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DissertationDOI

Technical Legality: Law, Technology and Science Fiction

01 Jan 2010-
TL;DR: In this article, the intersections of law and technology, referred to here as technical legality, are explored through taking science fiction seriously, and it is argued that reflection on technical legality reveals the mythic of modernity.
Abstract: This thesis concerns the intersections of law and technology, referred to here as ‘technical legality’. It argues that reflection on technical legality reveals the mythic of modernity. The starting point for the argument is that the orthodox framing of technology by law – the ‘law and technology enterprise’ – does not comprehend its own speculative jurisdiction – that is, it fails to realise its oracle orientation towards imagining the future. In this science fiction as the modern West’s mythform, as the repository for projections of technological futures, is recognised as both the law and technology enterprise’s wellspring and cipher. What is offered in this thesis is a more thorough exploration of technical legality through taking science fiction seriously. This seriousness results in two implications for the understanding of technical legality. The first implication is that the anxieties and fantasies that animate the calling forth of law by technology become clearer. Science fiction operates as a window into the cultural milieu that frames law-making moments. In locating law-making events – specifically the making of the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth) and the Motor Car Act 1909 (Vic) – with the clone ‘canon’ in science fiction (specifically Star Trek: Nemesis (2002)) and H.G. Wells’ scientific romances, what is offered is a much richer understanding of how the cultural framing of technology becomes law than that provided by the ‘pragmatic’ positivism of the law and technology enterprise. The second implication arises from the excess that appears at the margins of the richer analyses. Exploring technical legality through science fiction does not remain within the epistemological frame. Each of the analyses gestures towards something essential about technical legality. The law and technology enterprise is grounded on the modern myth, which is also the myth of modernity – Frankenstein. It tells a story of monstrous technology, vulnerable humanity and saving law. The analyses of the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth) and the Motor Car Act 1909 (Vic) show that this narrative is terrorised, that the saving law turns out to be the monster in disguise; that the law called forth by technology is in itself technological. In extended readings of two critically acclaimed science fictions, Frank Herbert’s Dune cycle (1965–83) and the recent television series Battlestar Galactica (2003–10), the essential commitments of technological law are exposed. Dune as technical legality makes clear that technological law is truly monstrous, for behind its positivism and sovereignty its essence is with the alchemy of death and time. Battlestar Galactica as technical legality reduces further the alchemical properties of technical law. Battlestar Galactica moves the metaphysical highlight to the essence of technology and very nearly ends with Heidegger’s demise of Being in ‘Enframing’: monstrous technology and monstrous law reveal a humanity that cannot be saved. However, at the very moment of this fall, Battlestar Galactica collapses the metaphysical frame, affirming technological Being-in-the-world over empty ordering, life over death. This free responsibility to becoming that emerges from Battlestar Galactica reunites technical legality with the mythic of modernity. The modern denial of myth, which allowed Frankenstein to narrate technical legality, has been challenged. Free responsibility to becoming means a confidence with myths; it clears the way for the telling of new stories about law and technology.
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a judge in some representative American jurisdiction is assumed to accept the main uncontroversial constitutive and regulative rules of the law in his jurisdiction and to follow earlier decisions of their court or higher courts whose rationale, as l
Abstract: 1.. HARD CASES 5. Legal Rights A. Legislation . . . We might therefore do well to consider how a philosophical judge might develop, in appropriate cases, theories of what legislative purpose and legal principles require. We shall find that he would construct these theories in the same manner as a philosophical referee would construct the character of a game. I have invented, for this purpose, a lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen, whom I shall call Hercules. I suppose that Hercules is a judge in some representative American jurisdiction. I assume that he accepts the main uncontroversial constitutive and regulative rules of the law in his jurisdiction. He accepts, that is, that statutes have the general power to create and extinguish legal rights, and that judges have the general duty to follow earlier decisions of their court or higher courts whose rationale, as l

2,050 citations

Journal ArticleDOI

369 citations

References
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Book
01 Jan 1986
TL;DR: This article found that the critical vocabulary of the mainstream often gives short shrift to the fantastic, and scholars of the fantastic have often had to look elsewhere for their critical termionology.
Abstract: "The critical vocabulary of the mainstream often give short shrift to the fantastic, and scholars of the fantastic have often had to look elsewhere for their critical termionology. Such scholars will find Wolfe's work an excellent resource." Choice

38 citations


Additional excerpts

  • ...106 Wolfe (1986), pp 109–111....

