Q1. What are the contributions in "The case for nit+ft in europe. an empirical optimal taxation exercise" ?
The authors present an exercise in empirical optimal taxation for European countries from three areas: Southern, Central and Northern Europe.
The case for NIT+FT in Europe. An empirical optimal taxation exercise
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors presented an empirical optimal taxation approach to a negative tax with flat tax reform for a sample of eight European countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom.
About: This article is published in Economic Modelling.The article was published on 2018-11-01 and is currently open access. It has received 8 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Negative income tax & Optimal tax.
Summary (2 min read)
Jump to: [2. The alternative policies] – [4.1 Household preferences and choices] – [D ] – [4.2 Data] – [SMRS e e] – [4.5. Identifying the optimal policies] and [5. Results]
2. The alternative policies
- Note that GNIT is by definition more general than the other NIT special cases.
- Yet it is important to define the optimal design of the special cases: although necessarily not superior to GNIT according to the Social Welfare criterion, they might be more attractive than GNIT according to other dimensions that are not taken into account by the Social Welfare function.
4.1 Household preferences and choices
- Households can choose within an opportunity set containing jobs or activities characterized by hours of work h, sector of market job s (wage employment or self-employment) and other characteristics (observed by the household but not by us).
- The authors define h as a vector with one element for the singles and two elements for the couples,.
D
- For couples, i D contains two analogous sets of variables, one for each partner.
- The parameter estimates of the behavioral models for singles and couples for six countries (Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy.
4.2 Data
- The datasets used in the analysis are the EUROMOD input data based on the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) for the year 2010.
- The input data provide all required information on demographic characteristics and human capital, employment and wages of household members, as well as information about various sources of non-labour income.
- The authors apply common sample selection criteria for all countries under study by selecting individuals in the age range 18-65 who are not retired or disabled.
- Then EUROMOD 4 provides calculations of household-level tax and transfer liabilities given the household characteristics and gross incomes according the existing tax and transfer rules.
- The target population consists of all private households throughout the national territory in every country.
SMRS e e
- The simulation results presented in Section 5 are based on 0.05.
- Absolute indexes are less popular than relative indexes (e.g. Gini's or Atkinsos's), although there is no strict logical or economical motivation for preferring one rather than the other.
- 7 Blundell and Shephard (2012) adopt a social welfare index which turns out to be very close to Kolm's.
- Their main motivation for their index seems to be the computational convenience, since it handles negative numbers (random utility levels, in their case).
- The authors motivation in choosing Kolm's index is analogous.
4.5. Identifying the optimal policies
- It is important to keep in mind that the simulated policies differ from the current policies with respect to many dimensions.
- First, the authors simulate policies with a FT, while all the countries included in the present exercise adopt increasing marginal tax rates.
- In general, while the current systems might be somehow close to CBI or IWB or other versions of NIT-like mechanism, they are much more complicated.
- The comparison of the reforms to the current system is informative upon the effects of the reformed budget sets, including the effects of the universal and permanent extention to the whole population.
- It is not directly informative upon dimensionssuch as the administration costswhich are not represented in their microeconometric model.
5. Results
- The Tablesone for each countryshow, for each of the policies considered, the optimal tax-transfer parameters, the average individual labour supply, the household poverty rate, the percentage of household winners with respect to the current system and the change in the money-metric social welfare as percentage of the average household available income.
- Labour supply is measured by average annual hours of work (including the zero hours of the non-employed).
- The poverty rate is the percentage of households with available equivalized income below 60% of the median equivalized income.
- Let W0 and WP respectively the Social Welfare levels attained under the current regime and under a certain policy.
- Note that they are monetary measures .
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Figures (15)
Table A.12 – Maximum likelihood estimates – singles (Ireland) 
Table A.4 – Maximum likelihood estimates – singles (Belgium) 
Table A.8 – Maximum likelihood estimates – singles (France) 
Table A11. – Maximum likelihood estimates – couples (Ireland) 
Table 1. Optimal CBI, GNIT, UBI and IWB with k = 0.05 for Italy 
Table 2. Optimal CBI, GNIT, UBI and IWB with k = 0.05 for Belgium 
Table A.1 – Maximum likelihood estimates – couples (Italy) 
Table A.6 – Maximum likelihood estimates – singles (Luxembourg) 
Fig. 1d. An example of IWB 
Table 4. Optimal CBI, GNIT, UBI and IWB with k = 0.05 for France 
Table 3. Optimal CBI, GNIT, UBI and IWB with k = 0.05 for Luxembourg 
Table A.10 – Maximum likelihood estimates – singles (UK) 
Table A.2 – Maximum likelihood estimates – singles (Italy) 
Table 6. Optimal CBI, GNIT, UBI and IWB with k = 0.05 for Ireland 
Table 5. Optimal CBI, GNIT, UBI and IWB with k = 0.05 for UK
Citations
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01 Jan 2007
TL;DR: Van Parijs as mentioned in this paper presents an alternative vision of the just society: a capitalist society offering a substantial and unconditional basic income to all its members, and reveals a new ideal of a free society and its meaning in the real world.
