Book•
The Dialogical Mind: Common Sense and Ethics
01 Sep 2016-
TL;DR: In this paper, Markova presents an ethics of dialogicality as an alternative to the narrow perspective of individualism and cognitivism that has traditionally dominated the field of social psychology.
Abstract: Dialogue has become a central theoretical concept in human and social sciences as well as in professions such as education, health, and psychotherapy. This 'dialogical turn' emphasises the importance of social relations and interaction to our behaviour and how we make sense of the world; hence the dialogical mind is the mind in interaction with others - with individuals, groups, institutions, and cultures in historical perspectives. Through a combination of rigorous theoretical work and empirical investigation, Markova presents an ethics of dialogicality as an alternative to the narrow perspective of individualism and cognitivism that has traditionally dominated the field of social psychology. The dialogical perspective, which focuses on interdependencies among the self and others, offers a powerful theoretical basis to comprehend, analyse, and discuss complex social issues. Markova considers the implications of dialogical epistemology both in daily life and in professional practices involving problems of communication, care, and therapy.
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79 citations
09 May 2022
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors trace the historical roots and current landmark work that have been shaping the field and categorize these works under three broad umbrellas: (i) those grounded in Western canonical philosophy, (ii) mathematical and statistical methods, and (iii) those emerging from critical data/algorithm/information studies.
Abstract: How has recent AI Ethics literature addressed topics such as fairness and justice in the context of continued social and structural power asymmetries? We trace both the historical roots and current landmark work that have been shaping the field and categorize these works under three broad umbrellas: (i) those grounded in Western canonical philosophy, (ii) mathematical and statistical methods, and (iii) those emerging from critical data/algorithm/information studies. We also survey the field and explore emerging trends by examining the rapidly growing body of literature that falls under the broad umbrella of AI Ethics. To that end, we read and annotated peer-reviewed papers published over the past four years in two premier conferences: FAccT and AIES. We organize the literature based on an annotation scheme we developed according to three main dimensions: whether the paper deals with concrete applications, use-cases, and/or people’s lived experience; to what extent it addresses harmed, threatened, or otherwise marginalized groups; and if so, whether it explicitly names such groups. We note that although the goals of the majority of FAccT and AIES papers were often commendable, their consideration of the negative impacts of AI on traditionally marginalized groups remained shallow. Taken together, our conceptual analysis and the data from annotated papers indicate that the field would benefit from an increased focus on ethical analysis grounded in concrete use-cases, people’s experiences, and applications as well as from approaches that are sensitive to structural and historical power asymmetries.
33 citations
TL;DR: This article argued that ubiquitous Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) systems are close descendants of the Cartesian and Newtonian worldview in so far as they are tools that fundamentally sort, categorize, and classify the world, and forecast the future.
Abstract: On the one hand, complexity science and enactive and embodied cognitive science approaches emphasize that people, as complex adaptive systems, are ambiguous, indeterminable, and inherently unpredictable. On the other, Machine Learning (ML) systems that claim to predict human behaviour are becoming ubiquitous in all spheres of social life. I contend that ubiquitous Artificial Intelligence (AI) and ML systems are close descendants of the Cartesian and Newtonian worldview in so far as they are tools that fundamentally sort, categorize, and classify the world, and forecast the future. Through the practice of clustering, sorting, and predicting human behaviour and action, these systems impose order, equilibrium, and stability to the active, fluid, messy, and unpredictable nature of human behaviour and the social world at large. Grounded in complexity science and enactive and embodied cognitive science approaches, this article emphasizes why people, embedded in social systems, are indeterminable and unpredictable. When ML systems "pick up" patterns and clusters, this often amounts to identifying historically and socially held norms, conventions, and stereotypes. Machine prediction of social behaviour, I argue, is not only erroneous but also presents real harm to those at the margins of society.
32 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the importance of generalisation from dialogical single case studies is explained and justified, drawing on historical, theoretical and cultural knowledge, and explaining the meaning of generalization from case studies.
Abstract: Drawing on historical, theoretical and cultural knowledge, this introduction explains and justifies the importance of generalisation from dialogical single case studies. We clarify the meaning of d...