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Posted Content
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that in-game trades of virtual items should not be treated as taxable barter, but rather should be treated like other property that requires effort to obtain, such as fish pulled from the ocean, which is taxed only upon sale.
Abstract: Virtual worlds, including massive multi-player on-line role-playing games (game worlds), such as City of Heroes, Everquest, and World of Warcraft, have become popular sources of entertainment. Game worlds provide scripted contexts for events such as quests. Other virtual worlds, such as Second Life, are unstructured virtual environments that lack specific goals but allow participants to socialize and engage virtually in such activities as shopping or attending a concert. Many of these worlds have become commodified, with millions of dollars of real-world trade in virtual items taking place every year. Most game worlds prohibit these real market transactions, but some worlds actually encourage it. Second Life, for example, grants participants intellectual property rights in their creations.Although it seems intuitively the case that someone who accepts real money for the transfer of a virtual item should be taxed, what about the player who only accumulates items or virtual currency within a virtual world? Is valuable "loot" acquired in a game taxable, as a prize or award is? And is the profit in a purely in-game trade or sale for virtual currency taxable? This is an important set of questions, given the tax revenues at stake. Although the Internal Revenue Service has not yet attempted to tax transactions within virtual worlds, it is aware of the issue, and there is pressure on the government to determine how to resolve it, given that the economies of some virtual worlds are comparable to those of small countries. The Joint Economic Committee has announced that it is studying the issue.Most people's intuition probably would be that accumulation of assets within a "game" should not be taxed even though the federal income tax applies even to non-cash accessions to wealth. This Article argues that federal income tax law and policy support that result. Loot "drops" in game worlds should not be treated as taxable prizes and awards, but rather should be treated like other property that requires effort to obtain, such as fish pulled from the ocean, which is taxed only upon sale. Moreover, in-game trades of virtual items should not be treated as taxable barter. If courts uphold game agreements that purport to provide players with a mere license to use the game, in-game trades do not constitute realization events and thus are not taxable. Otherwise, tax policy considerations suggest that Congress should provide nonrecognition for these exchanges.By contrast, in virtual worlds that are intentionally commodified, such as Second Life, tax doctrine and policy counsel taxation of even in-world sales for virtual currency, regardless of whether the participant cashes out. However, as in game worlds, participants should not be taxed on purely in-world trades of non-currency items. This approach would allow entertainment value to go untaxed without creating a new tax shelter for virtual commerce.

37 citations

Book
18 May 1953

37 citations


Additional excerpts

  • ...Ever since Asimov 119 Pohl and Kornbluth (2003)....

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Journal ArticleDOI
16 Aug 2001-Nature
TL;DR: The tale of the epic voyage made to establish the metric system is an intriguing and exciting one.
Abstract: The tale of the epic voyage made to establish the metric system is an intriguing and exciting one.

35 citations


Additional excerpts

  • ...312 United States: Lederman (2007), p 1671; Mack (2008), pp 762–764; Australia: Macrae (2008)....

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  • ...316 Lastowka and Hunter (2004), pp 14–29; see also Lederman (2007), pp 1625–1630; Caramore (2008), pp 3–4; Lin (2008), pp 82–87; Chen (2006), pp 1064–1066; Glushko (2007), pp 509–511; Chin (2007), pp 1308–1311; Zarsky (2004), pp 236–238; Castronova (2004), pp 192–196; Macrae (2008), pp 325–326;…...

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  • ...27 Lastowka and Hunter (2004), p 6; Balkin and Noveck (2006), p 3; Hunt (2007), p 145; Lederman (2007), p 1621; Chin (2007), p 1306; Sheldon (2007), p 786; Zack (2007), p 225; Lin (2008), p 87; Brenner (2008), p 32; Dougherty and Lastowka (2008), p 758....

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  • ...267 Lastowka and Hunter (2004), pp 55–56 268 Lederman (2007), p 1641; Caramore (2008), p 2....

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  • ...…p 289; Jankowich (2005), p 176; Kayser (2006), p 60; Blazer (2006), p 139; Mayer-Schönberger and Crowley (2006), p 1801; Glushko (2007), p 512; Chin (2007), p 1305; Lederman (2007), p 1621; Sheldon (2007), p 760; Holdaway (2007), p 2; Reuveni (2007), p 264; Zack (2007), p 228; Kerr (2008), p 416....

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