Abstract: Capitalist societies are full of unacceptable inequalities. Freedom is of paramount importance. These two convictions, widely shared around the world, seem to be in direct contradiction with each other. Fighting inequality jeopardizes freedom, and taking freedom seriously boosts inequality. Can this conflict be resolved? In this ground-breaking book, Philippe Van Parijs sets a new and compelling case for a just society. Assessing and rejecting the claims of both socialism and conventional capitalism, he presents a clear and compelling alternative vision of the just society: a capitalist society offering a substantial and unconditional basic income to all its members. Not just an exercise in political theory, this book reveals a new ideal of a free society and its meaning in the real world by drawing out its policy implications. It is essential reading for anyone concerned about the just society and the welfare state as we move into the twenty-first century.
21 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present empirical evidence from studies over the last few decades on the effects of implementation of a UBI on employment, and they apply the PRISMA methodology to better judge their validity and ensure maximum reliability of the results by avoiding biases and making the work reproducible.
Abstract: The objective of this article is to determine, as conclusively as possible, if the implementation of a Universal Basic Income (UBI) would lead to a significant reduction in the working age population labour supply. If this were true, implementation of a UBI may not be sustainable. To do this, we will compile empirical evidence from studies over the last few decades on the effects of implementation of a UBI on employment. We apply the PRISMA methodology to better judge their validity, which ensures maximum reliability of the results by avoiding biases and making the work reproducible. Given that the methodologies used in these studies are diverse, they are reviewed to contextualize the results taking into account the possible limitations detected in these methodologies. While many authors have been writing about this issue citing experiences or experiments, the added value of this article is that it performs a systematic review following a widely tested scientific methodology. Over 1200 documents that discuss the UBI/employment relationship have been reviewed. We found a total of 50 empirical cases, of which 18 were selected, and 38 studies with contrasted empirical evidence on this relationship. The results speak for themselves: Despite a detailed search, we have not found any evidence of a significant reduction in labour supply. Instead, we found evidence that labour supply increases globally among adults, men and women, young and old, and the existence of some insignificant and functional reductions to the system such as a decrease in workers from the following categories: Children, the elderly, the sick, those with disabilities, women with young children to look after, or young people who continued studying. These reductions do not reduce the overall supply since it is largely offset by increased supply from other members of the community.
14 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors develop a unifying framework for optimal income taxation in multi-sector economies with general patterns of externalities, where agents are characterized by an N-dimensional skill vector corresponding to intrinsic abilities in N potentially externality-causing activities.
Abstract: We develop a unifying framework for optimal income taxation in multi-sector economies with general patterns of externalities. Agents in this model are characterized by an N-dimensional skill vector corresponding to intrinsic abilities in N potentially externality-causing activities. The private return to each activity depends on individual skill and an aggregate activity-specific return, which is a fully general function of the economy-wide distribution of activity-specific efforts. We show that the N dimensional heterogeneity can be collapsed to a one-dimensional, endogenous statistic sufficient for screening. The optimal tax schedule features a multiplicative income specific correction to an otherwise standard tax formula. Because externalities change the relative returns to different activities, corrective taxes induce changes in the across activity allocation of effort. These relative return effects cause the optimal correction to diverge, in general, from the Pigouvian tax that would align private and social returns. We characterize this divergence and its implications for the shape of the tax schedule both generally and in a number of applications, including externality free economies, increasing and decreasing returns to scale, zero-sum activities such as bargaining or rent extraction, and positive or negative spillovers.
9 citations
TL;DR: In this article , a micro-econometric model is developed and estimated to simulate household labour supply decisions and the implied economic, fiscal and welfare effects, embedded into a numerical optimization routine that identifies the tax-transfer rule that maximizes a social welfare function.
Abstract: In this paper we propose a computational approach to empirical optimal taxation. We develop and estimate a microeconometric model that is run to simulate household labour supply decisions and the implied economic, fiscal and welfare effects. The microsimulation is embedded into a numerical optimization routine that identifies the tax- transfer rule that maximizes a social welfare function. We consider the class of tax- transfer rules where net available income is computed as a 4th degree polynomial transformation of taxable income plus a transfer. We present the results for six European countries: Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and the United Kingdom. For most values of the inequality aversion parameter k that characterizes the social welfare function, the optimized rules provide a higher social welfare than the current rule, with the exception of Luxembourg. The optimized tax- transfer rules are close to a Flat Tax plus a Universal Basic Income (or equivalently a Negative Income Tax).
