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DissertationDOI

Technical Legality: Law, Technology and Science Fiction

01 Jan 2010-
TL;DR: In this article, the intersections of law and technology, referred to here as technical legality, are explored through taking science fiction seriously, and it is argued that reflection on technical legality reveals the mythic of modernity.
Abstract: This thesis concerns the intersections of law and technology, referred to here as ‘technical legality’. It argues that reflection on technical legality reveals the mythic of modernity. The starting point for the argument is that the orthodox framing of technology by law – the ‘law and technology enterprise’ – does not comprehend its own speculative jurisdiction – that is, it fails to realise its oracle orientation towards imagining the future. In this science fiction as the modern West’s mythform, as the repository for projections of technological futures, is recognised as both the law and technology enterprise’s wellspring and cipher. What is offered in this thesis is a more thorough exploration of technical legality through taking science fiction seriously. This seriousness results in two implications for the understanding of technical legality. The first implication is that the anxieties and fantasies that animate the calling forth of law by technology become clearer. Science fiction operates as a window into the cultural milieu that frames law-making moments. In locating law-making events – specifically the making of the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth) and the Motor Car Act 1909 (Vic) – with the clone ‘canon’ in science fiction (specifically Star Trek: Nemesis (2002)) and H.G. Wells’ scientific romances, what is offered is a much richer understanding of how the cultural framing of technology becomes law than that provided by the ‘pragmatic’ positivism of the law and technology enterprise. The second implication arises from the excess that appears at the margins of the richer analyses. Exploring technical legality through science fiction does not remain within the epistemological frame. Each of the analyses gestures towards something essential about technical legality. The law and technology enterprise is grounded on the modern myth, which is also the myth of modernity – Frankenstein. It tells a story of monstrous technology, vulnerable humanity and saving law. The analyses of the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth) and the Motor Car Act 1909 (Vic) show that this narrative is terrorised, that the saving law turns out to be the monster in disguise; that the law called forth by technology is in itself technological. In extended readings of two critically acclaimed science fictions, Frank Herbert’s Dune cycle (1965–83) and the recent television series Battlestar Galactica (2003–10), the essential commitments of technological law are exposed. Dune as technical legality makes clear that technological law is truly monstrous, for behind its positivism and sovereignty its essence is with the alchemy of death and time. Battlestar Galactica as technical legality reduces further the alchemical properties of technical law. Battlestar Galactica moves the metaphysical highlight to the essence of technology and very nearly ends with Heidegger’s demise of Being in ‘Enframing’: monstrous technology and monstrous law reveal a humanity that cannot be saved. However, at the very moment of this fall, Battlestar Galactica collapses the metaphysical frame, affirming technological Being-in-the-world over empty ordering, life over death. This free responsibility to becoming that emerges from Battlestar Galactica reunites technical legality with the mythic of modernity. The modern denial of myth, which allowed Frankenstein to narrate technical legality, has been challenged. Free responsibility to becoming means a confidence with myths; it clears the way for the telling of new stories about law and technology.
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a judge in some representative American jurisdiction is assumed to accept the main uncontroversial constitutive and regulative rules of the law in his jurisdiction and to follow earlier decisions of their court or higher courts whose rationale, as l
Abstract: 1.. HARD CASES 5. Legal Rights A. Legislation . . . We might therefore do well to consider how a philosophical judge might develop, in appropriate cases, theories of what legislative purpose and legal principles require. We shall find that he would construct these theories in the same manner as a philosophical referee would construct the character of a game. I have invented, for this purpose, a lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen, whom I shall call Hercules. I suppose that Hercules is a judge in some representative American jurisdiction. I assume that he accepts the main uncontroversial constitutive and regulative rules of the law in his jurisdiction. He accepts, that is, that statutes have the general power to create and extinguish legal rights, and that judges have the general duty to follow earlier decisions of their court or higher courts whose rationale, as l

