scale organized crime. We emphasize that statistical physics of crime can relevantly inform the design of successful crime prevention strategies, as well as improve the accuracy of expectations about how different policing interventions should impact malicious human activity deviating from social norms. We also outline possible directions for future research, related to the effects of social and coevolving networks and to the hierarchical growth of criminal structures due to self-organization.

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  • This is particularly evident – even for microcriminality – in urban areas (in Europe and North America the percent of population living in urban areas is around 85%).
  • And the role of mathematical, statistical, and physical models has been steadily increasing.
  • Thus, the paper [6] appears to be extremely timely and useful.
  • Generally speaking, models are often more descriptive than predictive, in the sense that it is not expected that they predict e.g. the number of burglaries or car thefts that will occur in a given district over a given period of time.
  • Nevertheless, they can be instrumental in describing the mechanisms by which it can be foreseen that a concentration of crimes can appear in particular zones (hot spots), or the “contagion” that criminal behaviour can have on particular classes of individuals.
  • This description can in turn suggest how to contrast the phenomena.
  • Therefore, modelling the diffusion of criminal (or simply unlawful) behaviour in urban areas can be a tool that administrations and police authorities can use in order to choose optimal strategies to combat crime.
  • And this is particularly important in a horizon of budget cuts that impose the best use of the existing resources, optimization of strategies, logistics etc.
  • Of course “for complex phenomena as criminality (in its various guises), the goal is not to represent the whole reality, let alone generate precise predictions.
  • The enhanced understanding of “stylized facts” that characterise a system of interest by isolating elements of a theoretical model can shed new light on the subject and contribute to new insights into the more complex global picture.
  • With the aid of such models, one can then investigate the various effects implied by factors such as the severity of punishment, duration of imprisonment, different deterrence strategies, or the allocation of limited crime reduction resources in the most efficient way” [4].

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Physics of Life Reviews 12 (2015) 34–35
www.elsevier.com/locate/plrev
Comment
The role of mathematical modelling in modern criminology
Comment
on “Statistical physics of crime: A review” by
M.R. D’Orsogna and M. Perc
Mario Primicerio
Dipartimento di Matematica “U. Dini”, Università di Firenze, Viale Morgagni 67/A, 50141 Firenze, Italy
Received 2
December 2014; accepted 3 December 2014
Available
online 5 December 2014
Communicated by L.
Peliti
Criminality is a big challenge at several different levels. This is particularly evident even for microcriminality
in urban areas (in Europe and North America the percent of population living in urban areas is around 85%). It is
considered by sociologists among the most important indexes affecting the (perception of the) quality of life in a gi
ven
place.
Starting from the seminal paper by G. Beck
er [3], the study of crime and criminality from the point of view of
economics has been developed in several directions. And the role of mathematical, statistical, and physical models
has been steadily increasing. Thus, the paper [6] appears to be extremely timely and useful.
Generally speaking, models are often more descriptive than pr
edictive, in the sense that it is not expected that
they predict e.g. the number of burglaries or car thefts that will occur in a given district over a given period of time.
Nevertheless, they can be instrumental in describing the mechanisms by which it can be foreseen that a concentration
of crimes can appear in particular zones (hot spots), or the “contagion” that criminal beha
viour can have on particular
classes of individuals. This description can in turn suggest how to contrast the phenomena.
Therefore, modelling the dif
fusion of criminal (or simply unlawful) behaviour in urban areas can be a tool that
administrations and police authorities can use in order to choose optimal strategies to combat crime. And this is par-
ticularly important in a horizon of budget cuts that impose the best use of the existing (scarce) resources, optimization
of strate
gies, logistics etc.
Another feature of the models is the fact that they allow to perform simulations to mimic the response of the system
to changes of parameters, of external inputs or constraints. Of course “for complex phenomena as criminality (in its
various guises), the goal is not to represent the whole reality, let alone generate precise predictions. However, the
enhanced understanding of “stylized facts” that characterise a system of inter
est by isolating elements of a theoretical
model can shed new light on the subject and contribute to new insights into the more complex global picture. With the
aid of such models, one can then investigate the various effects implied by factors such as the severity of punishment,
dur
ation of imprisonment, different deterrence strategies, or the allocation of limited crime reduction resources in the
most efficient way” [4].
DOI of original article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.plrev.2014.11.001.
E-mail
address: primicer@math.unifi.it.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.plrev.2014.12.001
1571-0645/© 2014
Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