1 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the effect of a move from joint to individual taxation system using 2,276 couple household living in Luxembourg was studied, where the authors estimate simultaneously labour supply and social assistance participation, exploiting a discrete choice model.
Abstract: We study the effect of a move from joint to individual taxation system using 2,276 couple household living in Luxembourg We estimate simultaneously labour supply and social assistance (RMG) participation, exploiting a discrete choice model We focus on the distributional, work (extensive and intensive margin) incentive, and the social welfare effect of introducing a mandatory individual taxation system in Luxembourg The work incentive of married women increases by 227% in intensive margin and 258% in extensive margin after the reform The incentive of married men is almost zero Equivalised disposable income, after the behavioural adjustment, decreases on average 21 per cent After adjustments to direct and indirect taxes, the net revenue-neutral result is a budget surplus for the central government of around €10 million
1 citations
Additional excerpts
...For instance, Islam & Colombino (2018), Aaberge and Colombino (2013) and many others adopt a procedure that consists of using a common utility function as an argument of the social welfare function following Deaton and Muelbauer (1980) approach18....
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...Islam & Colombino (2018)....
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References
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors present an approach based on a computational approach to the optimal taxation problem, where they identify optimal income tax rules according to various social welfare criteria, keeping fixed the total net tax revenue.
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to present an exercise where we identify optimal income tax rules according to various social welfare criteria, keeping fixed the total net tax revenue. Empirical applications of optimal taxation theory have typically adopted analytical expressions for the optimal taxes and then imputed numerical values to their parameters by using “calibration” procedures or previous econometric estimates. Besides the restrictiveness of the assumptions needed to obtain analytical solutions to the optimal taxation problem, a shortcoming of that procedure is the possible inconsistency between the theoretical assumptions and the assumptions implicit in the empirical evidence. In this paper we follow a different procedure, based on a computational approach to the optimal taxation problem. To this end, we estimate a microeconomic model with 78 parameters that capture heterogeneity in consumption-leisure preferences for singles and couples as well as in job opportunities across individuals based on detailed Norwegian household data for 1994. For any given tax rule, the estimated model can be used to simulate the labour supply choices made by single individuals and couples. Those choices are therefore generated by preferences and opportunities that vary across the decision units. We then identify optimal tax rules – within a class of 9-parameter piece-wise linear rules - by iteratively running the model until a given social welfare function attains its maximum under the constraint of keeping constant the total net tax revenue. The parameters to be determined are an exemption level, four marginal tax rates, three “kink points” and a lump sum transfer that can be positive (benefit) or negative (tax). We explore a variety of social welfare functions with differing degree of inequality aversion. All the social welfare functions imply monotonically increasing marginal tax rates. When compared with the current (1994) tax systems, the optimal rules imply a lower average tax rate. Moreover, all the optimal rules imply – with respect to the current rule – lower marginal rates on low and/or average income levels and higher marginal rates on relatively high income levels. These results are partially at odds with the tax reforms that took place in many countries during the last decades. While those reforms embodied the idea of lowering average tax rates, the way to implement it has typically consisted in reducing the top marginal rates. Our results instead suggest to lower average tax rates by reducing marginal rates on low and average income levels and increasing marginal rates on very high income levels.
50 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, van de Walle focuses on three key questions: What is the welfare objective? How are the benefits of public spending currently distributed? How can that distribution be improved?
