Personality and Social Psychology Review
16(1) 76 –99
© 2012 by the Society for Personality
and Social Psychology, Inc.
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DOI: 10.1177/1088868311418749
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Self-control is related to a wide range of behaviors. Empirical
research shows that people with high self-control are better
able to control their thoughts, regulate their emotions, and
inhibit their impulses than people with low self-control
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). They enjoy
greater psychological well-being, more academic success, and
better interpersonal relations (W. Mischel, Shoda, & Peake,
1988; Shoda, Mischel, & Peake, 1990; Tangney, Baumeister,
& Boone, 2004). High self-control is relevant to nearly all
forms of behavior conducive to a successful and healthy life.
Conversely, low self-control is assumed to be at the heart of
many societal problems, including obesity, substance
abuse, criminality, impulsive buying, and procrastination
(Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Gottfredson & Hirschi,
1990; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995; Vohs & Faber, 2007).
In view of its beneficial effects for human functioning, self-
control is considered a hallmark of adaptation (W. Mischel,
Cantor, & Feldman, 1996; Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982;
Vohs & Baumeister, 2004) and has become a prominent con-
cept in different areas of research in psychology and other dis-
ciplines, including social psychology, clinical psychology,
developmental psychology, health psychology, criminology,
sociology, and medical sciences.
Given the frequent assertions of the theoretical, empirical,
and practical importance of self-control, the present inves-
tigation undertook to review the evidence concerning the
behavioral concomitants of trait self-control. We sought to learn
whether trait self-control has been shown to be reliably related
to behavior and, if so, how large these effects are. We tested a
series of hypotheses about possible moderators of the rela-
tionship between self-control and behavior, such as whether it
is more strongly related to inhibiting unwanted behaviors or
promoting desired ones, and whether it is more relevant for
habitual, automatic behaviors or for controlled actions.
418749PSRXXX10.1177/1088868311418749de
Ridder et al.Personality and Social Psychology Review
1
Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands
2
VU University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
3
Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA
Corresponding Author:
Denise T. D. de Ridder, Utrecht University, Department of Clinical &
Health Psychology, PO Box 80140, 3508 TC Utrecht, Netherlands
Email: D.T.D.deRidder@uu.nl
Taking Stock of Self-Control:
A Meta-Analysis of How Trait
Self-Control Relates to a Wide
Range of Behaviors
Denise T. D. de Ridder
1
, Gerty Lensvelt-Mulders
1
,
Catrin Finkenauer
2
, F. Marijn Stok
1
, and Roy F. Baumeister
3
Abstract
Given assertions of the theoretical, empirical, and practical importance of self-control, this meta-analytic study sought to review
evidence concerning the relationship between dispositional self-control and behavior. The authors provide a brief overview
over prominent theories of self-control, identifying implicit assumptions surrounding the effects of self-control that warrant
empirical testing. They report the results of a meta-analysis of 102 studies (total N = 32,648) investigating the behavioral effects
of self-control using the Self-Control Scale, the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, and the Low Self-Control Scale. A small to medium
positive effect of self-control on behavior was found for the three scales. Only the Self-Control Scale allowed for a fine-grained
analysis of conceptual moderators of the self-control behavior relation. Specifically, self-control (measured by the Self-Control
Scale) related similarly to the performance of desired behaviors and the inhibition of undesired behaviors, but its effects varied
dramatically across life domains (e.g., achievement, adjustment). In addition, the associations between self-control and behavior
were significantly stronger for automatic (as compared to controlled) behavior and for imagined (as compared to actual)
behavior.
Keywords
self-control, impulsiveness, self-regulation, adaptive behavior, meta-analysis
Konstanzer Online-Publikations-System (KOPS)
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de Ridder et al. 77
The present article is organized as follows. First, it defines
self-control and provides a brief overview of the most promi-
nent theories on self-control, identifying implicit assumptions
surrounding the effects of self-control that warrant empirical
testing. Second, it reports the results of a meta-analysis on
studies investigating the behavioral correlates of trait self-
control as measured by the Self-Control Scale (Tangney et al.,
2004), the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Patton et al., 1995),
and the Low Self-Control Scale (Grasmick, Tittle, Bursik, &
Arneklev, 1993). It includes all published and unpublished
studies since 2004. Third, based on the results of the meta-
analysis, it evaluates the three scales and what the meta-
analytic results have to say about trait self-control and
self-control theory.
