Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts
TL;DR: This chapter extends the newsvendor model by allowing the retailer to choose the retail price in addition to the stocking quantity, and discusses an infinite horizon stochastic demand model in which the retailer receives replenishments from a supplier after a constant lead time.
Abstract: Publisher Summary This chapter reviews the supply chain coordination with contracts. Numerous supply chain models are discussed. In each model, the supply chain optimal actions are identified. The chapter extends the newsvendor model by allowing the retailer to choose the retail price in addition to the stocking quantity. Coordination is more complex in this setting because the incentives provided to align one action might cause distortions with the other action. The newsvendor model is also extended by allowing the retailer to exert costly effort to increase demand. Coordination is challenging because the retailer's effort is noncontractible—that is, the firms cannot write contracts based on the effort chosen. The chapter also discusses an infinite horizon stochastic demand model in which the retailer receives replenishments from a supplier after a constant lead time. Coordination requires that the retailer chooses a large basestock level.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a review of various quantitative models for managing supply chain risks and relate various supply chain risk management strategies examined in the research literature with actual practices, highlighting the gap between theory and practice, and motivate researchers to develop new models for mitigating supply chain disruptions.
2,085 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide a conceptual framework that reflects the joint activities of risk assessment and risk mitigation that are fundamental to disruption risk management in supply chains, and consider empirical results from a rich data set covering the period 1995-2000 on accidents in the U. S. Chemical Industry.
Abstract: There are two broad categories of risk affecting supply chain design and management: (1) risks arising from the problems of coordinating supply and demand, and (2) risks arising from disruptions to normal activities. This paper is concerned with the second category of risks, which may arise from natural disasters, from strikes and economic disruptions, and from acts of purposeful agents, including terrorists. The paper provides a conceptual framework that reflects the joint activities of risk assessment and risk mitigation that are fundamental to disruption risk management in supply chains. We then consider empirical results from a rich data set covering the period 1995–2000 on accidents in the U. S. Chemical Industry. Based on these results and other literature, we discuss the implications for the design of management systems intended to cope with supply chain disruption risks.
1,771 citations
Cites background from "Supply Chain Coordination with Cont..."
...…2004; Boyaci and Gallego 2004; Souza et al. 2004; Gan et al. 2004, 2005)); and the literature on supply chain contracting in particular (e.g., Peleg et al. 2002; Kleindorfer and Wu 2003; Cachon 2003; Kraiselburd et al. 2004; Gerchak and Wang 2004; and Martinez-de-Albeniz and Simchi-Levi 2005)....
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors describe how after a fire at a sub-supplier, with a huge impact on Ericsson, has implemented a new organization, and new processes and tools for SCRM.
Abstract: Supply chain risk management (SCRM) is of growing importance, as the vulnerability of supply chains increases. The main thrust of this article is to describe how Ericsson, after a fire at a sub‐supplier, with a huge impact on Ericsson, has implemented a new organization, and new processes and tools for SCRM. The approach described tries to analyze, assess and manage risk sources along the supply chain, partly by working close with suppliers but also by placing formal requirements on them. This explorative study also indicates that insurance companies might be a driving force for improved SCRM, as they now start to understand the vulnerability of modern supply chains. The article concludes with a discussion of risk related to traditional logistics concepts (time, cost, quality, agility and leanness) by arguing that supply chain risks should also be put into the trade‐off analysis when evaluating new logistics solutions – not with the purpose to minimize risks, however, but to find the efficient level of risk and prevention.
977 citations
01 Jan 2004
TL;DR: Game theory is a powerful tool for analyzing situations in which the decisions of multiple agents affect each agent's payoff as discussed by the authors and deals with interactive optimization problems, such as games with imperfect information and auctions.
Abstract: Game theory (hereafter GT) is a powerful tool for analyzing situations in which the decisions of multiple agents affect each agent’s payoff. As such, GT deals with interactive optimization problems. While many economists in the past few centuries have worked on what can be considered game-theoretic models, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern are formally credited as the fathers of modern game theory. Their classic book “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior”, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), summarizes the basic concepts existing at that time. GT has since enjoyed an explosion of developments, including the concept of equilibrium by Nash (1950), games with imperfect information by Kuhn (1953), cooperative games by Aumann (1959) and Shubik (1962) and auctions by Vickrey (1961), to name just a few. Citing Shubik (2002), “In the 50s ... game theory was looked upon as a curiosum not to be taken seriously by any behavioral scientist. By the late 1980s, game theory in the new industrial organization has taken over ... game theory has proved its success in many disciplines.”
