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DissertationDOI

Technical Legality: Law, Technology and Science Fiction

01 Jan 2010-
TL;DR: In this article, the intersections of law and technology, referred to here as technical legality, are explored through taking science fiction seriously, and it is argued that reflection on technical legality reveals the mythic of modernity.
Abstract: This thesis concerns the intersections of law and technology, referred to here as ‘technical legality’. It argues that reflection on technical legality reveals the mythic of modernity. The starting point for the argument is that the orthodox framing of technology by law – the ‘law and technology enterprise’ – does not comprehend its own speculative jurisdiction – that is, it fails to realise its oracle orientation towards imagining the future. In this science fiction as the modern West’s mythform, as the repository for projections of technological futures, is recognised as both the law and technology enterprise’s wellspring and cipher. What is offered in this thesis is a more thorough exploration of technical legality through taking science fiction seriously. This seriousness results in two implications for the understanding of technical legality. The first implication is that the anxieties and fantasies that animate the calling forth of law by technology become clearer. Science fiction operates as a window into the cultural milieu that frames law-making moments. In locating law-making events – specifically the making of the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth) and the Motor Car Act 1909 (Vic) – with the clone ‘canon’ in science fiction (specifically Star Trek: Nemesis (2002)) and H.G. Wells’ scientific romances, what is offered is a much richer understanding of how the cultural framing of technology becomes law than that provided by the ‘pragmatic’ positivism of the law and technology enterprise. The second implication arises from the excess that appears at the margins of the richer analyses. Exploring technical legality through science fiction does not remain within the epistemological frame. Each of the analyses gestures towards something essential about technical legality. The law and technology enterprise is grounded on the modern myth, which is also the myth of modernity – Frankenstein. It tells a story of monstrous technology, vulnerable humanity and saving law. The analyses of the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth) and the Motor Car Act 1909 (Vic) show that this narrative is terrorised, that the saving law turns out to be the monster in disguise; that the law called forth by technology is in itself technological. In extended readings of two critically acclaimed science fictions, Frank Herbert’s Dune cycle (1965–83) and the recent television series Battlestar Galactica (2003–10), the essential commitments of technological law are exposed. Dune as technical legality makes clear that technological law is truly monstrous, for behind its positivism and sovereignty its essence is with the alchemy of death and time. Battlestar Galactica as technical legality reduces further the alchemical properties of technical law. Battlestar Galactica moves the metaphysical highlight to the essence of technology and very nearly ends with Heidegger’s demise of Being in ‘Enframing’: monstrous technology and monstrous law reveal a humanity that cannot be saved. However, at the very moment of this fall, Battlestar Galactica collapses the metaphysical frame, affirming technological Being-in-the-world over empty ordering, life over death. This free responsibility to becoming that emerges from Battlestar Galactica reunites technical legality with the mythic of modernity. The modern denial of myth, which allowed Frankenstein to narrate technical legality, has been challenged. Free responsibility to becoming means a confidence with myths; it clears the way for the telling of new stories about law and technology.
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a judge in some representative American jurisdiction is assumed to accept the main uncontroversial constitutive and regulative rules of the law in his jurisdiction and to follow earlier decisions of their court or higher courts whose rationale, as l
Abstract: 1.. HARD CASES 5. Legal Rights A. Legislation . . . We might therefore do well to consider how a philosophical judge might develop, in appropriate cases, theories of what legislative purpose and legal principles require. We shall find that he would construct these theories in the same manner as a philosophical referee would construct the character of a game. I have invented, for this purpose, a lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen, whom I shall call Hercules. I suppose that Hercules is a judge in some representative American jurisdiction. I assume that he accepts the main uncontroversial constitutive and regulative rules of the law in his jurisdiction. He accepts, that is, that statutes have the general power to create and extinguish legal rights, and that judges have the general duty to follow earlier decisions of their court or higher courts whose rationale, as l