M. Primicerio / Physics of Life Reviews 12 (2015) 34–35 35
The review by M.R. D’Orsogna and M. Perc [6] shows how rich is the panorama of the methods that can be of
help.
A special attention is devoted to agent-based models in which the time-varying attractiveness of a given target (for
instance in burglary) is modelled, biasing the movement of a burglar over a grid simulating the city; the consequent
probability of occurrence of crime is evaluated, thus influencing in turn the attractiveness of the target. Possible
mean-field approximations are discussed, leading to models based on population dynamics and on reaction–dif
fusion
equations. Perhaps, from this point of view, the bibliography of the review could be successfully complemented with
the one that can be found in the paper by M. Gordon [7] and by the papers published in a special issue of EJAM [11]
in 2010.
Among the agent-based models, one could also include the methods based on cellular automata that can take into
account the influence that “neighbours” can have in the diffusion of unlawful behaviour (e.g. tax evasion), see for
instance [9].
Another important class of models is based on “space–time point processes”. These are particularly rele
vant to
the crimes that appear to be clustered in time and space, so that a methodology similar to that applied in studying
earthquake swarms and clusters can be used. This is a typical example in which a technique that has pro
ved efficient
in a context that is far from sociology and criminology appears to be successful not only in describing the occurrence
of an offence, but also, in some cases, to locate the home base of criminals.
It is well-kno
wn, and properly outlined in the paper, that evolutionary game theory has proved to be apt to model
some basic phenomena connected with crime and criminology, including the role of social control in discouraging
criminality: the category of “informants” plays a major role in the desirable transition from a criminal-controlled
society to an almost crime-free situation. And this is clearly described by an e
volutionary game with four possible
strategies (criminal, informants, guards, and “blinds”). Inspection games are another category of techniques that are
used in this context, although some counter-intuitive results could be obtained (see e.g. [1]).
An emer
ging line of investigation is also reviewed by the paper, with several hints of possible new areas of research:
the development of networks of criminality. The increasing interconnectivity of our societies suggests that, besides of
the classical cases of geographically localized networks such as street gangs, one could have to deal with or
ganized
criminal networks [8] that have a worldwide domain of action (drug dealers, money laundering [2,10] etc.); but another
topic that deserves further investigation concerns the way criminal or unlawful behaviour can proliferate just because
of the existence of social networks [5].
A final remark on the paper: the bibliograph
y is so rich that it would have been desirable that the references are
ordered by the alphabetical order of the first author, or by the date of publication.
References
[1] Andreozzi L. Rewarding policemen increases crime. Some more surprising results from the inspection game. Public Choice 2004;121:69–82.
[2] Araujo
RA. An evolutionary game theory approach to combat money laundering. J Money Laund Control 2010;13:70–8.
[3] Beck
er G. Crime and punishment: an economic approach. J Polit Econ 1968;76:169–217.
[4] Berestycki
H, Johnson SD, Ockendon JR, Primicerio M. Foreword to the special issue of EJAM on crime modelling. Eur J Appl Math
2010;21:271–4.
[5] Calvò-Armengol
A, Zenou Y. Social networks and crime decisions: the role of social structure in facilitating delinquent behaviour. Int Econ
Rev 2004;45:939–58.
[6] D’Orsogna
MR, Perc M. Statistical physics of crime: a review. Phys Life Rev 2015;12:1–21 [in this issue].
[7] Gordon
MB. A random walk in the literature on criminality: a partial and critical view on some statistical analysis and modeling approaches.
Eur J Appl Math 2010;21:283–306.
[8] McIll
wain JS. Organized crime: a social network approach. Crime Law Soc Change 1999;32:301–23.
[9] Meacci
L, Nuno JC, Primicerio M. Fighting tax evasion: a cellular automata approach. Adv Math Sci Appl 2012;22:597–610.
[10] Wa
lker J, Unger B. The Walker gravity model. Int Rev Law Econ 2009;5:821–53.
[11] http://journals.cambridge.or
g/action/displayIssue?jid=EJM&volumeId=21&seriesId=0&issueId=4-5.
Citations
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TL;DR: The field of social physics has been a hot topic in the last few decades as mentioned in this paper , with many researchers venturing outside of their traditional domains of interest, but also taking from physics the methods that have proven so successful throughout the 19th and the 20th century.

