Technical Legality: Law, Technology and Science Fiction
01 Jan 2010-
TL;DR: In this article, the intersections of law and technology, referred to here as technical legality, are explored through taking science fiction seriously, and it is argued that reflection on technical legality reveals the mythic of modernity.
Abstract: This thesis concerns the intersections of law and technology, referred to here as
‘technical legality’. It argues that reflection on technical legality reveals the
mythic of modernity. The starting point for the argument is that the orthodox
framing of technology by law – the ‘law and technology enterprise’ – does not
comprehend its own speculative jurisdiction – that is, it fails to realise its oracle
orientation towards imagining the future. In this science fiction as the modern
West’s mythform, as the repository for projections of technological futures, is
recognised as both the law and technology enterprise’s wellspring and cipher.
What is offered in this thesis is a more thorough exploration of technical
legality through taking science fiction seriously. This seriousness results in two
implications for the understanding of technical legality. The first implication is
that the anxieties and fantasies that animate the calling forth of law by technology
become clearer. Science fiction operates as a window into the cultural milieu that
frames law-making moments. In locating law-making events – specifically the
making of the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth) and the Motor Car
Act 1909 (Vic) – with the clone ‘canon’ in science fiction (specifically Star Trek:
Nemesis (2002)) and H.G. Wells’ scientific romances, what is offered is a much
richer understanding of how the cultural framing of technology becomes law than
that provided by the ‘pragmatic’ positivism of the law and technology enterprise.
The second implication arises from the excess that appears at the margins
of the richer analyses. Exploring technical legality through science fiction does
not remain within the epistemological frame. Each of the analyses gestures
towards something essential about technical legality. The law and technology
enterprise is grounded on the modern myth, which is also the myth of modernity – Frankenstein. It tells a story of monstrous technology, vulnerable humanity and
saving law. The analyses of the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth) and
the Motor Car Act 1909 (Vic) show that this narrative is terrorised, that the saving
law turns out to be the monster in disguise; that the law called forth by technology
is in itself technological. In extended readings of two critically acclaimed science
fictions, Frank Herbert’s Dune cycle (1965–83) and the recent television series
Battlestar Galactica (2003–10), the essential commitments of technological law
are exposed. Dune as technical legality makes clear that technological law is truly
monstrous, for behind its positivism and sovereignty its essence is with the
alchemy of death and time. Battlestar Galactica as technical legality reduces
further the alchemical properties of technical law. Battlestar Galactica moves the
metaphysical highlight to the essence of technology and very nearly ends with
Heidegger’s demise of Being in ‘Enframing’: monstrous technology and
monstrous law reveal a humanity that cannot be saved. However, at the very
moment of this fall, Battlestar Galactica collapses the metaphysical frame,
affirming technological Being-in-the-world over empty ordering, life over death.
This free responsibility to becoming that emerges from Battlestar
Galactica reunites technical legality with the mythic of modernity. The modern
denial of myth, which allowed Frankenstein to narrate technical legality, has been
challenged. Free responsibility to becoming means a confidence with myths; it clears the way for the telling of new stories about law and technology.
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Abstract: 1.. HARD CASES 5. Legal Rights A. Legislation . . . We might therefore do well to consider how a philosophical judge might develop, in appropriate cases, theories of what legislative purpose and legal principles require. We shall find that he would construct these theories in the same manner as a philosophical referee would construct the character of a game. I have invented, for this purpose, a lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen, whom I shall call Hercules. I suppose that Hercules is a judge in some representative American jurisdiction. I assume that he accepts the main uncontroversial constitutive and regulative rules of the law in his jurisdiction. He accepts, that is, that statutes have the general power to create and extinguish legal rights, and that judges have the general duty to follow earlier decisions of their court or higher courts whose rationale, as l
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References
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Book•
01 Jan 1970
TL;DR: Problems encountered as science makes genetic control of man a real possibility are faced, including discussions of asexual reproduction of men, frozen semen banks, and breeding human beings for special purposes.
Abstract: Problems encountered as science makes genetic control of man a real possibility. Includes discussions of asexual reproduction of men, frozen semen banks, and breeding human beings for special purposes.
123 citations
08 Sep 2004
TL;DR: Constitutional Failure is a major contribution to studies of the German political philosopher Carl Schmitt (1888-1985), the Weimar Republic, and the relationship of constitutionalism, political economy, and democracy.
