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The Economics of Identity and Creativity: A Cultural Science Approach

TL;DR: The Economics of Identity and Creativity as discussed by the authors proposes a theory of creativity from the ideas of conceptual blending in the cognitive sciences, and examines the problems in fixing the boundaries of an individual identity both in biological evolutionary theory and brain sciences.
Abstract: The Economics of Identity and Creativity aims to sythesize naturalistic evolutionary theory while discussing new developments in economics. The author's approach reexamines fundamental assumptions about how a capitalist economy works, from the relation between producers and consumers to the functioning of intellectual property rights. In the creative economy, the author argues, identities merge with the flow of creative action. To explain these changes, he draws upon a range of theories from analytical philosophy to biology, and from economics to sociology. The first part of the book examines the role of language in the naturalistic approach to cultural science. Hermann-Pillath draws on Darwinian evolutionary theory to map a concept of knowledge. Part Two offers a systematic approach to creativity and identity from the naturalistic point of view developed in Part One. Here the author builds a theory of creativity from the ideas of conceptual blending in the cognitive sciences. Herrmann-Pillath presents a theory of identity based on analytical philosophy, and looks at the problems in fixing the boundaries of an individual identity both in biological evolutionary theory and brain sciences. He takes the concept of identity through the current economic approaches, examining the distinction between social and personal identity. This fascinating interdisciplinary work provides a precise argument that the foundations of economics can be found in cultural science, and it has evolved to become the cultural institution at the core of the modern economy.
Citations
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Posted Content
TL;DR: In this paper, the role of institutions in substantive forms as societal artifacts that cognitively mediate agents' strategic interactions and their individual beliefs in societal games is discussed and a proposal for a three-level approach to institutions: generic-ontological, comparative-substantive, and policy-design levels.
Abstract: This paper begins with contested issues among various approaches to institutions and seeks an analytical/conceptual framework for integrating them. Based on fundamental studies of knowledge theory and epistemic game theory, it discusses the role of institutions in substantive forms as societal artifacts that cognitively mediate agents’ strategic interactions and their individual beliefs in societal games. This approach is termed as the institutions-as-cognitive-media-view and its implications to the role of culture, institutional complementarities, and policy in the institutional process are discussed. It concludes with a proposal for a three-level approach to institutions: generic-ontological, comparative-substantive, and policy-design levels.

93 citations


Additional excerpts

  • ... Further,  the  latter   perspective  appears  to  give  a  rise  to  a  renewed  debate  between  the  mentalist  vs.  the   externalist  views  of  institutions  (e.g.,  Sterelney,  2004;  Herrmann-‐Pillath,  2010)....

    [...]

  • ...… found  in  the  evolution  of  rat  races  among  the   financial  engineers  who  pursued  higher  “social”  status  symbolized  by  “money”  rewards   under  distorted  incentive  contracts,  which  led  to  the  2008  global  financial  crisis  (e.g.,   Aoki,  2010;  Herrmann-‐Pillath,  2010b)....

    [...]

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the role of institutions in substantive forms as societal artifacts that cognitively mediate agents' strategic interactions and their individual beliefs in societal games is discussed and a proposal for a three-level approach to institutions: generic-ontological, comparative-substantive, and policy-design levels.
Abstract: This paper begins with contested issues among various approaches to institutions and seeks an analytical/conceptual framework for integrating them. Based on fundamental studies of knowledge theory and epistemic game theory, it discusses the role of institutions in substantive forms as societal artifacts that cognitively mediate agents’ strategic interactions and their individual beliefs in societal games. This approach is termed as the institutions-as-cognitive-media-view and its implications to the role of culture, institutional complementarities, and policy in the institutional process are discussed. It concludes with a proposal for a three-level approach to institutions: generic-ontological, comparative-substantive, and policy-design levels.

82 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The theory of institutional change as elaborated by P.D. Foster provided an important device for analysis, with its clarification of the value bases and of forms and dynamics of value-behavior patterns as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The Theory of Institutional Change as elaborated by P.D. Bush in the tradition of Veblen, Ayres and J.F. Foster provided an important device for analysis, with its clarification of the value bases and of forms and dynamics of value-behavior patterns. Bush pushed institutionalism to a certain limit. Coming from different "galaxies," formal approaches, such as system dynamics, network analysis, graph theory, or game theory have been further developed by institutional and evolutionary economists in order to close gaps and to further operationalize, formalize, and develop institutionalism. This paper strives to demonstrate that we can bridge gaps between the theory of institutional change and an evolutionary-institutional interpretation of game theory. This allows for a deeper analysis of institutions, the value base in game theory, the instrumental-ceremonial asymmetry, ceremonial dominance and encapsulation, and the institutionalist policy conception. So, it is part of a broader project for the extension of...