What Is Self-Control? Although there is considerable dissent in
the literature over how to name, define, and measure the con-
struct of self-control (Duckworth & Kern, 2011), existing
theories generally agree that self-control can be defined as
the capacity to alter or override dominant response tenden-
cies and to regulate behavior, thoughts, and emotions (Ban-
dura, 1989; Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1982; Metcalfe &
Mischel, 1999; Rothbaum et al., 1982; Vohs & Baumeister,
2004). Because self-control includes the successful regula-
tion of impulses, researchers often equate low trait self-con-
trol with trait impulsiveness, though in principle impulse
strength and self-control or restraint contribute indepen-
dently to whether a behavior is enacted (Duckworth & Kern,
2011; Duckworth & Seligman, 2005; Tangney et al., 2004).
In addition, researchers agree that self-control focuses on the
efforts people exert to stimulate desirable responses and
inhibit undesirable responses and that self-control thereby con-
stitutes an important prerequisite for self-regulation (Bau-
meister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Carver & Scheier, 1998;
Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Tangney et al., 2004).
Research distinguishes between state self-control and
dispositional self-control (Tangney et al., 2004). State self-
control varies across situations and time. Ample empirical
evidence confirms that people’s capacity to exert self-control
is susceptible to situational influences, including previous
attempts at self-control (Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven &
Baumeister, 2000), mood (Fishbach & Labroo, 2007; Tice,
Baumeister, Shmueli, & Muraven, 2007), working memory
capacity (Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt,
2008; Schmeichel, 2007), and motivation (Muraven, 2007).
Dispositional self-control is assumed to be relatively sta-
ble across situations and over time; people with high self-
control are better than others at controlling their impulses
(Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; W. Mischel et al., 1996;
Rothbart, Ellis, Rueda, & Posner, 2003). Similarly, as com-
pared to people with low self-control, people with high self-
control report less substance abuse, psychopathology, eating
disorders, physical and verbal aggression (Tangney et al.,
2004), show greater inhibition of a negative emotional
response (Kieras, Tobin, Graziano, & Rothbart, 2005), and
make greater accommodations in close relationships (Finkel
& Campbell, 2001). Conversely, children with low self-con-
trol, as indicated by poor performance on a delay of gratifi-
cation measure, had poorer academic performance 10 years
later than those with high self-control (W. Mischel et al.,
1988). Adolescents with low self-control engage in more
health risk behaviors, such as increased use of alcohol,
tobacco, and marijuana as well as increased saturated fat
intake than adolescents with high self-control (Wills et al.,
2001; Wills, Isasi, Mendoza, & Ainette, 2007; Wills, Walker,
Mendoza, & Ainette, 2006). Adults low in self-control
engage more often in deviant behavior, including risky driv-
ing, not wearing seatbelts, using force, and committing fraud
(Pratt & Cullen, 2000; Vazsonyi, Pickering, Junger, &
Hessing, 2001). The present article is focused on the behav-
ioral implications of dispositional self-control.
Theories of Self-Control. In this section we briefly describe the
most prominent theories on self-control and identify implicit
assumptions regarding the effects of self-control that have
remained untested. Moreover, we highlight how the differ-
ent theories converge to suggest that self-control is a quintes-
sential feature of self-regulatory behavior.
The discounting model of impulsiveness (Ainslie, 1975)
considers self-control as the choice of a delayed but more valu-
able outcome over a more immediate outcome that is ultimately
of less value. This perspective on self-control is similar to the
delay of gratification concept (W. Mischel, 1974) and equally
emphasizes the importance of controlling immediate impulses
and responses. Similarly, other approaches in this tradition
highlight that self-control requires one to make decisions
and to act in accordance with long-term rather than short-
term outcomes (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Logue, 1988;
Rachlin, 2000). Specifically, Gottfredson and Hirschi’s
(1990) self-control theory contends that the ability to exercise
self-control in the face of temptation accounts for individual
differences in criminal and deviant behavior. Individuals with
low self-control are likely to give in to temptations for misbe-
havior because they have trouble anticipating the long-term
costs of their behavior. Individuals with high self-control, on
the contrary, can resist temptation because they recognize that
in the long run misbehavior comes with costs. Self-control in
these models thus concerns decisions in which people sacri-
fice short-term outcomes in favor of long-term interests, deci-
sions in which immediate (and thus more certain) options are
preferred over delayed (and thus more uncertain) outcomes
(i.e., delay discounting; cf. Frederick, Loewenstein, &
O’Donoghue, 2003).