Abstract: Constitutional Failure is a major contribution to studies of the German political philosopher Carl Schmitt (1888–1985), the Weimar Republic, and the relationship of constitutionalism, political economy, and democracy. An internationally renowned scholar of Weimar legal theory, Ellen Kennedy brought Schmitt’s neglected work to the attention of English-speaking readers with her highly regarded translations of his work and studies of its place in twentieth-century political theory. In this eagerly awaited book, she tracks Schmitt’s contribution to the canon of Western political philosophy during its most difficult and dangerous moment—the time of Weimar Germany and the Third Reich—demonstrating the centrality of his thought to understandings of the modern constitutional state and its precarious economic and social foundations.
Kennedy reveals how Schmitt’s argument for a strong but neutral state supported the maximization of market freedom at the cost of the political constitution. She argues that the major fault lines of Weimar liberalism—emergency powers, the courts as “defenders of the constitution,” mass mobilization of anti-liberal politics, ethnic-identity politics, a culture of resentment and contested legitimacy—are not exceptions within the liberal-democratic orders of the West, but central to them. Contending that Schmitt’s thought remains vital today because liberal norms are inadequate to the political challenges facing constitutional systems as diverse as those of Eastern Europe and the United States, Kennedy develops a compelling, rigorous argument that unsettles many assumptions about liberalism, democracy, and dictatorship.
121 citations
Additional excerpts
...166 Schmitt (1919), quoted in Kennedy (2004), p 45....
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...164 Kennedy (2004), p 44....
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Book•
01 Jan 1992
TL;DR: Sachs as mentioned in this paper examines the history of the automobile from the late 1880s until today for evidence on the nature of dreams and desires embedded in modern culture, and concludes that the triumphal procession of private motorization has in fact become an intrusion.
Abstract: In his cultural analysis of the motor car in Germany, Wolfgang Sachs starts from the assumption that the automobile is more than a means of transportation and that its history cannot be understood merely as a triumphant march of technological innovation. Instead, Sachs examines the history of the automobile from the late 1880s until today for evidence on the nature of dreams and desires embedded in modern culture. Written in a lively style and illustrated by a wealth of cartoons, advertisements, newspaper stories, and propaganda, this book explores the nature of Germany's love affair with the automobile. A 'history of our desires' for speed, wealth, violence, glamour, progress, and power--as refracted through images of the automobile - it is at once fascinating and provocative. Sachs recounts the development of the automobile industry and the impact on German society of the marketing and promotion of the motor car. As cars became more affordable and more common after World War II, advertisers fanned the competition for status, refining their techniques as ownership became ever more widespread. Sachs concludes by demonstrating that the triumphal procession of private motorization has in fact become an intrusion. The grand dreams once attached to the automobile have aged. Sachs appeals for the cultivation of new dreams born of the futility of the old ones, dreams of 'a society liberated from progress', in which location, distance, and speed are reconceived in more appropriately humane dimensions.
119 citations
Book•
01 Jan 2004
TL;DR: Critical Jurisprudence as mentioned in this paper is a general philosophy of law that is concerned both with posited law and with the law of the law, which is the prudence of jus, law's consciousness and conscience, the exploration of law's justice and an ideal law or equity at the bar of which state law is always judged.
Abstract: Book synopsis: Jurisprudence is the prudence of jus, law's consciousness and conscience. Throughout history, when thinkers wanted to contemplate the organisation of society or the relationship between authority and the subject, they turned to law. All great philosophers, from Plato to Hobbes, Kant, Hegel, Marx and Weber had either studied the law or had a deep understanding of legal operations. But jurisprudence is also the conscience of law, the exploration of law's justice and of an ideal law or equity at the bar of which state law is always judged. Jurisprudence brings together 'is' and 'ought', the positive and the normative, law and justice.
But after a long process of decay, legal theory is today characterised by cognitive and moral poverty. Jurisprudence has become restricted and academically peripheral, a guidebook to technocratic legalism and a legitimation of the existent. Critical jurisprudence returns to the classical tradition of a general philosophy of law and adopts a much wider concept of legality. It is concerned both with posited law and with the law of the law. All legal aspects of the economic, political, emotional and physical modes of production and reproduction of society are part of critical jurisprudence. This widening of scope allows a radical rethinking of the nature of rights, justice, sovereignty and judgement. A political philosophy of justice today must examine the political economy of law; transitions from Empire to nation; ideological and imaginary constructions through which we understand ourselves and relate to others; ways in which gender, race or sexuality create forms of identity that both discipline bodies and offer sites of resistance. Law's complicity with political oppression, violence and racism has to be faced before it is possible to speak of a new beginning for legal thought, which in turn is the necessary precondition for a theory of justice. Critical Jurisprudence offers an ethics of law against the nihilism of power and an aesthetics of existence for the melancholic lawyer.
116 citations