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10 Jan 2022-Fractals
TL;DR: In this article , the authors proposed a fractional-order crime transmission model by categorizing the existing population into four clusters: law-abiding citizens, criminally active individuals who have not been imprisoned, prisoners, and prisoners who completed the prison tenure.
Abstract: Due to the alarming rise in types of crime committed and the number of criminal activities across the world, there is a great need to amend the existing policies and models adopted by jurisdictional institutes. The majority of the mathematical models have not included the history of the crime committed by the individual, which is vital to control crime transmission in stipulated time. Further, due to various external factors and policies, a considerable number of criminals have not been imprisoned. To address the aforementioned issues prevailing in society, this research proposes a fractional-order crime transmission model by categorizing the existing population into four clusters. These clusters include law-abiding citizens, criminally active individuals who have not been imprisoned, prisoners, and prisoners who completed the prison tenure. The well-posedness and stability of the proposed fractional model are discussed in this work. Furthermore, the proposed model is extended to the delayed model by introducing the time-delay coefficient as time lag occurs between the individual’s offense and the judgment. The endemic equilibrium of the delayed model is locally asymptotically stable up to a certain extent, after which bifurcation occurs.

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TL;DR: In this paper , a comprehensive investigation of corruption networks related to political scandals in Spain and Brazil over nearly three decades is presented, showing that corruption networks of both countries share universal structural and dynamical properties, including similar degree distributions, clustering and assortativity coefficients, modular structure, and a growth process that is marked by the coalescence of network components due to a few recidivist criminals.
Abstract: Corruption crimes demand highly coordinated actions among criminal agents to succeed. But research dedicated to corruption networks is still in its infancy and indeed little is known about the properties of these networks. Here we present a comprehensive investigation of corruption networks related to political scandals in Spain and Brazil over nearly three decades. We show that corruption networks of both countries share universal structural and dynamical properties, including similar degree distributions, clustering and assortativity coefficients, modular structure, and a growth process that is marked by the coalescence of network components due to a few recidivist criminals. We propose a simple model that not only reproduces these empirical properties but reveals also that corruption networks operate near a critical recidivism rate below which the network is entirely fragmented and above which it is overly connected. Our research thus indicates that actions focused on decreasing corruption recidivism may substantially mitigate this type of organized crime.

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TL;DR: In this paper , structural properties of political corruption, police intelligence, and money laundering networks can be used to recover missing criminal partnerships, distinguish among different types of criminal and legal associations, as well as predict the total amount of money exchanged among criminal agents.
Abstract: Recent research has shown that criminal networks have complex organizational structures, but whether this can be used to predict static and dynamic properties of criminal networks remains little explored. Here, by combining graph representation learning and machine learning methods, we show that structural properties of political corruption, police intelligence, and money laundering networks can be used to recover missing criminal partnerships, distinguish among different types of criminal and legal associations, as well as predict the total amount of money exchanged among criminal agents, all with outstanding accuracy. We also show that our approach can anticipate future criminal associations during the dynamic growth of corruption networks with significant accuracy. Thus, similar to evidence found at crime scenes, we conclude that structural patterns of criminal networks carry crucial information about illegal activities, which allows machine learning methods to predict missing information and even anticipate future criminal behavior.