In hot/cool system approaches to self-regulation
(Loewenstein, 1996; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; W. Mischel,
Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989), self-control is typically concep-
tualized as part of the cool-cognitive or reflective system that
guides goal-directed behavior and requires a person’s voli-
tional control or willpower to be effective. The cool system is
seen as having evolved to serve long-term self-regulatory
purposes that, by means of executive functions (e.g., rea-
soned judgments, strategic action plans), are able to override
78 Personality and Social Psychology Review 16(1)
prepotent impulses and habits. The cool system operates by
a pragmatic principle (“do it if it makes sense”) and is associ-
ated with high self-control, rational self-interest, and lack of
impulsive decision making. In contrast, the hot system oper-
ates by a feeling principle (“do it if it feels good”) and is
associated with low self-control and the potential for impul-
sive action.
The self-regulatory strength model of self-control (Baumeister
et al., 1994; Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996) theorizes that
exerting self-control to change or alter behavior or emotions
requires effort and some form of energy or willpower. Self-
control is considered a strength (rather than a skill or a cogni-
tive schema). By exerting self-control to resist temptations or
engage in desirable behavior, for example, people deplete a
reservoir of limited resources. When self-regulatory resources
have been expended, a state of ego depletion results and failure
on a subsequent, unrelated task requiring self-control is more
likely (Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister,
1998). Importantly, the model and empirical evidence suggest
that different types of self-control (e.g., temptation resistance,
impulse overcoming, task persistence, emotion regulation,
choice making) tap into a common, limited resource. The
important implication is that exerting self-control temporar-
ily depletes resources necessary for a large variety of self-
regulatory behavior across a variety of behavioral domains,
making subsequent self-control failure more likely.
As becomes evident, all models share our definition of self-
control as the capacity of the self to alter dominant responses
and to regulate behavior, thoughts, and emotions. They gener-
ally assume (a) that self-control helps to promote desirable
behavior and inhibit undesirable behavior, (b) that it is ben-
eficial for a large range of behaviors, (c) that it is a conscious
and effortful form of regulating behavior, and (d) that it
affects actual behavior (rather than imagined behavior). In
light of the abundant research on self-control, these assump-
tions seem robust. Nevertheless, as we show in the following,
many of them have not yet been put to an empirical test.
Self-Control Promotes Desirable Behavior and Inhibits Undesirable
Behavior. Most theories and definitions agree that self-control
facilitates both the inhibition of undesirable behavior and the
promotion of desirable behavior to the same extent (although
some theories deny the existence of a behavioral promotion
system and argue that desired behavior comes naturally once
an individual has successfully inhibited an undesired
response; cf. Norman & Shallice, 1986). Nevertheless, sound
empirical evidence for the assumption that self-control has
similar effects on both is lacking. Most research focuses on
the influence of self-control on either undesirable behavior
(e.g., impaired reasoning; Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister,
2003) or desirable behavior (e.g., academic performance;
Duckworth & Seligman, 2005). Even studies that included
both types of behavior assessed many more measures of
undesirable behavior than desirable behavior (Tangney et al.,
2004). Moreover, researchers often seem to assume that
when self-control affects undesirable behavior (less binge
eating; Tangney et al., 2004), this also implies that it affects
desirable behaviors (e.g., healthy eating), and vice versa.
Although this assumption may be valid, it has not yet been
empirically tested. Importantly, the literature suggests rea-
sons to argue that self-control may have differential effects on
desirable and undesirable behavior.
Research on the positive–negative asymmetry consistently
shows that negative events have stronger effects than positive
events for virtually all dimensions of people’s lives, including
their thoughts, their feelings, their behavior, and their relation-
ships (for a review, see Baumeister, Bratlavsky, Finkenauer, &
Vohs, 2001). For example, people are more distressed by the
loss of a certain amount of money than they are made happy
by finding the same amount of money (Kahneman & Tversky,
1984). Some researchers suggest that for positive events to be
stronger than negative events, they need to outnumber them.