30 citations
Cites background or methods from "The Dialogical Mind: Common Sense a..."
...As such, tensions between the holistic nature of the uniqueness and dynamics of ontologically interdependent Self–Other units, and the methodological tools with which such units are studied, remain (Grossen, 2010; Marková, 2016)....
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...Other units, and the methodological tools with which such units are studied, remain (Grossen, 2010; Marková, 2016)....
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...…to study dynamic and ethical interdependent units does not approach the construction of their case using a method of sampling that treats the Self as something other than an ethical being from whose unique communication with Others something important can be known (see also Marková, 2016)....
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References
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Book•
11 Sep 2000TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a methodology of the teleological power of judgment, which is a dialectic of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment (APJ) and the Teleological Power of judgment (TOPJ).
Abstract: Editor's introduction Part I. The First Draft of the Introduction: 1. The first draft of the introduction Part II. Critique of the Power of Judgment: 2. Preface 3. Introduction Part III. First Part: Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment: 4. First section, first book: analytic of the beautiful 5. First section, second book: analytic of the sublime 6. Deduction of pure aesthetic judgments 7. Second section: the dialectic of the aesthetic power of judgment 8. Appendix: on the methodology of taste Part IV. Second Part: Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment: 9. First division: analytic of the teleological power of judgment 10. Second division: dialectic of the teleological power of judgment 11. Appendix: methodology of the teleological power of judgment.
1,415 citations
Book•
01 Dec 1996
TL;DR: The theory theory of the scientist as child was first proposed in this paper, where a cognitive view of science, naturalistic epistemology and development -an evolutionary speculation, science as horticulture, objections - sociology, timing and convergence, and objections -magic, empirical advances.
Abstract: The other Socratic method: Socrates's problem Augustine's problem a road map. Part 1 The theory theory: the scientist as child - but surely it can't really be a theory? a cognitive view of science, naturalistic epistemology and development - an evolutionary speculation, science as horticulture, objections - sociology, objections - timing and convergence, objections - magic, empirical advances, what is theory? structural features of theories, functional features of theories, dynamic features of theories, theories in childhood, theories as representations theories, modules, and empirical generalizations - modules, theories and development, modules and development, modularity in peripheral and central processing, empirical generalization - scripts, narratives, and nets, interactions among theories, modules, and empirical generalizations, nonconceptual development - information processing and social construction. Part 2 Evidence for the theory theory: the child's theory of appearances - the adult theory, the initial theory, the paradox of invisible objects, an alternative - a theory-change account, the nine-month-old's theory, the A-not-B error as an auxiliary hypothesis, the 18-month-old's theory, other evidence for the theory theory, semantic developments - from objects permanence to perspective taking, later semantic developments - "gone" and "see", conclusion the child's theory of action - the adult theory, the initial theory, the nine-month-old's theory, the 18-month-old's theory, other evidence for the theory theory, semantic development - "no", "uh-oh" and "there", later developments - from actions to desires, later semantic developments - "want", conclusion the child's theory of kinds - the adult theory, categories and kinds, the initial theory, the nine-month-old's theory, the 18-month-old's theory , other evidence for the theory theory, semantic development - the naming Spurt, later developments, conclusion. Part 3 Theories and language: language and thought - prerequisites, interactions, a theory-theory view, methodological issues - specificity and correlation, developmental relations between language and cognition, theories and constraints, crosslinguistic studies, individual-difference studies, conclusion the Darwinian conclusion - who's afraid of semantic holism? a developmental cognitive science, computational and neurological mechanisms, after Piaget, sailing in Neurath's boat.
1,312 citations
Book•
01 May 2009
TL;DR: The question of what is the best political constitution for a given country is also addressed in this article, where it is argued that the substance of that for which subordination is necessary, even in its most important bearings, should be decided and resolved on by the people.
