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The Endgame of Telecommunications Policy? A Survey
TL;DR: A literature review of the five policy areas (1) termination monopoly, (2) local bottleneck access, (3) net neutrality, (4) spectrum management, and (5) universal service) suggests that in some of them a move to competition policy will soon be the efficient state of the art, while regulation will remain efficient in others for some time as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Will telecommunications policy in the form of industry-specific regulation go away? A literature review of the five policy areas (1) termination monopoly, (2) local bottleneck access, (3) net neutrality, (4) spectrum management, and (5) universal service suggests that in some of them a move to competition policy will soon be the efficient state of the art, while regulation will remain efficient in others for some time. In particular, some regulation should persist for net neutrality in the form of transparency requirements, (quasi-)common carrier obligations and minimum quality standards. Also, spectrum management will continue to see regulators provide zoning and other services, in particular for unlicensed spectrum.
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TL;DR: The history of the market for spam is described, highlighting the strategic cat-and-mouse game between spammers and email providers, and the spam market's externality ratio of 100 is put into context by comparing it to other activities with negative externalities.
Abstract: We estimate that American firms and consumers experience costs of almost $20 billion annually due to spam. Our figure is more conservative than the $50 billion figure often cited by other authors, and we also note that the figure would be much higher if it were not for private investment in anti-spam technology by firms, which we detail further on. Based on the work of crafty computer scientists who have infiltrated and monitored spammers' activity, we estimate that spammers and spam-advertised merchants collect gross worldwide revenues on the order of $200 million per year. Thus, the "externality ratio" of external costs to internal benefits for spam is around 100:1. In this paper, we start by describing the history of the market for spam, highlighting the strategic cat-and-mouse game between spammers and email providers. We discuss how the market structure for spamming has evolved from a diffuse network of independent spammers running their own online stores to a highly specialized industry featuring a well-organized network of merchants, spam distributors (botnets), and spammers (or "advertisers"). We then put the spam market's externality ratio of 100 into context by comparing it to other activities with negative externalities. Lastly, we evaluate various policy proposals designed to solve the spam problem, cautioning that these proposals may err in assuming away the spammers' ability to adapt.
136 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze the incentives of a vertical integrated Internet service provider (ISP) to block competitors from content markets using a simple model and find that the ISP does not block competing content providers as long as the contents are differentiated sufficiently.
Abstract: This paper analyses the incentives of a vertical integrated Internet service provider (ISP) to block competitors from content markets. Using a simple model we find that the ISP does not block competing content providers as long as the contents are differentiated sufficiently. Exclusion only takes place when the competitor offers perfect homogeneous content and the ISP has a local monopoly over its Internet access customers or if network effects are strong. In this case, however, the abuse of market power can at least in Europe be prohibited by competition authorities. That is, according to our model there is no need for a regulation of net neutrality.
41 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on all alternative policies to promote the deployment of new fiber-based communications infrastructure is presented, where the available policies refer to different kinds of ex ante sector-specific regulations including cost-based access regulations as well as softer regulations such as regulatory holidays or geographically differentiated regulations.
Abstract: Our survey reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on all alternative policies to promote the deployment of new fiber-based communications infrastructure Since such investment is expected to induce substantial positive externalities, dynamic efficiency becomes a particularly important policy goal The available policies refer to i) different kinds of ex ante sector-specific regulations including cost-based access regulations as well as softer regulations such as regulatory holidays or geographically differentiated regulations, ii) deregulatory approaches based on effective competition law implementation and competitive market structures including allowance of co-investment models, and iii) public subsidies to cover non-profitable (“white”) areas Our survey identifies the most significant research gaps, finding that numerous studies related to the impact of access regulations exist, whereas only a much smaller branch of literature addresses the impact of competition policies, and even fewer studies analyze the impact of public subsidies on new communications deployment Moreover, our work allows for a generic framework for policy recommendations that identifies the comparative advantages of the individual policy options for different market structures and for varying degrees of externalities We find that public subsidies are the dominant policy alternative in white areas, whereas access regulations can be the preferred policy in white or “grey” areas, where only monopoly structure or co-investment models lead to private investment Deregulatory policies might be preferable in grey areas, if there is sufficient pressure from competitive outside options and if competition law is strong Finally, deregulatory policies including soft regulation are the dominant policy in “black” areas, where several independent infrastructure operators exist
35 citations
TL;DR: The analysis suggests that the impact of different types of competition on prices is critically affected by the levels of development of the broadband market achieved by the considered country.
35 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, a survey of the relevant U.S. and EU related economics literature is presented for the five policy areas of interconnection, wholesale loop access, net neutrality, spectrum policy and universal service.