For example, Gottman (1994) proposed that positive and
good interactions between partners must outnumber the nega-
tive and bad ones by at least 5 to 1 for close relationships to
succeed. Thus, many good interactions can override the nega-
tive effects of one bad interaction. Given equal numbers of
positive and negative interactions, however, the effects of
negative ones are generally stronger than those of the positive
ones.
What are the implications of the positive–negative asymme-
try for the effect of self-control on desirable versus undesirable
behavior? Theoretically, the hypothesis can go both ways. On
one hand, one could argue that self-control is less effective for
the inhibition of undesirable behavior than for the promotion
of desirable behavior. If undesirable behavior weighs stron-
ger than desirable behavior, then people should need much
more self-control to inhibit undesirable behavior (e.g., yell-
ing back at one’s partner) than to engage in desirable behav-
ior (e.g., engage in accommodation; Rusbult, Verette,
Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991). Conversely, one could
argue that self-control is less effective for the promotion of
desirable behavior than it is for the inhibition of undesirable
behavior. Indeed, if self-control is needed to replace undesir-
able behavior (e.g., yelling back at one’s partner) with desir-
able behavior (engage in accommodation; Finkel & Campbell,
2001), then people should need much more self-control to
approach the desirable behavior because they need to over-
come the pull of the undesirable behavior, which is much
stronger.
These predictions become even more complex when one
considers the great variety of behavior that is affected by self-
control. For example, self-control is assumed to help people
to inhibit an impulse toward a desired outcome (foregoing an
enjoyable evening with friends) in the service of attaining
another desired outcome (a high grade for an exam). In this
example, the undesired behavior is actually a desired out-
come, yet this outcome is in conflict with a delayed, even
more desirable outcome. Taking one more step, some undesir-
able behaviors that at first glance appear to be self-control fail-
ures (e.g., smoking or alcohol consumption) may in fact be acts
of self-control because they are performed in the service of a
de Ridder et al. 79
valued long-term goal (e.g., acceptance by significant others;
Rawn & Vohs, 2011). Whether behavior is regarded as desir-
able or undesirable is thus highly influenced by contextual
factors and may even be idiosyncratic as it relates to the
personal goals an individual holds. To avoid confusion with
respect to the ambiguity of desirability in the long versus
short term, we conceptualize desirable behavior as all
behaviors that are associated with people’s goal to meet
their obligations, duties, and responsibilities and adjust to
social norms to live happy, successful, and healthy lives,
including psychosocial adjustment, adequate and appropri-
ate expression of emotions, physical exercise, and academic
success. Undesirable behaviors, on the contrary, are behav-
iors that interfere with this goal, including antisocial and
destructive impulses, absenteeism, overeating, and interper-
sonal conflict.
In short, although theories on self-control generally agree
that self-control is necessary to inhibit undesirable behavior
and stimulate desirable behavior, studies have not directly
compared the influence of self-control on desirable and unde-
sirable behaviors. So the first aim of this meta-analysis is to
examine whether self-control relates differently to desirable
and undesirable behaviors.
Self-Control Is Beneficial for a Large Range of Behaviors
. We con-
ceptualize self-control as people’s capacity to override or
change their inner responses, to inhibit undesired behavioral
tendencies, and to facilitate desired behavior tendencies. This
conceptualization suggests that self-control should be rele-
vant to various behavioral domains. In line with this sugges-
tion, Tangney and her colleagues (2004) identified five
behavioral domains for which dispositional self-control
should be particularly relevant: achievement and task perfor-
mance (e.g., grades, SAT scores), impulse control, psychoso-
cial adjustment (e.g., depression, anxiety), interpersonal
functioning (e.g., accommodation, relationship satisfaction),
and moral emotions (e.g., shame, guilt). Consistent with
their predictions, people with high self-control had more
positive outcomes in all five domains than people with low
self-control. Given that self-control has been proposed to
play a crucial role in the control and inhibition of impulses,
research has increasingly investigated the role of self-control
for academic performance (Duckworth & Seligman, 2005),
health-related behaviors (e.g., physical exercise, condom
use, dieting; cf. Kuijer, De Ridder, Ouwehand, Houx, & Van
den Bos, 2008; Wills et al., 2007), and affect regulation (e.g.,
anger control). To capture the broad variety of behavioral
domains covered in the existing literature on self-control
more effectively, we integrated the different behavioral
domains into nine categories, namely (a) school and work
achievement, (b) eating and weight-related behavior, (c) sex-
ual behavior, (d) addictive behavior, (e) interpersonal func-
tioning, (f) affect regulation, (g) well-being and adjustment,
(h) deviant behavior, and (i) planning and decision making.