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The present study indicates that, for all reasonably regular initial data and any corresponding Neumann initial-boundary value problem possesses a global generalized solution, which becomes bounded and smooth at least eventually.
Abstract:

We consider a chemotaxis system over a bounded domain \begin{document}$ \Omega\subset \mathbb R^2 $\end{document} of the following form

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The present study indicates that nevertheless, for all reasonably regular initial data and any \begin{document}$ \chi>0 $\end{document}, the corresponding Neumann initial-boundary value problem possesses a global generalized solution. Furthermore, it also demonstrates that, whenever \begin{document}$ a = 0 $\end{document}, such global generalized solution becomes bounded and smooth at least eventually. In particular, it approaches the spatial equilibria at exponential rate in the large time limit.

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References
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The implementation of self-exciting point process models in the context of urban crime is illustrated using residential burglary data provided by the Los Angeles Police Department to gain insight into the form of the space–time triggering function and temporal trends in the background rate of burglary.
Abstract: Highly clustered event sequences are observed in certain types of crime data, such as burglary and gang violence, due to crime-specific patterns of criminal behavior. Similar clustering patterns are observed by seismologists, as earthquakes are well known to increase the risk of subsequent earthquakes, or aftershocks, near the location of an initial event. Space–time clustering is modeled in seismology by self-exciting point processes and the focus of this article is to show that these methods are well suited for criminological applications. We first review self-exciting point processes in the context of seismology. Next, using residential burglary data provided by the Los Angeles Police Department, we illustrate the implementation of self-exciting point process models in the context of urban crime. For this purpose we use a fully nonparametric estimation methodology to gain insight into the form of the space–time triggering function and temporal trends in the background rate of burglary.

797 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
25 Nov 2004-Nature
TL;DR: It is shown that the threat of exclusion from indirect reciprocity can sustain collective action in the laboratory, and that such exclusion is evolutionarily stable, providing an incentive to engage in costly cooperation, while avoiding the second-order free rider problem.
Abstract: Models of large-scale human cooperation take two forms 'Indirect reciprocity' occurs when individuals help others in order to uphold a reputation and so be included in future cooperation In 'collective action', individuals engage in costly behaviour that benefits the group as a whole Although the evolution of indirect reciprocity is theoretically plausible, there is no consensus about how collective action evolves Evidence suggests that punishing free riders can maintain cooperation, but why individuals should engage in costly punishment is unclear Solutions to this 'second-order free rider problem' include meta-punishment, mutation, conformism, signalling and group-selection The threat of exclusion from indirect reciprocity can sustain collective action in the laboratory Here, we show that such exclusion is evolutionarily stable, providing an incentive to engage in costly cooperation, while avoiding the second-order free rider problem because punishers can withhold help from free riders without damaging their reputations However, we also show that such a strategy cannot invade a population in which indirect reciprocity is not linked to collective action, thus leaving unexplained how collective action arises

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TL;DR: This paper analyzed the relationship between unemployment and crime using U.S. state data and found that a substantial portion of the decline in property crime rates during the 1990s is attributable to the decline of the unemployment rate.
Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the relationship between unemployment and crime. Using U.S. state data, we estimate the effect of unemployment on the rates of seven felony offenses. We control extensively for state‐level demographic and economic factors and estimate specifications that include state‐specific time trends, state effects, and year effects. In addition, we use prime defense contracts and a state‐specific measure of exposure to oil shocks as instruments for unemployment rates. We find significantly positive effects of unemployment on property crime rates that are stable across model specifications. Our estimates suggest that a substantial portion of the decline in property crime rates during the 1990s is attributable to the decline in the unemployment rate. The evidence for violent crime is considerably weaker. However, a closer analysis of the violent crime of rape yields some evidence that the employment prospects of males are weakly related to state rape rates.