Abstract: Currently, U.S. and EU telecommunications policies differ in many respects. For example, wholesale access to local loops is largely deregulated in the U.S. but continues to be regulated in the EU. Or, the U.S. has an elaborate universal service policy with a set of universal service funds and specific policies for high-cost regions and low-income users, while universal service policies in the EU are much more sporadic. Will the forceful technical and market developments that are associated with IP convergence, next generation access (NGA) and mobile broadband (4G) lead to a convergence of telecommunications policies in the U.S. and EU? Based on a survey of the relevant U.S. and EU related economics literature the current paper addresses this issue for the five policy areas of interconnection, wholesale loop access, net neutrality, spectrum policy and universal service. While IP convergence and the spread of 4G are likely to enhance policy convergence, NGA could have a different effect, because the penetration of and the competitive properties of NGA depend crucially on legacy infrastructures that differ between the two continents.
29 citations
References
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Proceedings Article•
01 Jan 2005
TL;DR: This book aims to provide a chronology of key events and individuals involved in the development of microelectronics technology over the past 50 years and some of the individuals involved have been identified and named.
Abstract: Alhussein Abouzeid Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Raviraj Adve University of Toronto Dharma Agrawal University of Cincinnati Walid Ahmed Tyco M/A-COM Sonia Aissa University of Quebec, INRSEMT Huseyin Arslan University of South Florida Nallanathan Arumugam National University of Singapore Saewoong Bahk Seoul National University Claus Bauer Dolby Laboratories Brahim Bensaou Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Rick Blum Lehigh University Michael Buehrer Virginia Tech Antonio Capone Politecnico di Milano Javier Gómez Castellanos National University of Mexico Claude Castelluccia INRIA Henry Chan The Hong Kong Polytechnic University Ajit Chaturvedi Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur Jyh-Cheng Chen National Tsing Hua University Yong Huat Chew Institute for Infocomm Research Tricia Chigan Michigan Tech Dong-Ho Cho Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Tech. Jinho Choi University of New South Wales Carlos Cordeiro Philips Research USA Laurie Cuthbert Queen Mary University of London Arek Dadej University of South Australia Sajal Das University of Texas at Arlington Franco Davoli DIST University of Genoa Xiaodai Dong, University of Alberta Hassan El-sallabi Helsinki University of Technology Ozgur Ercetin Sabanci University Elza Erkip Polytechnic University Romano Fantacci University of Florence Frank Fitzek Aalborg University Mario Freire University of Beira Interior Vincent Gaudet University of Alberta Jairo Gutierrez University of Auckland Michael Hadjitheodosiou University of Maryland Zhu Han University of Maryland College Park Christian Hartmann Technische Universitat Munchen Hossam Hassanein Queen's University Soong Boon Hee Nanyang Technological University Paul Ho Simon Fraser University Antonio Iera University "Mediterranea" of Reggio Calabria Markku Juntti University of Oulu Stefan Kaiser DoCoMo Euro-Labs Nei Kato Tohoku University Dongkyun Kim Kyungpook National University Ryuji Kohno Yokohama National University Bhaskar Krishnamachari University of Southern California Giridhar Krishnamurthy Indian Institute of Technology Madras Lutz Lampe University of British Columbia Bjorn Landfeldt The University of Sydney Peter Langendoerfer IHP Microelectronics Technologies Eddie Law Ryerson University in Toronto
7,826 citations
Posted Content•
6,100 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide a road map to the burgeoning literature on two-sided markets and present new results on the mix of membership and usage charges when price setting or bargaining determine payments between end-users.
Abstract: The paper provides a road map to the burgeoning literature on two-sided markets and presents new results. It identifies two-sided markets with markets in which the structure, and not only the level of prices charged by platforms matters. The failure of the Coase theorem is necessary but not sufficient for two-sidedness. The paper builds a model integrating usage and membership externalities, that unifies two hitherto disparate strands of the literature emphasizing either form of externality, and obtains new results on the mix of membership and usage charges when price setting or bargaining determine payments between end-users.
2,524 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors survey recent theoretical work on two-sided markets and the main questions are (i) what determines which side of the market is subsidized (if either) in order to attract the other side, and (ii) is the resulting outcome socially e¢cient?
Abstract: There are many examples of markets involving two groups of participants who need to interact via intermediaries. Moreover, these intermediaries usually have to compete for business from both groups. Examples include academic publishing (where journals facilitate the interaction between authors and readers), advertising in media markets (where newspapers or TV channels enable adverts from producers to reach consumers), payment systems (where credit cards can be a convenient method of transaction between consumers and retailers), and telecommunications networks (where networks are used to provide links between callers and those who receive calls). The paper surveys recent theoretical work on these two-sided markets. The main questions are (i) what determines which side of the market is subsidized (if either) in order to attract the other side, and (ii) is the resulting outcome socially e¢cient?
2,331 citations