The second aim of the present meta-analysis is to examine
whether self-control relates similarly to behavior across the
nine domains.
Self-Control Is Effortful and Conscious: Does It Equally Affect
Controlled and Automatic Behavior? As discussed previously,
virtually all theoretical approaches to self-control highlight
the role of willpower and an active self in the exertion of
self-control (Baumeister et al., 1998; W. Mischel et al.,
1996). The prevailing assumption, and the favored hypoth-
esis in this investigation also, is that self-control is relevant
mainly to behaviors that are under conscious control,
whereas behaviors that are performed without conscious
effort (such as habitual behaviors) are resistant if not
immune to self-control. Still, alternative predictions could
be put forward.
It has been suggested that the exertion of self-control may
not necessarily be related only to conscious or effortful
behavioral processes (Alberts, Martijn, Greb, Merkelbach, &
De Vries, 2007; Ferguson, 2008; Fishbach, Friedman, &
Kruglanski, 2003; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2004). Whether self-
control is exerted in an automatic or controlled fashion is not
an issue we want to debate in this article. Nevertheless, it is
possible that many automatic behavior patterns are potentially
subject to being overridden or altered by self-control and that
self-control might therefore exert its impact mainly by its
influence on such automatic responses. Research on the reg-
ulatory strength model generally assumes that behaviors
that are more effortful also consume more self-regulatory
resources (self-control) than automatic behaviors, such as
habits (Baumeister et al., 1994). For that reason, as Baumeister
and Alquist (2009) point out, people who are high on self-
control are probably good at automatizing behavior.
To illustrate, when first starting to exercise, Mary may
need to exert a great deal of self-control to do her five miles
of running after a long day at work and taking care of the
children and the household chores. After a couple of weeks
and continued exertion of self-control, the exercise becomes
part of her daily routine, and Mary may need to exert less
self-control to do her running at the end of the day. In this
case, Mary’s exercise routine becomes so engrained in her
daily schedule that she does it almost automatically. Thus
over time, Mary needs to exert less self-control to maintain
her exercising behavior, although self-control may still be
active to monitor her efforts and ensure that Mary continues
to behave in ways that help her to attain her goals (Carver &
Scheier, 1998). In a sense, the main value of self-control may
lie more in creating the healthy habit than in regulating
behavior each day anew.
When self-control operates in such a way that it eventually
does not consume resources, such as when the behavior
becomes habitual (Baumeister & Alquist, 2009), it may simi-
larly affect responses that are automatic as it affects behaviors
that are regulated by conscious control. Evidence examining
whether dispositional self-control affects controlled and auto-
matic behavior in the same fashion is lacking, however. The
80 Personality and Social Psychology Review 16(1)
third aim of this meta-analysis therefore is to examine whether
the effects of self-control differ for effortful and automatic
behaviors.
Is Self-Control Related to Actual Behavior, or Do People With
High Self-Control Merely Imagine That They Are Doing Better?
An impressive number of studies have provided convincing
evidence that intended behavior does not necessarily trans-
late into actual behavior (Gollwitzer, 1990; Gollwitzer &
Sheeran, 2006; Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987). In a similar
vein, people’s reports about what think they can do (e.g.,
expectations of behavior or behavior-specific self-efficacy)
and what they should do (e.g., subjective norms or attitudes) do
not necessarily reflect what they actually do (Nordgren, Van
der Pligt, & Harreveld, 2010). Therefore, the distinction
between actual behavior and imagined behavior (i.e., behavior
that one intends to do, thinks one can do, or thinks one should
do) is relevant for examining the link between self-control
and behavior. As a fourth aim of this meta-analysis we
investigated whether self-control equally affects actual
behavior and imagined behavior. Imagined behaviors may
be more vulnerable to wishful thinking and may therefore
reflect biased beliefs about one’s capacity for self-control,
resulting in stronger associations between self-control and
behavior.
Assessing Dispositional Self-Control. Self-control is at the heart
of many desirable behavioral responses, whereas its lack is
associated with many undesirable behavioral responses.