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Journal ArticleDOI
20 Mar 2008-Nature
TL;DR: It is shown that the option of costly punishment increases the amount of cooperation but not the average payoff of the group, which suggests that costly punishment behaviour is maladaptive in cooperation games and might have evolved for other reasons.
Abstract: Many theories have been offered to explain the evolution of cooperation in humans. One proposal is that costly punishment can promote cooperation. Everyone benefits on average, the theory goes, despite the cost to those doing the punishing. But most of our interactions are repeated, and in such cases punishment can lead to retaliation. Using a variant of the 'Prisoner's Dilemma' game, Dreber et al. find that punishment increases the frequency of cooperation, but not the average payoff. Costly punishments confer no overall advantage to the group. And players who end up with the highest total payoff ('winners') tend not to use punishment, while those with the lowest payoff ('losers') punish most frequently. It seems that costly punishment may not have evolved to promote cooperation, but for some other purpose. An experimental economics approach finds that punishment increases the frequency of cooperation, but not the average payoff. Thus, the option of costly punishment does not confer an advantage to the group. Moreover, players who end up with the highest total payoff ('winners') do not use punishment, whereas players who end up with the lowest payoff ('losers') use punishment most frequently. A key aspect of human behaviour is cooperation1,2,3,4,5,6,7. We tend to help others even if costs are involved. We are more likely to help when the costs are small and the benefits for the other person significant. Cooperation leads to a tension between what is best for the individual and what is best for the group. A group does better if everyone cooperates, but each individual is tempted to defect. Recently there has been much interest in exploring the effect of costly punishment on human cooperation8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23. Costly punishment means paying a cost for another individual to incur a cost. It has been suggested that costly punishment promotes cooperation even in non-repeated games and without any possibility of reputation effects10. But most of our interactions are repeated and reputation is always at stake. Thus, if costly punishment is important in promoting cooperation, it must do so in a repeated setting. We have performed experiments in which, in each round of a repeated game, people choose between cooperation, defection and costly punishment. In control experiments, people could only cooperate or defect. Here we show that the option of costly punishment increases the amount of cooperation but not the average payoff of the group. Furthermore, there is a strong negative correlation between total payoff and use of costly punishment. Those people who gain the highest total payoff tend not to use costly punishment: winners don’t punish. This suggests that costly punishment behaviour is maladaptive in cooperation games and might have evolved for other reasons.

683 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
04 Sep 2009-Science
TL;DR: It is shown that reward is as effective as punishment for maintaining public cooperation and leads to higher total earnings and that human cooperation in such repeated settings is best supported by positive interactions with others.
Abstract: The public goods game is the classic laboratory paradigm for studying collective action problems. Each participant chooses how much to contribute to a common pool that returns benefits to all participants equally. The ideal outcome occurs if everybody contributes the maximum amount, but the self-interested strategy is not to contribute anything. Most previous studies have found punishment to be more effective than reward for maintaining cooperation in public goods games. The typical design of these studies, however, represses future consequences for today’s actions. In an experimental setting, we compare public goods games followed by punishment, reward, or both in the setting of truly repeated games, in which player identities persist from round to round. We show that reward is as effective as punishment for maintaining public cooperation and leads to higher total earnings. Moreover, when both options are available, reward leads to increased contributions and payoff, whereas punishment has no effect on contributions and leads to lower payoff. We conclude that reward outperforms punishment in repeated public goods games and that human cooperation in such repeated settings is best supported by positive interactions with others.

659 citations

Frequently Asked Questions (1)
Q1. What have the authors contributed in "The role of mathematical modelling in modern criminology.comment on “statistical physics of crime: a review” by m.r. d'orsogna and m. perc" ?

Starting from the seminal paper by G. Becker [ 3 ], the study of crime and criminality from the point of view of economics has been developed in several directions. Thus, the paper [ 6 ] appears to be extremely timely and useful. Therefore, modelling the diffusion of criminal ( or simply unlawful ) behaviour in urban areas can be a tool that administrations and police authorities can use in order to choose optimal strategies to combat crime. This description can in turn suggest how to contrast the phenomena.