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DissertationDOI

Technical Legality: Law, Technology and Science Fiction

01 Jan 2010-
TL;DR: In this article, the intersections of law and technology, referred to here as technical legality, are explored through taking science fiction seriously, and it is argued that reflection on technical legality reveals the mythic of modernity.
Abstract: This thesis concerns the intersections of law and technology, referred to here as ‘technical legality’. It argues that reflection on technical legality reveals the mythic of modernity. The starting point for the argument is that the orthodox framing of technology by law – the ‘law and technology enterprise’ – does not comprehend its own speculative jurisdiction – that is, it fails to realise its oracle orientation towards imagining the future. In this science fiction as the modern West’s mythform, as the repository for projections of technological futures, is recognised as both the law and technology enterprise’s wellspring and cipher. What is offered in this thesis is a more thorough exploration of technical legality through taking science fiction seriously. This seriousness results in two implications for the understanding of technical legality. The first implication is that the anxieties and fantasies that animate the calling forth of law by technology become clearer. Science fiction operates as a window into the cultural milieu that frames law-making moments. In locating law-making events – specifically the making of the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth) and the Motor Car Act 1909 (Vic) – with the clone ‘canon’ in science fiction (specifically Star Trek: Nemesis (2002)) and H.G. Wells’ scientific romances, what is offered is a much richer understanding of how the cultural framing of technology becomes law than that provided by the ‘pragmatic’ positivism of the law and technology enterprise. The second implication arises from the excess that appears at the margins of the richer analyses. Exploring technical legality through science fiction does not remain within the epistemological frame. Each of the analyses gestures towards something essential about technical legality. The law and technology enterprise is grounded on the modern myth, which is also the myth of modernity – Frankenstein. It tells a story of monstrous technology, vulnerable humanity and saving law. The analyses of the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth) and the Motor Car Act 1909 (Vic) show that this narrative is terrorised, that the saving law turns out to be the monster in disguise; that the law called forth by technology is in itself technological. In extended readings of two critically acclaimed science fictions, Frank Herbert’s Dune cycle (1965–83) and the recent television series Battlestar Galactica (2003–10), the essential commitments of technological law are exposed. Dune as technical legality makes clear that technological law is truly monstrous, for behind its positivism and sovereignty its essence is with the alchemy of death and time. Battlestar Galactica as technical legality reduces further the alchemical properties of technical law. Battlestar Galactica moves the metaphysical highlight to the essence of technology and very nearly ends with Heidegger’s demise of Being in ‘Enframing’: monstrous technology and monstrous law reveal a humanity that cannot be saved. However, at the very moment of this fall, Battlestar Galactica collapses the metaphysical frame, affirming technological Being-in-the-world over empty ordering, life over death. This free responsibility to becoming that emerges from Battlestar Galactica reunites technical legality with the mythic of modernity. The modern denial of myth, which allowed Frankenstein to narrate technical legality, has been challenged. Free responsibility to becoming means a confidence with myths; it clears the way for the telling of new stories about law and technology.
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a judge in some representative American jurisdiction is assumed to accept the main uncontroversial constitutive and regulative rules of the law in his jurisdiction and to follow earlier decisions of their court or higher courts whose rationale, as l
Abstract: 1.. HARD CASES 5. Legal Rights A. Legislation . . . We might therefore do well to consider how a philosophical judge might develop, in appropriate cases, theories of what legislative purpose and legal principles require. We shall find that he would construct these theories in the same manner as a philosophical referee would construct the character of a game. I have invented, for this purpose, a lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen, whom I shall call Hercules. I suppose that Hercules is a judge in some representative American jurisdiction. I assume that he accepts the main uncontroversial constitutive and regulative rules of the law in his jurisdiction. He accepts, that is, that statutes have the general power to create and extinguish legal rights, and that judges have the general duty to follow earlier decisions of their court or higher courts whose rationale, as l

2,050 citations

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369 citations

References
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28 citations

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27 citations


"Technical Legality: Law, Technology..." refers background in this paper

  • ...See also Porte (1979), p 103; Lorio (1982), p 983; Clapshaw (1980–1983), p 254; Wadington (1983), p 264; Lane et al (1983), p 320; Scott (1984), p 405; Dickman (1985), p 817; McCartan (1986), p 727; Robertson (1986), pp 951, 1023....

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  • ...…Scott (1981), pp 199–214; Turner (1981), pp 460–471; Andrews (1982), p 206; Mason (1982), pp 348, 350; Frey (1982), pp 312–316 Crabtree (1983), pp 912–916; Wadington (1983), pp 468–473; Clapshaw (1980– 1983), pp 255–262; Venturatos Lorio (1984), pp 1643–1653; Lupton (1985), pp 277–289; Priest…...

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  • ...This return had two 122 Mahlon Blow (1982), p 169 123 Wadington (1983), p 467....

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  • ...155 Wadington (1983), p 465....

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  • ...See also Porte (1979), p 85; Dickens (1980), pp 259–262; Scott (1981), pp 217–220; Venturatos Lorio (1982), p 983; Annas and Elias (1983), pp 216–223; Wadington (1983), pp 474–477; Sappideen (1983), pp 85–87; Clapshaw (1980–1983), p 266; Venturatos Lorio (1984), pp 1673–1674; Hollinger (1986), pp…...