Abstract: Public spending is a potentially powerful instrument for fighting poverty. Generally, what is needed is universalism in certain spending categories (basic services) and finer targeting in others (for providing safety nets, for example). Public spending aims to promote efficiency (by correcting for various market failures) and equity (by improving the distribution of economic welfare). This paper, drawn from a book on public spending and the poor, is concerned with the latter. In it van de Walle focuses on three key questions: What is the welfare objective? How are the benefits of public spending currently distributed? How can that distribution be improved? We must first be clear about how performance is to be judged, says van de Walle. Different assumptions about policy objectives shape disagreements about program assessments and recommendations. Evaluating a policy's impact requires assessing how different things would have been without it, but quantifying a counterfactual is not easy. One approach - benefit incidence - ignores behavioral responses and second-round effects, and simply uses the cost of provision as a proxy for benefits received. Other methods focus entirely on the individual's valuation of the policy benefits, allowing for responses to changes in the individual's budget set. Some reasonably robust conclusions have emerged from studies of public spending incidence: ° Spending on basic services - notably primary and secondary education and basic health care - almost universally reaches the poor. The case for broad targeting, by expanding the share of public spending on these services, is well-substantiated. But even here, monitoring is required so that marginal investments are not lavished on better serving the better-off. ° Certain food subsidy and distribution schemes, social cash transfers (such as are common in the former Soviet Union countries and Eastern Europe), public employment schemes, and other targeted transfer schemes have at times been quite propoor. ° But many programs whose stated rationale is to reduce poverty have instead been dismal, expensive failures. A popular reaction has been to clamor for reform of public spending, to demand finer targeting of benefits to the poor. Most public spending programs are to some degree targeted. The question is, what degree of targeting is optimal? Other things being equal, the more ways one discriminates between beneficiaries, the greater targeting's impact on poverty. But other things are not equal. Fine targeting sometimes comes at a cost to the poor. Administrative costs may escalate, political support may vanish, and behavioral responses may add costs to targeted interventions. There is no simple answer about how much targeting is desirable, but empirical evidence from past studies suggests some clear principles. The optimal mix of targeted and universal poverty-reduction programs depends on several factors, including the characteristics of the poor (who they are, how many there are, and why they are poor) and country-specific circumstances (initial conditions, infrastructure development, and administrative capabilities). ° When poverty is widespread and administrative capacity is low, broad targeting is desirable and results from incidence of public spending studies should help guide sectoral and intrasectoral allocations. ° Generally, what is needed is a combination of universalism in certain spending categories and finer targeting in others (for providing safety nets, for example). Such a two-pronged approach is a sound starting point for policy design. But in implementing it, one should never confuse the ends and the means of policy. This paper - a product of the Public Economics Division, Policy Research Department - is derived from Incidence and Targeting: An Overview of Implications for Research and Policy, a chapter in the book Public Spending and the Poor: Theory and Evidence. The author may be contacted at dvandewalle@worldbank.org.
49 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed and estimated a micro-econometric model of household labour supply in four European countries representative of different economies and welfare policy regimes: Denmark, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom.
Abstract: We develop and estimate a microeconometric model of household labour supply in four European countries representative of different economies and welfare policy regimes: Denmark, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom. We then simulate, under the constraint of constant total net tax revenue (fiscal neutrality), the effects of various hypothetical tax-transfer reforms which include alternative versions of a Basic Income policy: Guaranteed Minimum Income, Work Fare, Participation Basic Income and Universal Basic Income. We produce indexes and criteria according to which the reforms can be ranked and compared to the current tax-transfer systems. The exercise can be considered as one of empirical optimal taxation, where the optimization problem is solved computationally rather than analytically. It turns out that many versions of the Basic Income policies would be superior to the current system. The most successful policies are those involving non means-tested versions of basic income (Universal or Participation Basic Income) and adopting progressive tax-rules. If ﾖ besides the fiscal neutrality constraint ﾖ also other constraints are considered, such as the implied top marginal top tax rate or the effect on female labour supply, the picture changes: unconditional policies remain optimal and feasible in Denmark and the UK; instead in Italy and Portugal universal policies appear to be too costly in terms of implied top marginal tax rates and in terms of adverse effects on female participation, and conditional policies such as Work-Fare, emerge as more desirable.
48 citations
"The case for NIT+FT in Europe. An e..." refers methods in this paper
...To deal with this issue, we follow a two-stage procedure presented in Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) and also adopted in Coda-Moscarola et al. (2014)....
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TL;DR: O'Donoghue et al. as discussed by the authors provide a detailed discussion in relation to the development of the field of labour supply focused microsimulation models and methodological choices, and describe approaches to utilising these models for policy simulation in terms of producing and interpreting simulation outcomes, outlining an extensive literature of policy analyses utilizing the approach.
Abstract: This paper is published as Chapter 7 of Handbook of Microsimulation Modelling edited by Cathal O’Donoghue, and issued in the series Contributions to Economic Analysis by Emerald Publishing Group. The purpose of the paper is to provide a detailed discussion in relation to the development of the field of labour supply focused microsimulation models and methodological choices. The paper identifies three methodologies for modelling labour supply • The Reduced Form Approach • The Structural “Marginalist” Approach • The Random Utility Maximisation Approach The paper considers issues associated with the reliability of structural models relative to (ex-post) experimental or quasi-experimental analysis. Recognising however the need to undertake ex-ante analysis, it questions, whether there are alternatives to structural models and how can we evaluate structural models and how they are compared with other approaches. The paper then describes approaches to utilising these models for policy simulation in terms of producing and interpreting simulation outcomes, outlining an extensive literature of policy analyses utilising the approach. Also labour supply is not only central to modelling behavioural response but also modelling optimal tax-benefit systems, with a focus on a computational approach, given some of the challenges of the theoretical approach. Combining labour supply results with welfare functions enables the social evaluation of policy simulations. Combining welfare functions and labour supply functions, the chapter then identifies how to model socially optimal income taxation.
45 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a peer-reviewed version of the article is published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12015 This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.
Abstract: "This is the peer reviewed version of the article, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12015 This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions."
43 citations