The causes of corruption: a cross-national study
TL;DR: The authors analyzed several indexes of perceived corruption compiled from business risk surveys for the 1980s and 1990s and found that countries with Protestant traditions, histories of British rule, more developed economies, and (probably) higher imports were less corrupt.
About: This article is published in Journal of Public Economics.The article was published on 2000-06-01 and is currently open access. It has received 3592 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Corruption Perceptions Index & Corruption.
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TL;DR: The authors investigated empirically the determinants of the quality of governments in a large cross-section of countries and found that countries that are poor, close to the equator, ethnolinguistically heterogeneous, use French or socialist laws, or have high proportions of Catholics or Muslims exhibit inferior government performance.
Abstract: We investigate empirically the determinants of the quality of governments in a large cross-section of countries. We assess government performance using measures of government intervention, public sector efficiency, public good provision, size of government, and political freedom. We find that countries that are poor, close to the equator, ethnolinguistically heterogeneous, use French or socialist laws, or have high proportions of Catholics or Muslims exhibit inferior government performance. We also find that the larger governments tend to be the better performing ones. The importance of (reasonably) exogenous historical factors in explaining the variation in government performance across countries sheds light on the economic, political, and cultural theories of institutions.
5,555 citations
Book•
01 Jan 2002
TL;DR: In this paper, Veto players analysis of European Union Institutions is presented, focusing on the role of individual veto players and collective players in the analysis of the institutions of the European Union.
Abstract: List of Figures ix List of Tables xi Preface and Acknowledgments xiii Introduction 1 PART I: VETO PLAYERS THEORY 17 One: Individual Veto Players 19 Two: Collective Veto Players 38 PART II: VETO PLAYERS AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 65 Three: Regimes: Nondemocratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary 67 Four: Governments and Parliaments 91 Five: Referendums 116 Six: Federalism, Bicameralism, and Qualified Majorities 136 PART III: POLICY EFFECTS OF VETO PLAYERS 161 Seven: Legislation 165 Eight: Macroeconomic Policies 187 PART IV: SYSTEMIC EFFECTS OF VETO PLAYERS 207 Nine: Government Stability 209 Ten: Judiciary and Bureaucracies 222 Eleven: Veto Players Analysis of European Union Institutions 248 Conclusion 283 Bibliography 291 Index 309
2,983 citations
Cites background from "The causes of corruption: a cross-n..."
...Countries with smaller first-tier jurisdictions tended to be perceived as more corrupt” (Treisman 2000b: 1)....
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...In the most recent of these empirical analyses, Treisman (2000b) creates a data set including 154 countries and defines five different types of decentralization depending on the political institutions prevailing in a country, the number of tiers that different units can be classified, the size of…...
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...(Treisman 2000c: 844)....
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...Treisman (2000c) studied inflation in 87 countries during the 70s and 80s....
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...59 In chapter 10 I discuss an article by Treisman (2000) using exactly this strategy....
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TL;DR: In this article, an examination of firms in 47 countries showed a widespread overlap of controlling shareholders and top officers who are connected with national parliaments or governments, particularly in countries with higher levels of corruption, with barriers to foreign investment, and with more transparent systems.
Abstract: Examination of firms in 47 countries shows a widespread overlap of controlling shareholders and top officers who are connected with national parliaments or governments, particularly in countries with higher levels of corruption, with barriers to foreign investment, and with more transparent systems. Connections are diminished when regulations set more limits on official behavior. Additionally, I show that the announcement of a new political connection results in a significant increase in value.
2,716 citations
TL;DR: In this article, an examination of firms in 47 countries showed a widespread overlap of controlling shareholders and top officers who are connected with national parliaments or governments, particularly in countries with higher levels of corruption, with barriers to foreign investment, and with more transparent systems.
Abstract: Examination of firms in 47 countries shows a widespread overlap of controlling shareholders and top officers who are connected with national parliaments or governments, particularly in countries with higher levels of corruption, with barriers to foreign investment, and with more transparent systems. Connections are diminished when regulations set more limits on official behavior. Additionally, I show that the announcement of a new political connection results in a significant increase in value.
2,440 citations
TL;DR: The authors discuss eight frequently asked questions about public corruption: What is corruption, which countries are the most corrupt, what are the common characteristics of countries with high corruption, what is the magnitude of corruption, do higher wages for bureaucrats reduce corruption, can competition reduce corruption and why have there been so few successful attempts to fight corruption?
Abstract: This paper will discuss eight frequently asked questions about public corruption: (1) What is corruption? (2) Which countries are the most corrupt? (3) What are the common characteristics of countries with high corruption? (4) What is the magnitude of corruption? (5) Do higher wages for bureaucrats reduce corruption? (6) Can competition reduce corruption? (7) Why have there been so few (recent) successful attempts to fight corruption? (8) Does corruption adversely affect growth?
1,631 citations
References
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TL;DR: Putnam et al. as discussed by the authors analyzed the efficacy of these governments in such fields as agriculture, housing, and health services, revealing patterns of associationism, trust, and cooperation that facilitate good governance and economic prosperity.
Abstract: Why do some democratic governments succeed and others fail? In a book that has received attention from policymakers and civic activists in America and around the world, Robert Putnam and his collaborators offer empirical evidence for the importance of "civic community" in developing successful institutions Their focus is on a unique experiment begun in 1970 when Italy created new governments for each of its regions After spending two decades analyzing the efficacy of these governments in such fields as agriculture, housing, and health services, they reveal patterns of associationism, trust, and cooperation that facilitate good governance and economic prosperity
13,915 citations
TL;DR: The authors showed that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets than those with stronger investor protections.
Abstract: Using a sample of 49 countries, we show that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. These findings apply to both equity and debt markets. In particular, French civil law countries have both the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets, especially as compared to common law countries.
10,005 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a newly assembled data set consisting of subjective indices of corruption, the amount of red tape, the efficiency of the judicial system, and various categories of political stability for a cross section of countries is analyzed.
Abstract: This paper analyzes a newly assembled data set consisting of subjective indices of corruption, the amount of red tape, the efficiency of the judicial system, and various categories of political stability for a cross section of countries. Corruption is found to lower investment, thereby lowering economic growth. The results are robust to controlling for endogeneity by using an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization as an instrument.
7,191 citations
"The causes of corruption: a cross-n..." refers background or methods in this paper
...Previous empirical work has found that perceived corruption reduces economic growth (Mauro, 1995)....
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...For a few examples of use of perceived corruption indexes, see Mauro (1995), La Porta et al....
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...25 – Source TI TI TI TI TI TI Mauro (1995)...
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...This rating was compiled by the organization Business International (BI) in the early 1980s, and used by Mauro to analyze the effects of perceived 16 corruption (Mauro, 1995)....
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...In the data published in Mauro (1995), Iraq received a perfect score of 10 — less ‘corrupt’ than Denmark, Sweden or Finland....
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Book•
01 Jan 1968
TL;DR: This now-classic examination of the development of viable political institutions in emerging nations is a major and enduring contribution to modern political analysis as mentioned in this paper, and its Foreword, Francis Fukuyama assesses Huntington's achievement, examining the context of the original publication as well as its lasting importance.
Abstract: This now-classic examination of the development of viable political institutions in emerging nations is a major and enduring contribution to modern political analysis. In a new Foreword, Francis Fukuyama assesses Huntington's achievement, examining the context of the book's original publication as well as its lasting importance. "This pioneering volume, examining as it does the relation between development and stability, is an interesting and exciting addition to the literature."--American Political Science Review "'Must' reading for all those interested in comparative politics or in the study of development."--Dankwart A. Rustow, Journal of International Affairs
6,601 citations