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Posted Content
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that existing laws regulate virtual worlds with little or no regard to the virtual reality they foster, and they conclude that legislatures should not enact new criminal laws to account for the new social harms that may occur in virtual worlds.
Abstract: When does conduct by an online player in a virtual world game trigger liability for a real-world crime? In the future, will new criminal laws be needed to account for new social harms that occur in virtual worlds? This short essay considers both questions. Part I argues that existing laws regulate virtual worlds with little or no regard to the virtual reality they foster. Criminal law tends to follow the physical rather than the virtual: it looks to what a person does rather than what the victim virtually perceives. This dynamic greatly narrows the role of criminal law in virtual worlds. Existing law will not recognize virtual murder, virtual threats, or virtual theft. Virtual worlds will be regulated like any other game, but their virtualness normally will have no independent legal resonance from the standpoint of criminal law.Part II turns to the normative question: Are new laws needed? It concludes that legislatures should not enact new criminal laws to account for the new social harms that may occur in virtual worlds. Virtual worlds at bottom are computer games, and games are artificial structures better regulated by game administrators than federal or state governments. The best punishment for a violation of a game comes from the game itself. Criminal law is a blunt instrument that should be used only as a last resort. The state's power to deny individuals their freedom is an extraordinary power, and it should be reserved for harms that other mechanisms cannot remedy. Online virtual worlds may seem real to some users, but unlike real life, they are mediated by game administrators who can take action with consequences internal to the game. Internal virtual harms should trigger internal virtual remedies. It is only when harms go outside the game that the criminal law should be potentially available to remedy wrongs not redressable elsewhere.

27 citations


"Technical Legality: Law, Technology..." refers background in this paper

  • ...297 Kerr (2008), p 417....

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  • ...227 Balkin (2004b), cited by Jankowich (2005), p 187; Mayer-Schönberger and Crowley (2006), p 1801; Reuveni (2007), p 264; Jacob Rogers (2007), p 412; Chin (2007), p 1307; Zack (2007), p 242; Kerr (2008), p 416; Passman (2008), p 262....

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  • ...296 Kerr (2008), p 425....

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  • ...…Lucy Davis concluded that: It is uncertain whether the Australian law relating to trade marks would assist either a physical world trade mark owner preventing misuse in Second Life or 249 Kerr (2008), pp 422–423; Dougherty and Lastowka (2008), pp 763–764; Stoup (2008), p 340; Brenner (2008), p 57....

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  • ...248 Rosette (2008), pp 289–290; see also White (2008), pp 239–240; Arias (2008), pp 1318–1327; Kerr (2008), p 420 80 (which could only be purchased with real-world money) in Sulake’s Habbo Hotel was prosecuted as fraud in Holland.249 Susan W. Brenner, after an exhaustive survey of applicable United…...

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Schmitt and Strauss belong to a single tradition of anti-liberalism, whose ultimate practical implication is suggested by Schmitt's fate as a Nazi apologist as mentioned in this paper, and the encounter between Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss remains a source of fascination and polemics for the friends and enemies of both thinkers.
Abstract: The encounter between Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss remains a source of fascination and polemics for the friends and enemies of both thinkers. According to Stephen Holmes, both Schmitt and Strauss belong to a single tradition of anti-liberalism, whose ultimate practical implication is suggested by Schmitt's fate as a Nazi apologist. Indeed, Holmes places much emphasis on Strauss's criticism of Schmitt for failing to develop a critique of liberalism that goes beyond the horizon of liberalism itself, and interprets this criticism of Schmitt as a call for a form of anti-liberalism more extreme and virulent than that propounded by Schmitt on the very eve of his membership in the Nazi party.

26 citations

01 Jan 2003
TL;DR: The authors found that most Australians are mostly comfortable about the rate of technological change, but there is some evidence of ambivalence, uncertainty, division and possible volatility in relation to public perceptions of technology change, and most Australians do not trust key institutions such as government, major companies or media for information about new technologies.
Abstract: This article examines how comfortable Australians are in relation to the rate of technological change; how comfortable they are about different technologies; and how much they trust different institutions, organisations and groups in relation to information about technological change. It finds that Australians are mostly comfortable about the rate of technological change. There is no evidence of a ‘deep chasm between science and public awareness’, as suggested by some observers in relation to western societies. In particular, Australians trust CSIRO, universities, hospitals and scientists for information about new technologies. Apart from age, trust in these groups is the best predictor for feeling comfortable about new technologies. By the same token, there is some evidence of ambivalence, uncertainty, division and possible volatility in relation to public perceptions of technological change. In particular, most Australians are uncomfortable in relation to genetic engineering technologies; some Australians (especially those who are older, and those who have a religious affiliation) are less comfortable with new technologies than others; and most Australians do not trust key institutions such as government, major companies or the media for information about new technologies. Replications of the study in future years will provide an opportunity to explore the robustness of Australians’ comfort with technological change, or conversely the volatility of their perceptions.

25 citations