2,050 citations

Journal ArticleDOI

369 citations

References
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Book
01 Jan 2007
TL;DR: Lex Populi as discussed by the authors is a book about jurisprudence, or legal philosophy, with a focus on the legal philosophical meaning of popular culture, such as books, movies, TV shows, and movies.
Abstract: This is a book about jurisprudence--or legal philosophy. The legal philosophical texts under consideration are, to say the least, unorthodox. Tolkien, Buffy the Vampire Slayer, Harry Potter, Million Dollar Baby, and other cultural products are all referenced as exemplary instances of what the author calls lex populi--"people's" or "pop law". There, more than anywhere else will one find the leading issues of legal philosophy. These issues, however are heavily coded, for few of these texts announce themselves as expressly "legal". Nonetheless, Lex Populi reads these texts "jurisprudentially": that is, with an eye to their hidden legal philosophical meanings, enabling connections such as: Tolkien's Ring as Kelsen's grundnorm; vampire slaying as legal language's semiosis; Hogwarts as substantively unjust; and a seriously injured young woman as termination's rights-bearer. In so doing, Lex Populi attempts not only a jurisprudential reading of popular culture, but a popular rereading of jurisprudence, removing it from the legal experts in order to restore it to the public at large: a lex populi by and for the people.

50 citations


"Technical Legality: Law, Technology..." refers background in this paper

  • ...…for an internal point of view that is thoroughly reflective and truly critical’.108 MacNeil presents popular culture texts as jurisprudence, as sophisticated contributions to the theory of law that circulate and ‘recall jurisprudence to life’.109 The guiding motif for 104 MacNeil (2007), p 52....

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  • ...107 MacNeil (2007), p 59....

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  • ...See MacNeil (2007), pp 6–8....

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  • ...106 Hart (1994), p 247; MacNeil (2007), p 57....

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  • ...See MacNeil (2007), pp 44–60....

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Book
03 Feb 2004
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a collection of texts by Marshall Berman, Jane Jacobs, Roland Barthes, Marc Auge, and others, including some of their own works.
Abstract: Contributors include Michael Bracewell, Ziauddin Sardar, Al Rees, Martin Pawley, Donald Richie and Peter Hamilton. Key texts by Marshall Berman, Jane Jacobs, Roland Barthes, Marc Auge and others.

47 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the evidence concerning the effects of technological developments on household work and find that even with the unprecedented growth of the market sector and the almost universal availability of certain items of household equipment and goods, labor in the home still accounts for approximately half of this country's total work time.
Abstract: Historians and social scientists generally agree that the forces of industrialization and the growth of the market economy have progressively absorbed much of the household's economic function. Furthermore, popular belief assumes that the vestiges of old forms of production in the home will surely be eliminated by the application of technological rationality. Put another way, it is thought by the public and many academics that "technology," broadly defined, has "freed" women for other, nonhousework tasks-in particular, employment in the paid labor market. These assumptions are reflected in popular terminology such as "fast foods" (to save time), "convenience foods" (to increase ease of preparation), and "laborsaving devices" (conducive to easing the work load generally). This imagery has such power that much traditional research takes these effects for granted instead of demonstrating or disproving them empirically. Yet even with the unprecedented growth of the market sector and the almost universal availability of certain items of household equipment and goods, recent studies show that labor in the home still accounts for approximately half of this country's total work time.1 In this article our goal is to investigate the evidence concerning the effects of technological developments on household work. We believe that popular beliefs about the positive effects are inadequately sub-

47 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is not merely morally permissible but morally required that the authors employ cloning to produce embryos or fetuses for the sake of providing cells, tissues or even organs for therapy, followed by abortion of the embryo or fetus.
Abstract: The most publicly justifiable application of human cloning, if there is one at all, is to provide self-compatible cells or tissues for medical use, especially transplantation. Some have argued that this raises no new ethical issues above those raised by any form of embryo experimentation. I argue that this research is less morally problematic than other embryo research. Indeed, it is not merely morally permissible but morally required that we employ cloning to produce embryos or fetuses for the sake of providing cells, tissues or even organs for therapy, followed by abortion of the embryo or fetus.

46 citations