691 citations
Cites background from "Supply Chain Coordination with Cont..."
...See [ 17 ] for a comprehensive survey and taxonomy....
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a model of an SC contract aimed at coordinating a three-stage supply chain, which is based on the revenue sharing mechanism, which allows the system efficiency to be achieved as well as it could improve the profits of all the SC actors, by tuning the contract parameters.
684 citations
References
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TL;DR: In this article, the role of imperfect information in a principal-agent relationship subject to moral hazard is considered, and a necessary and sufficient condition for imperfect information to improve on contracts based on the payoff alone is derived.
Abstract: The role of imperfect information in a principal-agent relationship subject to moral hazard is considered. A necessary and sufficient condition for imperfect information to improve on contracts based on the payoff alone is derived, and a characterization of the optimal use of such information is given.
7,964 citations
"Supply Chain Coordination with Cont..." refers background in this paper
...See Chen and Zheng (1994) for an elegant proof....
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...(See §5.2.)...
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...See Milner and Pinker (2000) for another model with early capacity decisions and later forecast adjustments. van Mieghem (1999) and Donohue (2000) also di¤er on what they assume about the …rms ability to commit to future actions....
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...However, one suspects the supplier could bene…t in that situation from a partial return credit, i.e., b w.42 See Bernstein and Federgruen (1999) for a more complex model with deterministic demand and competing retailers....
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...See Pasternack (1985) for a detailed analysis of buy-back contracts in the context of the newsvendor problem....
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Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study moral hazard with many agents and focus on two features that are novel in a multiagent setting: free riding and competition, and show that competition among agents (due to relative evaluations) has merit solely as a device to extract information optimally.
Abstract: This article studies moral hazard with many agents. The focus is on two features that are novel in a multiagent setting: free riding and competition. The free-rider problem implies a new role for the principal: administering incentive schemes that do not balance the budget. This new role is essential for controlling incentives and suggests that firms in which ownership and labor are partly separated will have an advantage over partnerships in which output is distributed among agents. A new characterization of informative (hence valuable) monitoring is derived and applied to analyze the value of relative performance evaluation. It is shown that competition among agents (due to relative evaluations) has merit solely as a device to extract information optimally. Competition per se is worthless. The role of aggregate measures in relative performance evaluation is also explored, and the implications for investment rules are discussed.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
4,125 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors study moral hazard with many agents and focus on two features that are novel in a multiagent setting: free riding and competition, and show that competition among agents (due to relative evaluations) has merit solely as a device to extract information optimally.
Abstract: This article studies moral hazard with many agents. The focus is on two features that are novel in a multiagent setting: free riding and competition. The free-rider problem implies a new role for the principal: administering incentive schemes that do not balance the budget. This new role is essential for controlling incentives and suggests that firms in which ownership and labor are partly separated will have an advantage over partnerships in which output is distributed among agents. A new characterization of informative (hence valuable) monitoring is derived and applied to analyze the value of relative performance evaluation. It is shown that competition among agents (due to relative evaluations) has merit solely as a device to extract information optimally. Competition per se is worthless. The role of aggregate measures in relative performance evaluation is also explored, and the implications for investment rules are discussed.
3,991 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1998
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a framework for inventory management and production planning and scheduling with a focus on the most important (Class A) and routine (Class C) items.
Abstract: THE CONTEXT AND IMPORTANCE OF INVENTORY MANAGEMENT AND PRODUCTION PLANNING AND SCHEDULING. The Importance of Inventory Management and Production Planning and Scheduling. Strategic Issues. Frameworks for Inventory Management and Production Planning and Scheduling. Forecasting. TRADITIONAL REPLENISHMENT SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING INDIVIDUAL--ITEM INVENTORIES. Order Quantities When Demand is Approximately Level. Lot Sizing for Individual Items with Time--Varying Demand. Individual Items with Probabilistic Demand. SPECIAL CLASSES OF ITEMS. Managing the Most Important (Class A) Inventories. Managing Routine (Class C) Inventories. Style Goods and Perishable Items. THE COMPLEXITIES OF MULTIPLE ITEMS AND MULTIPLE LOCATIONS. Coorinated Replenishments at a Single Stocking Point. Supply Chain Management and Multiechelon Inventories. PRODUCTION PLANNING AND SCHEDULING. An Overall Framework for Production Planning and Scheduling. Medium--Range Aggregate Production Planning. Material Requirements Planning and its Extensions. Just--in--Time and Optimized Production Technology. Short--Range Production Scheduling. Summary. Appendices. Indexes.
2,739 citations