The architecture of government : rethinking political decentralization
01 Jul 2007-
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose a decentralization approach based on checks, balances, and freedom, where data to the rescue is used to solve the problem of ethnic conflict and secession.
Abstract: 1. Introduction 2. The political process 3. Administrative efficiency 4. Competition among governments 5. Fiscal policy and redistribution 6. Fiscal coordination and incentives 7. Citizens and government 8. Checks, balances, and freedom 9. Acquiring and using knowledge 10. Ethnic conflict and secession 11. Data to the rescue? 12. Conclusion: rethinking decentralization.
Citations
More filters
TL;DR: The authors examines how decentralization affects governance, in particular how it might increase political competition, improve public accountability, reduce political instability, and impose incentive-compatible limits on government power, but also threaten fiscal sustainability.
Abstract: The most important theoretical argument concerning decentralization is that it can improve governance by making government more accountable and responsive to the governed. Improving governance is also central to the motivations of real-world reformers, who bear risks and costs in the interest of devolution. But the literature has mostly focused instead on policy-relevant outcomes, such as education and health services, public investment, and fiscal deficits. This paper examines how decentralization affects governance, in particular how it might increase political competition, improve public accountability, reduce political instability, and impose incentive-compatible limits on government power, but also threaten fiscal sustainability.
394 citations
TL;DR: Decentralization is one of the most important reforms of the past generation, both in terms of the number of countries affected and the potentially deep implications for the nature and quality of governance.
318 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore how various forms of fiscal federalism work in the presence of political officials who, rather than being benevolent social planners, face different forms of political incentives.
224 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify a quasiexperiment, a large-scale municipal reform in Denmark, which allows them to estimate a causal effect of jurisdiction size on internal political efficacy.
Abstract: Optimal jurisdiction size is a cornerstone of government design. A strong tradition in political thought argues that democracy thrives in smaller jurisdictions, but existing studies of the effects of jurisdiction size, mostly cross-sectional in nature, yield ambiguous results due to sorting effects and problems of endogeneity. We focus on internal political efficacy, a psychological condition that many see as necessary for high-quality participatory democracy. We identify a quasiexperiment, a large-scale municipal reform in Denmark, which allows us to estimate a causal effect of jurisdiction size on internal political efficacy. The reform, affecting some municipalities, but not all, was implemented by the central government, and resulted in exogenous, and substantial, changes in municipal population size. Based on survey data collected before and after the reform, we find, using various difference-in-difference and matching estimators, that jurisdiction size has a causal and sizeable detrimental effect on citizens' internal political efficacy.
213 citations
Book•
11 May 2009TL;DR: In this paper, the authors introduce the design of federal constitutions and the role of governments in federal economies and the decentralization of government authority, and the practice of inter-governmental fiscal transfers.
Abstract: Part I. Design of Fiscal Constitutions: 1. Introduction to federalism and the role of governments in federal economies 2. The decentralization of government authority 3. Expenditure assignment 4. Revenue assignment 5. Natural resources ownership and management in a federal system 6. Local governance in theory 7. Local governance in practice Part II. Revenue Sharing and Fiscal Transfers: 8. Revenue sharing 9. The principles of intergovernmental transfers 10. The practice of intergovernmental fiscal transfers Part III. Finance and Provision of Public Services: 11. Finance and provision of health and education 12. Finance and provision of infrastructure 13. Poverty alleviation in federations Part IV. Challenges and Responses: 14. Fiscal federalism and macroeconomic governance 15. Inter-regional competition and policies for regional cohesion and convergence 16. Decentralized governance and corruption 17. Adapting to a changing world.
202 citations
References
More filters
TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown that a definition of a firm may be obtained which is not only realistic in that it corresponds to what is meant by a firm in the real world, but is tractable by two of the most powerful instruments of economic analysis developed by Marshall, the idea of the margin and that of substitution.
Abstract: Economic theory has suffered in the past from a failure to state clearly its assumptions. Economists in building up a theory have often omitted to examine the foundations on which it was erected. This examination is, however, essential not only to prevent the misunderstanding and needless controversy which arise from a lack of knowledge of the assumptions on which a theory is based, but also because of the extreme importance for economics of good judgement in choosing between rival sets of assumptions. For instance, it is suggested that the use of the word “firm” in economics may be different from the use of the term by the “plain man.”1 Since there is apparently a trend in economic theory towards starting analysis with the individual firm and not with the industry,2 it is all the more necessary not only that a clear definition of the word “firm” should be given but that its difference from a firm in the “real world,” if it exists, should be made clear. Mrs. Robinson has said that “the two questions to be asked of a set of assumptions in economics are: Are they tractable? and: Do they correspond with the real world?”3 Though, as Mrs. Robinson points out, “more often one set will be manageable and the other realistic,” yet there may well be branches of theory where assumptions may be both manageable and realistic. It is hoped to show in the following paper that a definition of a firm may be obtained which is not only realistic in that it corresponds to what is meant by a firm in the real world, but is tractable by two of the most powerful instruments of economic analysis developed by Marshall, the idea of the margin and that of substitution, together giving the idea of substitution at the margin.
21,195 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1957
TL;DR: Downs presents a rational calculus of voting that has inspired much of the later work on voting and turnout as discussed by the authors, particularly significant was his conclusion that a rational voter should almost never bother to vote.
Abstract: Downs presents a rational calculus of voting that has inspired much of the later work on voting and turnout. Particularly significant was his conclusion that a rational voter should almost never bother to vote. This conclusion, especially as elaborated on by Riker and Ordeshook (1968) has shifted the attention of modern political scientists from explaining why people don't vote to explaining why they do.
14,677 citations
Book•
[...]
01 Jan 1966
TL;DR: The Tacit Dimension, originally published in 1967, argues that such tacit knowledge - tradition, inherited practices, implied values, and prejudgments - is a crucial part of scientific knowledge.
Abstract: 'I shall reconsider human knowledge by starting from the fact that we can know more than we can tell', writes Michael Polanyi, whose work paved the way for the likes of Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper. "The Tacit Dimension", originally published in 1967, argues that such tacit knowledge - tradition, inherited practices, implied values, and prejudgments - is a crucial part of scientific knowledge. Back in print for a new generation of students and scholars, this volume challenges the assumption that skepticism, rather than established belief, lies at the heart of scientific discovery.
13,830 citations
TL;DR: The authors show that the Musgrave-Samuelson analysis, which is valid for federal expenditures, need not apply to local expenditures, and restate the assumptions made by Musgrave and Samuelson and the central problems with which they deal.
Abstract: NE of the most important recent developments in the area of "applied economic theory" has been the work of Musgrave and Samuelson in public finance theory.2 The two writers agree on what is probably the major point under investigation, namely, that no "market type" solution exists to determine the level of expenditures on public goods. Seemingly, we are faced with the problem of having a rather large portion of our national income allocated in a "non-optimal" way when compared with the private sector. This discussion will show that the Musgrave-Samuelson analysis, which is valid for federal expenditures, need not apply to local expenditures. The plan of the discussion is first to restate the assumptions made by Musgrave and Samuelson and the central problems with which they deal. After looking at a key difference between the federal versus local cases, I shall present a simple model. This model yields a solution for the level of expenditures for local public goods which reflects the preferences of the population more adequately than they can be reflected at the national level. The assumptions of the model will then be relaxed to see what implications are involved. Finally, policy considerations will be discussed.
12,105 citations