Abstract: ion — the State — attains life and reality; but this involves the distinction between those who command and those who obey. — Yet obedience seems inconsistent with liberty, and those who command appear to do the very opposite of that which the fundamental idea of the State, viz. that of Freedom, requires. It is, however, urged that — though the distinction between commanding and obeying is absolutely necessary, because affairs could not go on without it — and indeed this seems only a compulsory limitation, external to and even contravening freedom in the abstract — the constitution should be at least so framed, that the citizens may obey as little as possible, and the smallest modicum of free volition be left to the commands of the superiors; — that the substance of that for which subordination is necessary, even in its most important bearings, should be decided and resolved on by the People — by the will of many or of all the citizens; though it is su pposed to be thereby provided that the State should be possessed of vigor and strength as a reality — an individual unity. — The primary consideration is, then, the distinction between the governing and the governed, and the political constitutions in the abstract have been rightly divided into Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy; which gives occasion, however, to the remark that Monarchy itself must be further divided into Despotism and Monarchy proper; that in all the divisions to which the leading Idea gives rise, only the G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History , 60 generic character is to be made prominent — it being not intended thereby that the particular category under review should be exhausted as a Form, Order, or Kind in its concrete development. But especially it must be observed, that the abovementioned divisions admit of a multitude of particular modifications — not only such as lie within the limits of those classes themselves — but also such as are mixtures of several of these essentially distinct classes, and which are consequently misshapen, unstable, and inconsistent forms. In such a collision, the concerning question is, what is the best constitution; that is, by what arrangement, organization, or mechanism of the power of the State its object can be most surely attained. This object may indeed be variously understood; for instance, as the calm enjoyment of life on the part of the citizens, or as Universal Happiness. Such aims have suggested the so-called Ideals of Constitutions, and — as a particular branch of the subject — Ideals of the Education of Princes (Fenelon), or of the governing body — the aristocracy at large (Plato); for the chief point they treat of is the condition of those subjects who stand at the head of affairs: and in these Ideals the concrete details of political organization are not at all considered. The inquiry into the best constitution is frequently treated asif not only the theory were an affair of subjective independent conviction, but as if the introduction of a constitution recognized as the best — or as superior to others — could be the result of a resolve adopted in this theoretical manner; as if the form of a constitution were a matter of free choice, determined by nothing else but reflection. Of this artless fashion was that deliberation — not indeed of the Persian people, but of the Persian grandees, who had conspired to overthrow the pseudo-Smerdis and the Magi, after their undertaking had succeeded, and when there was no scion of the royal family living — as to what constitution they should introduce into Persia; and Herodotus gives an equally naive account of this deliberation. In the present day, the Constitution of a country and people is not represented as so entirely dependent on free and deliberate choice. The fundamental but abstractly (and therefore imperfectly) entertained conception of Freedom, has resulted in G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History , 61 the Republic being very generally regarded — in theory — as the only just and true political constitution. Many even, who occupy elevated official positions under monarchical constitutions — so far from being opposed to this idea — are actually its supporters; only they see that such a constitution, though the best, cannot be realized under all circumstances; and that — while men are what they are — we must be satisfied with less if freedom; the monarchical constitution — under the given circumstances, and the present moral condition of the people — being even regarded as the most advantageous. In this view also, the necessity of a particular constitution is made to depend on the condition of the people in such a way as if the latter were non-essential and accidental. This representation is founded on the distinction which the reflective understanding makes between an idea and the corresponding reality; holding to an abstract and consequently untrue idea; not grasping it in its completeness, or — which is virtually, though not in point of form, the same — not taking a concrete view of a people and a state. We shall have to show further on that the constitution adopted by a people makes one substance — one spirit: — with its religion, its art and philosophy, or, at least, with its conceptions and thoughts — its culture generally; not to expatiate upon the additional influences, ab extra, of climate, of neighbors, of its place in the World. A State is an individual totality, of which you cannot select any particular side, although a supremely important one, such as its political constitution; and deliberate and decide respecting it in that isolated form. Not only is that constitution most intimately connected with and dependent on those other spiritual forces; but the form of the entire