The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion
TL;DR: This chapter discusses a wide variety of variables that proved instrumental in affecting the elaboration likelihood, and thus the route to persuasion, and outlines the two basic routes to persuasion.
Abstract: Publisher Summary
This chapter outlines the two basic routes to persuasion. One route is based on the thoughtful consideration of arguments central to the issue, whereas the other is based on the affective associations or simple inferences tied to peripheral cues in the persuasion context. This chapter discusses a wide variety of variables that proved instrumental in affecting the elaboration likelihood, and thus the route to persuasion. One of the basic postulates of the Elaboration Likelihood Model—that variables may affect persuasion by increasing or decreasing scrutiny of message arguments—has been highly useful in accounting for the effects of a seemingly diverse list of variables. The reviewers of the attitude change literature have been disappointed with the many conflicting effects observed, even for ostensibly simple variables. The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) attempts to place these many conflicting results and theories under one conceptual umbrella by specifying the major processes underlying persuasion and indicating the way many of the traditionally studied variables and theories relate to these basic processes. The ELM may prove useful in providing a guiding set of postulates from which to interpret previous work and in suggesting new hypotheses to be explored in future research.
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TL;DR: Ajzen, 1985, 1987, this article reviewed the theory of planned behavior and some unresolved issues and concluded that the theory is well supported by empirical evidence and that intention to perform behaviors of different kinds can be predicted with high accuracy from attitudes toward the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control; and these intentions, together with perceptions of behavioral control, account for considerable variance in actual behavior.
65,095 citations
TL;DR: It is proposed that motivation may affect reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes--that is, strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs--that are considered most likely to yield the desired conclusion.
Abstract: It is proposed that motivation may affect reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes—that is, strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs. The motivation to be accurate enhances use of those beliefs and strategies that are considered most appropriate, whereas the motivation to arrive at particular conclusions enhances use of those that are considered most likely to yield the desired conclusion. There is considerable evidence that people are more likely to arrive at conclusions that they want to arrive at, but their ability to do so is constrained by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications for these conclusions. These ideas can account for a wide variety of research concerned with motivated reasoning. The notion that goals or motives affect reasoning has a long and controversial history in social psychology. The propositions that motives may affect perceptions (Erdelyi, 1974), attitudes (Festinger, 1957), and attributions (Heider, 1958) have been put forth by some psychologists and challenged by others. Although early researchers and theorists took it for granted that motivation may cause people to make self-serving attributions and permit them to believe what they want to believe because they want to believe it, this view, and the research used to uphold it, came under concentrated criticism in the 1970s. The major and most damaging criticism of the motivational view was that all research purported to demonstrate motivated reasoning could be reinterpreted in entirely cognitive, nonmotivational terms (Miller & Ross, 1975; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Thus people could draw self-serving conclusions not because they wanted to but because these conclusions seemed more plausible, given their prior beliefs and expectancies. Because both cognitive and motivational accounts could be generated for any empirical study, some theorists argued that the hot versus cold cognition controversy could not be solved, at least in the attribution paradigm (Ross & Fletcher, 1985; Tetlock & Levi, 1982). One reason for the persistence of this controversy lies in the failure of researchers to explore the mechanisms underlying motivated reasoning. Recently, several authors have attempted to rectify this neglect (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Kunda, 1987; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986). All these authors share a view of motivation as having its effects through cognitive processes: People rely on cognitive processes and representations to arrive at their desired conclusions, but motivation plays a role in determining which of these will be used on a given occasion.
6,643 citations
Cites background from "The elaboration likelihood model of..."
...Often they will be forced to acknowledge and accept undesirable conclusions, as they appear to when confronted with strong arguments for undesired or counterattitudinal positions (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986)....
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...…to nonmessage factors such as source expertise or audience reaction and are more sensitive to the actual content of the message, most notably to the strength of the arguments, even when this leads them to adopt counterattitudinal, undesired stances (Chaiken et al, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986)....