Given the important implications of self-control for psycho-
social adjustment and well-being, it is crucial to assess dis-
positional self-control with a reliable and valid scale.
Moreover, researchers, practitioners, and laypeople need to
know whether the scale is able to detect self-control on a
sound and solid basis that is not vulnerable to variations in the
particular sample that is investigated (e.g., age, gender distri-
bution) or methodological variables (e.g., lab study vs. field
study).
A variety of scales have been developed to assess
self-control, including the Self-Control Behavior Inventory
(Fagen, Long, & Stevens, 1975), the Self-Control Schedule
(Rosenbaum, 1980), the Self-Control subscale of the California
Personality Inventory (Gough, 1987), the Self-Control
Questionnaire (Brandon, Oescher, & Loftin, 1990), the
adapted Kendall-Wilcox Inventory for self-management
(Kendall & Williams, 1982; Wills, Vaccaro, & McNamara,
1994), and the Ego-Undercontrol Scale (Letzring, Block, &
Funder, 2005). In fact, a recent meta-analysis of self-control
measures identified more than 100 self-report questionnaires
on self-control, most of which have been used only spo-
radically (Duckworth & Kern, 2011). Rather than assess-
ing individual differences in self-control across broad
behavioral domains in general populations (Baumeister et al.,
1994), most scales target specific behaviors (e.g., health
behavior; Brandon et al., 1990) in specific populations
(e.g., adolescents—Kendall & Williams, 1982; clinical
samples—Rosenbaum, 1980). Other scales are outdated
and have not been used recently (Fagen et al., 1975; Gough,
1987) or focus on a specific aspect of self-control such as ego
undercontrol (Letzring et al., 2005). In sum, none of these
scales have been used frequently in general populations.
Neither were they developed to examine the impact of self-
control on a wide range of behaviors, including thoughts and
emotions, across different life domains.
The present analysis examined three self-control scales
that have been used relatively frequently in a variety of pop-
ulations and with different types of behavioral outcomes: the
Self-Control Scale (Tangney et al., 2004), the Barratt
Impulsiveness Scale (Patton et al., 1995), and the Low-Self-
Control Scale (Grasmick et al., 1993).
1
In line with the defin-
ing features of self-control, the Self-Control Scale (Tangney
et al., 2004) assesses people’s ability to override or change
inner responses (e.g., “I get carried away by my feelings”;
reversed) and to interrupt undesired behavioral tendencies
and refrain from acting on them (e.g., “I am good at resisting
temptations”). In two large studies, Tangney et al. (2004)
demonstrated that the scale has good reliability (Cronbach’s
α = .89) and good test–retest reliability (r = .89 over 3 weeks).
In addition to the 36-item full scale, Tangney and her col-
leagues developed a 13-item brief scale, which showed a
strong correlation (r = .93) with the full scale and good
psychometric properties. Since its publication in 2004, the
scale has been used among different populations (young
adolescents—Finkenauer, Engels, & Baumeister, 2005;
adult romantic partners—Finkel & Campbell, 2001; stu-
dent samples—Gailliot, 2007b).
The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Patton et al., 1995)
assesses lack of planning, spontaneous decision making,
and acting without thinking (sample items are “I am more
interested in the present than in the future” and “I do things
without thinking”). Although trait self-control focuses on
overriding an impulse, trait impulsiveness highlights low
self-control. This scale thus seemingly assumes that impul-
siveness and (low) self-control are equivalent constructs
because they represent the two end points of the same
dimension (Duckworth & Kern, 2011; Tangney et al., 2004).
Although there is some debate about the separate dimensions
that constitute impulsiveness (Patton et al., 1995), the Barratt
Impulsiveness Scale is often used as a generic measure of
impulsiveness and is among the most widely used measures
of self-control (Duckworth & Kern, 2011). The 30-item scale
has good reliability (Cronbach’s α > .80) and discriminates
between populations known to be high or low in impulsive-
ness (e.g., substance-abuse patients vs. undergraduates; Patton
et al., 1995).
Another widely used measure is the Low Self-Control
Scale (Grasmick et al., 1993), derived from Gottfredson and
Hirschi’s (1990) self-control theory. As mentioned above, this
theory contends that variation among individuals in their abil-
ity to exercise self-control in the face of temptation accounts