2,050 citations

Journal ArticleDOI

369 citations

References
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Journal Article
TL;DR: Corcos et al. as mentioned in this paper discussed the importance of environmental law, law and film, slimers, etc., in an experimental course which I co-taught with Professors Melvyn R. Durchslag, Andrew P. Morriss, and Wendy E. Wagner at CWRU Law School in 1994 and 1995.
Abstract: * Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University (LSU) Law Center. JD, Case Western Reserve University (CWRU) Law School; AMLS, University of Michigan; MA, BA, Michigan State University. This Essay grew out of the introductory lecture and discussion of clips from Ghostbusters in an experimental course which I co-taught with Professors Melvyn R. Durchslag, Andrew P. Morriss, and Wendy E. Wagner at CWRU Law School in 1994 and 1995. See Christine A. Corcos et al., Teaching a Megacourse: Adventures in Environmental Policy, Co-Teaching, and Group Grading, 47 J. Legal Educ. 224 (1997). The term megacourse was created by the bemused and desperate Associate Dean, Wilbur C. Leatherberry, who tired of repeating the course's official title, Selected Problems in Environmental Law and Policy, along with four faculty names on every CWRU Law School curricular document. He eventually abbreviated the course title to "Mega" and the names to "Faculty." I wish to thank Dr. Morriss and Professor Wagner, kindred spirits, for many stimulating discussions about the importance of environmental law, law and film, slimers, etc. I am particularly indebted to Professor Wagner for her valuable comments on the symbolism of Ghostbusters and for the value-added pun in the title of this Essay. Professor Jay Bybee of LSU kindly provided guidance in the Chevron area, Professor John Devlin, also of LSU, made useful suggestions about pedagogy, symbolism, and the nature of evil over muffalattas and beer, and Professor Kenneth Muchison of LSU read the manuscript with great attention and contributed valuable criticisms. Professor Thomas C. Galligan gave questions about potential application of the Federal Tort Claims Act much more consideration than they deserve. Professor Jonathan Entin, of CWRU, commented wisely on a film he still has not seen. Thanks are also due to Cheryl Cheatham, CWRU Law Library, for her thoughtful comments on an early draft of this Article, and to Alison Colwell, CWRU Law School Class of 1996) and Jill Kuswa, LSU Law Center Class of 1998, for superb research assistance.

2 citations


"Technical Legality: Law, Technology..." refers background in this paper

  • ...See also Corcos (1997a); Berets (1998)....

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  • ...83 For example Christine A. Corcos (1997b) examined Ghostbusters (1984) (Reitman, Ghostbusters, (Columbia Pictures, 1984)) as informing the popular attitudes to environmental regulation....

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01 Jan 2007

2 citations


"Technical Legality: Law, Technology..." refers background in this paper

  • ...277 Chen (2006), p 1059; Abrahams (2007b), p 305....

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  • ...199 Abrahams (2007b), p 295; Kane and Duranske (2008), p 10....

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  • ...242 Jankowich (2005), p 214; Abrahams (2007b), p 305; Lastowka (2008), pp 913–914....

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  • ...235 Lastowka and Hunter (2004), pp 39–40; Kayser (2006), pp 65–66; Abrahams (2007b), p 304....

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  • ...233 Glushko (2007), pp 522–523; Abrahams (2007b), p 300; Rosette (2008), pp 284, 287–288....

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Journal Article
TL;DR: In this paper, a detailed critical discussion of Derrida's important 1994 book Specters of Marx is given, where the authors address a number of sub-themes in the book: the messianic, differance, democracy to come, justice, religion and the es spukt (it spooks).
Abstract: In this paper I give a detailed critical discussion of Derrida’s important 1994 book Specters of Marx. I begin by discussing the hypothesis advanced in the book and then make a number of remarks about its context. I then go on to discuss the central theme of Specters of Marx: the messianic. As a way of unpacking this theme, I address a number of subthemes in Specters of Marx: the injunction of differance, democracy to come, justice, religion and the es spukt (it spooks). As a consequence of this discussion, I turn to the theme of the political and address the subthemes of hegemony, the decision and the New International. I conclude the paper with a discussion of two more speculative themes that arise out of Specters of Marx: the question of the economic and the technological.

2 citations