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...Petty and Cacioppo (1986) and Chaiken et al. (1989) both assumed that in some circumstances, directional goals may bias responses to persuasion, but existing work in this paradigm has generally been interpreted as indicating objective and unbiased processing (see also Johnson & Eagly, 1989)....
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TL;DR: The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached.
Abstract: Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology.
6,080 citations
Cites background from "The elaboration likelihood model of..."
...These contrasts are discussed in Bruner (1986); Chaiken (1980); Epstein (1994); Freud (1900/1976); Margolis (1987); Metcalfe and Mischel (1999); Petty & Cacioppo (1986); Posner and Snyder (1975); Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1987); Reber (1993); Wegner (1994); Wilson (in press); and Zajonc (1980)....
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Book•
01 Jul 2002TL;DR: In this article, a review is presented of the book "Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman".
Abstract: A review is presented of the book “Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,” edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman.
3,642 citations
TL;DR: A 2-systems model that explains social behavior as a joint function of reflective and impulsive processes is described, which extends previous models by integrating motivational components that allow more precise predictions of behavior.
Abstract: This article describes a 2-systems model that explains social behavior as a joint function of reflective and impulsive processes. In particular, it is assumed that social behavior is controlled by 2 interacting systems that follow different operating principles. The reflective system generates behavioral decisions that are based on knowledge about facts and values, whereas the impulsive system elicits behavior through associative links and motivational orientations. The proposed model describes how the 2 systems interact at various stages of processing, and how their outputs may determine behavior in a synergistic or antagonistic fashion. It extends previous models by integrating motivational components that allow more precise predictions of behavior. The implications of this reflective–impulsive model are applied to various phenomena from social psychology and beyond. Extending previous dual-process accounts, this model is not limited to specific domains of mental functioning and attempts to integrate cognitive, motivational, and behavioral mechanisms.
3,468 citations
Cites background from "The elaboration likelihood model of..."
...For example, Chaiken, Liberman, and Eagly (1989) as well as Petty and Cacioppo (1986), who are among the proponents of dual-process models, spoke about heuristic/peripheral and systematic/central processing and applied their model to the domain of attitude change....
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References
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Book•
01 Jun 1975
36,032 citations
"The elaboration likelihood model of..." refers background in this paper
...Experimental research has shown that attitudes represent one of the most important theoretical constructs that determine behavior (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Petty and Cacioppo, 1981)....
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...These include social norms, (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975), the strength of the attitude (Petty and Krosnick, 1995), feelings of self-efficacy and competence (Bandura, 1986), and prior behaviors and habits (Triandis, 1980)....
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Book•
17 Mar 1980
TL;DR: In this paper, the author explains "theory and reasoned action" model and then applies the model to various cases in attitude courses, such as self-defense and self-care.
Abstract: Core text in attitude courses. Explains "theory and reasoned action" model and then applies the model to various cases.
26,683 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1957TL;DR: Cognitive dissonance theory links actions and attitudes as discussed by the authors, which holds that dissonance is experienced whenever one cognition that a person holds follows from the opposite of at least one other cognition that the person holds.
Abstract: Cognitive dissonance theory links actions and attitudes It holds that dissonance is experienced whenever one cognition that a person holds follows from the opposite of at least one other cognition that the person holds The magnitude of dissonance is directly proportional to the number of discrepant cognitions and inversely proportional to the number of consonant cognitions that a person has The relative weight of any discrepant or consonant element is a function of its Importance
22,553 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors pointed out that there is a strong functional tie between opinions and abilities in humans and that the ability evaluation of an individual can be expressed as a comparison of the performance of a particular ability with other abilities.
