The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Sanford J. Grossman,Oliver Hart +1 more
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In this paper, a theory of costly contracts is presented, which emphasizes the contractual rights can by of two types: specific rights and residual rights, and when it is costly to list all specific rights over assets, it may be optimal to let one party purchase all residual rights.Abstract:
Our theory of costly contracts emphasizes the contractual rights can by of two types: specific rights and residual rights. When it is costly to list all specific rights over assets in the contract, it may be optimal to let one party purchase all residual rights. Ownership is the purchase of these residual rights. When residual rights are purchased by one party, they are lost by a second party, and this inevitably creates distortions. Firm 1 purchases firm 2 when firm 1's control increases the productivity of its management more than the loss of control decreases the productivity of firm 2's management.read more
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The Nature of the Firm
TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown that a definition of a firm may be obtained which is not only realistic in that it corresponds to what is meant by a firm in the real world, but is tractable by two of the most powerful instruments of economic analysis developed by Marshall, the idea of the margin and that of substitution.
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TL;DR: In this paper, it is argued that the suggested courses of action are inappropriate, in that they lead to results which are not necessarily, or even usually, desirable, and therefore, it is recommended to exclude the factory from residential districts (and presumably from other areas in which the emission of smoke would have harmful effects on others).
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Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process
TL;DR: In this paper, the potential of post-contractural apportunistic behavior for improving market efficiency through intra-firm rather than interfirm transactions is examined under the assumption that vertical costs will increase less than contracting costs as specialized assets and appropriable quasi rents increase.
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Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model
TL;DR: In this paper, a study which examined perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model was presented, focusing on a strategic approach adopted for the study and details of the bargaining situation used; discussion on perfect equilibrium.