moral and intellectual individuality — comprising all the forces it embodies — is only a step in the development of the grand Whole — with its place preappointed in the process; a fact which gives the highest sanction to the constitution in question, and establishes its absolute necessity. — The origin of a state involves imperious lordship on the one hand, instinctive submission on the other. But even obedience — lordly power, and the fear inspired by a ruler — in itself implies some degree of voluntary connection. Even in barbarous states this is the case; it is not the isolated will of individuals that G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History , 62 prevails; individual pretensions are relinquished, and the general will is the essential bond of po litical union. This unity of the general and the particular is the Idea itself, manifesting itself as a state, and which subsequently undergoes further development within itself. The abstract yet necessitated process in the development of truly independent states is as follows: — They begin with regal power, whether of patriarchal or military origin. In the next phase, particularity and individuality assert themselves in the form of Aristocracy and Democracy. Lastly, we have the subjection of these separate interests to a single power; but which can be absolutely none other than one outside of which those spheres have an independent position, viz., the Monarchical. Two phases of royalty, therefore, must be distinguished — a primary and a secondary one. This process is necessitated, so that the form of government assigned to a particular stage of development must present itself: it is therefore no matter of choice, but is that form which is adapted to the spirit of the people. In a Constitution the main feature of interest is the selfdevelopment of the rational, that is, the political condition of a people; the setting free of the successive elements of the Idea: so that the several powers in the State manifest themselves as separate — attain their appropriate and special perfection — and yet in this independent condition, work together for one object, and are held together by it — i.e., form an organic whole. The State is thus the embodiment of rational freedom, realizing and recognizing itself in an objective form. For its objectivity consists in this — that its successive stages are not merely ideal, but are present in an appropriate reality; and that in their separate and several working, they are absolutely merged in that agency by which the totality — the soul — the individuate unity — is produced, and of which it is the result. The State is the Idea of Spirit in the external manifestation of human Will and its Freedom. It is to the State, therefore, that change in the aspect of History indissolubly attaches itself; and the successive phases of the Idea manifest themselves in it as distinct political principles. The Constitutions under which World-Historical peoples have reached their culmination, are G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History , 63 peculiar to them; and therefore do not present a generally applicable political basis. Were it otherwise, the differences of similar constitutions would consist only in a peculiar method of expanding and developing that generic basis; whereas they really originate in diversity of principle. From the comparison therefore of the political institutions of the ancient World-Historical peoples, it so happens, that for the most recent principle of a Constitution — for the principle of our own times — nothing (so to speak) can be learned. In science and art it is quite otherwise; e.g., the ancient philosophy is so decidedly the basis of the modern, that it is inevitably contained in the latter, and constitutes its basis. In this case the relation is that of a continuous development of the same structure, whose foundation-stone, walls, and roof have remained what they were. In Art, the Greek itself, in its original form, furnishes us the best models. But in regard to political constitution, it is quite otherwise : here the Ancient and the Modern have not their essential principle in common. Abstract definitions and dogmas respecting just government — importing that intelligence and
1,292 citations
TL;DR: The author discusses culture theory's romantic rebellion against the enlightenment, or there's more to thinking than reason and evidence, and reflections on cultural determinism and relativism with special reference to emotion and reason.
Abstract: Preview: a colloquy of culture theorists Richard A. Shweder Part I. Culture Theory: An Introduction 1. Anthropology's romantic rebellion against the enlightenment, or there's more to thinking than reason and evidence Richard A. Shweder 2. Properties of culture: an ethnographic view Robert A. LeVine 3. Cultural meaning systems Roy G. D'Andrade Part II. Culture, Self, and Emotion: 4. 'From the native's point of view: on the nature of anthropological understanding Clifford Geertz 5. Toward an anthropology of self and feeling Michelle Z. Rosaldo 6. Does the concept of the person vary cross-culturally? Richard A. Shweder and Edmund J. Bourne 7. Understanding people Zeno Vendler 8. Emotion, knowing and culture Robert I. Levy 9. Getting angry: the Jamesian theory of emotion in anthropology Robert C. Solomon Part III. Culture, Language, and Thought: 10. The development of competence in culturally defined domains: a preliminary framework Howard Gardner 11. Language acquisition and socialization: three developmental stories and their implications Elinor Ochs and Bambi B. Schieffelin Part IV. Commentary: 12. Some reflections on cultural determinism and relativism with special reference to emotion and reason Melford E. Spiro Name index Subject index.
1,132 citations