Abstract: Hypothesis I: There exists, in the human organism, a drive to evaluate his opinions and his abilities. While opinions and abilities may, at first glance, seem to be quite different things, there is a close functional tie between them. They act together in the manner in which they affect behavior. A person’s cognition (his opinions and beliefs) about the situation in which he exists and his appraisals of what he is capable of doing (his evaluation of his abilities) will together have bearing on his behavior. The holding of incorrect opinions and/or inaccurate appraisals of one’s abilities can be punishing or even fatal in many situations. It is necessary, before we proceed, to clarify the distinction between opinions and evaluations of abilities since at first glance it may seem that one’s evaluation of one’s own ability is an opinion about it. Abilities are of course manifested only through performance which is assumed to depend upon the particular ability. The clarity of the manifestation or performance can vary from instances where there is no clear ordering criterion of the ability to instances where the performance which reflects the ability can be clearly ordered. In the former case, the evaluation of the ability does function like other opinions which are not directly testable in “objective reality’. For example, a person’s evaluation of his ability to write poetry will depend to a large extent on the opinions which others have of his ability to write poetry. In cases where the criterion is unambiguous and can be clearly ordered, this furnishes an objective reality for the evaluation of one’s ability so that it depends less on the opinions of other persons and depends more on actual comparison of one’s performance with the performance of others. Thus, if a person evaluates his running ability, he will do so by comparing his time to run some distance with the times that other persons have taken. In the following pages, when we talk about evaluating an ability, we shall mean specifically the evaluation of that ability in situations where the performance is unambiguous and is known. Most situations in real life will, of course, present situations which are a mixture of opinion and ability evaluation. In a previous article (7) the author posited the existence of a drive to determine whether or not one’s opinions were “correct”. We are here stating that this same drive also produces behavior in people oriented toward obtaining an accurate appraisal of their abilities. The behavioral implication of the existence of such a drive is that we would expect to observe behaviour on the part of persons which enables them to ascertain whether or not their opinions are correct and also behavior which enables them accurately to evaluate their abilities. It is consequently
16,927 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1935
TL;DR: In this paper, Neuberg and Heine discuss the notion of belonging, acceptance, belonging, and belonging in the social world, and discuss the relationship between friendship, membership, status, power, and subordination.
Abstract: VOLUME 2. Part III: The Social World. 21. EVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Steven L. Neuberg, Douglas T. Kenrick, and Mark Schaller). 22. MORALITY (Jonathan Haidt and Selin Kesebir). 23. AGGRESSION (Brad J. Bushman and L. Rowell Huesmann). 24. AFFILIATION, ACCEPTANCE, AND BELONGING: THE PURSUIT OF INTERPERSONAL CONNECTION (Mark R. Leary). 25. CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS (Margaret S. Clark and Edward P. Lemay, Jr.). 26. INTERPERSONAL STRATIFICATION: STATUS, POWER, AND SUBORDINATION (Susan T. Fiske). 27. SOCIAL CONFLICT: THE EMERGENCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF STRUGGLE AND NEGOTIATION (Carsten K. W. De Dreu). 28. INTERGROUP RELATIONS 1(Vincent Yzerbyt and Stephanie Demoulin). 29. INTERGROUP BIAS (John F. Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaertner). 30. SOCIAL JUSTICE: HISTORY, THEORY, AND RESEARCH (John T. Jost and Aaron C. Kay). 31. INFLUENCE AND LEADERSHIP (Michael A. Hogg). 32. GROUP BEHAVIOR AND PERFORMANCE (J. Richard Hackman and Nancy Katz). 33. ORGANIZATIONAL PREFERENCES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES (Deborah H. Gruenfeld and Larissa Z. Tiedens). 34. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR (Jon A. Krosnick, Penny S. Visser, and Joshua Harder). 35. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW (Margaret Bull Kovera and Eugene Borgida). 36. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND LANGUAGE: WORDS, UTTERANCES, AND CONVERSATIONS (Thomas Holtgraves). 37. CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY (Steven J. Heine). AUTHOR INDEX. SUBJECT INDEX.
13,453 citations