82 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: It is argued that the category of ‘meaning’ supervenes on nested functions in semiosis, and has a function itself, namely to enable functional self-reference, which otherwise mainfests functional break-down because of standard set-theoretic paradoxes.
Abstract: In the biosemiotic literature there is a tension between the naturalistic reference to biological processes and the category of ‘meaning’ which is central in the concept of semiosis. A crucial term bridging the two dimensions is ‘information.’ I argue that the tension can be resolved if we reconsider the relation between information and entropy and downgrade the conceptual centrality of Shannon information in the standard approach to entropy and information. Entropy comes into full play if semiosis is seen as a physical process involving causal interactions between physical systems with functions. Functions emerge from evolutionary processes, as conceived in recent philosophical contributions to teleosemantics. In this context, causal interactions can be interpreted in a dual mode, namely as standard causation and as an observation. Thus, a function appears to be the interpretant in the Peircian triadic notion of the sign. Recognizing this duality, the Gibbs/Jaynes notion of entropy is added to the picture, which shares an essential conceptual feature with the notion of function: Both concepts are part of a physicalist ontology, but are observer relative at the same time. Thus, it is possible to give an account of semiosis within the entropy framework without limiting the notion of entropy to the Shannon measure, but taking full account of the thermodynamic definition. A central feature of this approach is the conceptual linkage between the evolution of functions and maximum entropy production. I show how we can conceive of the semiosphere as a fundamental physical phenomenon. Following an early contribution by Hayek, in conclusion I argue that the category of ‘meaning’ supervenes on nested functions in semiosis, and has a function itself, namely to enable functional self-reference, which otherwise mainfests functional break-down because of standard set-theoretic paradoxes.

59 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a neurolinguistic approach to performativity is proposed based on John Searle's theory of institutions, especially his concept of a "status function" and his explanation of rule-following as a neurophysiological disposition.
Abstract: What makes institutions "real" ? One central notion has been emerging recently in sociology, which is ‘performativity’, a term borrowed from the philosophy of language. The author proposes a neurolinguistic approach to performativity that is based on John Searle’s theory of institutions, especially his concept of a "status function" and his explanation of rule-following as a neurophysiological disposition. Positing a status function, the article shows, is a performative act. The author applies the concept of "conceptual blending" borrowed from cognitive science to the status function, and gives empirical applications from the research on performativity in financial markets. He also sketches the underlying neuroscience framework following the neural theory of metaphor, which is illustrated empirically with examples from behavioral finance and neuroeconomics.

48 citations

References
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Book
01 Jan 1990
TL;DR: In this article, a new approach to describing both stability and change in social systems by linking the behavior of individuals to organizational behavior is proposed. But the approach is not suitable for large-scale systems.
Abstract: Suggests a new approach to describing both stability and change in social systems by linking the behavior of individuals to organizational behavior.

16,017 citations

Book
Charles Taylor1
01 Mar 1992
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the conflicts of modernity and modernity's relationship with the self in moral space and the providential order of nature, and present a list of the main sources of conflict.
Abstract: Preface Part I. Identity and the Good: 1. Inescapable frameworks 2. The self in moral space 3. Ethics of inarticulacy 4. Moral sources Part II: Inwardness: 5. Moral topography 6. Plato's self-mastery 7. 'In Interiore Homine' 8. Descartes's disengaged reason 9. Locke's punctual self 10. Exploring 'l'Humaine Condition' 11. Inner nature 12. A digression on historical explanation Part III. The Affirmation of Ordinary Life: 13. 'God Loveth Adverbs' 14. Rationalised Christianity 15. Moral sentiments 16. The providential order 17. The culture of modernity Part IV. The Voice of Nature: 18. Fractured horizons 19. Radical enlightenment 20. Nature as source 21. The Expressivist turn Part V. Subtler Languages: 22. Our Victorian contemporaries 23. Visions of the post-romantic age 24. Epiphanies of modernism 25. Conclusion: the conflicts of modernity Notes Index.

5,608 citations

Book
01 Jan 1995
TL;DR: This book discusses the origins of societies, development and evolution, and the development of spatial patterns in simple organisms.
Abstract: List of Tables Preface 1. Introduction 2. What is Life? 3. Chemical evolution 4. The evolution of templates 5. The chicken and egg problem 6. The origin of translation and the genetic code 7. The origin of protocells 8. The origin of eukaryotes 9. The origin of sex and the nature of species 10. Intragenomic conflict 11. Symbiosis 12. Development in simple organisms 13. Gene regulation and cell heredity 14. The development of spatial patterns 15. Development and evolution 16. The origins of societies 17. The origins of language References Index

3,866 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is argued and present evidence that great apes understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality), and children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life.
Abstract: We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with oth- ers and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The develop- mental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.

3,660 citations

Book
01 Jan 1988
TL;DR: A re-issue of Gregory Bateson's classic work as discussed by the authors summarizes the author's thinking on the subject of the patterns that connect living beings to each other and to their environment.
Abstract: A re-issue of Gregory Bateson's classic work. It summarizes Bateson's thinking on the subject of the patterns that connect living beings to each other and to their environment.

3,351 citations