The Effects of Inducing Strategies on Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma Games
26 Aug 2013-Vol. 2, pp 311-315
TL;DR: It is shown that the inducing strategy have the ability to enhance both cooperation frequencies and payoffs of players.
Abstract: This paper introduces an inducing strategy for cooperation into prisoner's dilemma games. Based on the bounded rationality of players, using stochastic reactive strategies in games, we show that the inducing strategy have the ability to enhance both cooperation frequencies and payoffs of players.
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26 Aug 2015
TL;DR: In this paper, the distribution of rural collective resources and income, both village cadres and villagers seek to maximize their own interests by convening a villagers' assembly to decide on a distribution plan.
Abstract: During the distribution of rural collective resources and income, both village cadres and villagers seek to maximize their own interests. When village cadres try to get more benefits by making use of administrative resources, villagers will confront against the seizure of village cadres. With rising confrontation cost, limited channels of appeal and little or no support from superior authorities, the interests of villagers are vulnerable and villagers tend to protect their own interests by convening a villagers' assembly to decide on a distribution plan.
2 citations
Cites background from "The Effects of Inducing Strategies ..."
...In terms of research methods and tools, there are mostly qualitative studies, with only a small number of quantitative studies [8-12]....
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01 Jan 2016TL;DR: In this article, an analysis of the principal-agent relationship in implementation of rural development projects is conducted, and the authors conclude that information asymmetry exists in the game relationship between the principal and the agent in quality supervision of the projects, which makes it likely for the quality supervision agent to pose moral hazards.
Abstract: This paper begins with an analysis of the principal-agent relationship in implementation of rural development projects, and proceeds to conclude that information asymmetry exists in the game relationship between the principal and the agent in quality supervision of rural development projects, which makes it likely for the quality supervision agent to pose moral hazards, and that the introduction of a supervision and penalty mechanism can help achieve the consistency between the two parties in terms of interest goals. When the penalty is imposed to the extent that there comes a mixed equilibrium in the supervision game between the principal and the agent, the principal may supervise the agent in a way that combines key examinations with general ones, and, where necessary, punish severely the individual quality supervisor who has worked poorly.
1 citations
References
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide evidence that free riders are heavily punished even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher, and they also show that free riding causes strong negative emotions among cooperators.
Abstract: This paper provides evidence that free riders are heavily punished even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher. The more free riders negatively deviate from the group standard the more they are punished. As a consequence, the existence of an opportunity for costly punishment causes a large increase in cooperation levels because potential free riders face a credible threat. We show, in particular, that in the presence of a costly punishment opportunity almost complete cooperation can be achieved and maintained although, under the standard assumptions of rationality and selfishness, there should be no cooperation at all. We also show that free riding causes strong negative emotions among cooperators. The intensity of these emotions is the stronger the more the free riders deviate from the group standard. Our results provide, therefore, support for the hypothesis that emotions are guarantors of credible threats.
3,465 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that there is a widespread willingness of the cooperators to punish the free-riders, even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher.
Abstract: Casual evidence as well as daily experience suggest that many people have a strong aversion against being the 'sucker' in social dilemma situations. As a consequence, those who cooperate may be willing to punish free-riding, even if this is costly for them and even if they cannot expect future benefits from their punishment activities. A main purpose of this paper is to show experimentally that there is indeed a widespread willingness of the cooperators to punish the free-riders. Our results indicate that this holds true even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher. In addition, we provide evidence that free-riders are punished the more heavily the more they deviate from the cooperation levels of the cooperators. Potential free-riders, therefore, can avoid or at least reduce punishment by increasing their cooperation levels. This, in turn, suggests that in the presence of punishment opportunities there will be less free riding. Testing this conjecture is the other major aim of our paper.
3,161 citations
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TL;DR: This work introduces social diversity by means of heterogeneous graphs and shows that cooperation is promoted by the diversity associated with the number and size of the public goods game in which each individual participates and with the individual contribution to each such game.
Abstract: Humans often cooperate in public goods games and situations ranging from family issues to global warming. However, evolutionary game theory predicts that the temptation to forgo the public good mostly wins over collective cooperative action, and this is often also seen in economic experiments. Here we show how social diversity provides an escape from this apparent paradox. Up to now, individuals have been treated as equivalent in all respects, in sharp contrast with real-life situations, where diversity is ubiquitous. We introduce social diversity by means of heterogeneous graphs and show that cooperation is promoted by the diversity associated with the number and size of the public goods game in which each individual participates and with the individual contribution to each such game. When social ties follow a scale-free distribution, cooperation is enhanced whenever all individuals are expected to contribute a fixed amount irrespective of the plethora of public goods games in which they engage. Our results may help to explain the emergence of cooperation in the absence of mechanisms based on individual reputation and punishment. Combining social diversity with reputation and punishment will provide instrumental clues on the self-organization of social communities and their economical implications.
1,221 citations
"The Effects of Inducing Strategies ..." refers background in this paper
...In order to promote cooperation, many mechanisms have been studied, such as reward, punishment, positive interactions and volunteering [4-10]....
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TL;DR: This work presents a simple but effective mechanism operating under full anonymity that shows that in voluntary public goods interactions, cooperators and defectors will coexist and shows that this result holds under very diverse assumptions on population structure and adaptation mechanisms.
Abstract: The evolution of cooperation among nonrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and social sciences. Reciprocal altruism fails to provide a solution if interactions are not repeated often enough or groups are too large. Punishment and reward can be very effective but require that defectors can be traced and identified. Here we present a simple but effective mechanism operating under full anonymity. Optional participation can foil exploiters and overcome the social dilemma. In voluntary public goods interactions, cooperators and defectors will coexist. We show that this result holds under very diverse assumptions on population structure and adaptation mechanisms, leading usually not to an equilibrium but to an unending cycle of adjustments (a Red Queen type of evolution). Thus, voluntary participation offers an escape hatch out of some social traps. Cooperation can subsist in sizable groups even if interactions are not repeated, defectors remain anonymous, players have no memory, and assortment is purely random.
923 citations
"The Effects of Inducing Strategies ..." refers background in this paper
...In order to promote cooperation, many mechanisms have been studied, such as reward, punishment, positive interactions and volunteering [4-10]....
[...]
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TL;DR: It is shown that the option of costly punishment increases the amount of cooperation but not the average payoff of the group, which suggests that costly punishment behaviour is maladaptive in cooperation games and might have evolved for other reasons.
Abstract: Many theories have been offered to explain the evolution of cooperation in humans. One proposal is that costly punishment can promote cooperation. Everyone benefits on average, the theory goes, despite the cost to those doing the punishing. But most of our interactions are repeated, and in such cases punishment can lead to retaliation. Using a variant of the 'Prisoner's Dilemma' game, Dreber et al. find that punishment increases the frequency of cooperation, but not the average payoff. Costly punishments confer no overall advantage to the group. And players who end up with the highest total payoff ('winners') tend not to use punishment, while those with the lowest payoff ('losers') punish most frequently. It seems that costly punishment may not have evolved to promote cooperation, but for some other purpose. An experimental economics approach finds that punishment increases the frequency of cooperation, but not the average payoff. Thus, the option of costly punishment does not confer an advantage to the group. Moreover, players who end up with the highest total payoff ('winners') do not use punishment, whereas players who end up with the lowest payoff ('losers') use punishment most frequently. A key aspect of human behaviour is cooperation1,2,3,4,5,6,7. We tend to help others even if costs are involved. We are more likely to help when the costs are small and the benefits for the other person significant. Cooperation leads to a tension between what is best for the individual and what is best for the group. A group does better if everyone cooperates, but each individual is tempted to defect. Recently there has been much interest in exploring the effect of costly punishment on human cooperation8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23. Costly punishment means paying a cost for another individual to incur a cost. It has been suggested that costly punishment promotes cooperation even in non-repeated games and without any possibility of reputation effects10. But most of our interactions are repeated and reputation is always at stake. Thus, if costly punishment is important in promoting cooperation, it must do so in a repeated setting. We have performed experiments in which, in each round of a repeated game, people choose between cooperation, defection and costly punishment. In control experiments, people could only cooperate or defect. Here we show that the option of costly punishment increases the amount of cooperation but not the average payoff of the group. Furthermore, there is a strong negative correlation between total payoff and use of costly punishment. Those people who gain the highest total payoff tend not to use costly punishment: winners don’t punish. This suggests that costly punishment behaviour is maladaptive in cooperation games and might have evolved for other reasons.
683 citations