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Journal ArticleDOI

The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice

30 Jan 1981-Science (American Association for the Advancement of Science)-Vol. 211, Iss: 4481, pp 453-458

TL;DR: The psychological principles that govern the perception of decision problems and the evaluation of probabilities and outcomes produce predictable shifts of preference when the same problem is framed in different ways.
Abstract: The psychological principles that govern the perception of decision problems and the evaluation of probabilities and outcomes produce predictable shifts of preference when the same problem is framed in different ways. Reversals of preference are demonstrated in choices regarding monetary outcomes, both hypothetical and real, and in questions pertaining to the loss of human lives. The effects of frames on preferences are compared to the effects of perspectives on perceptual appearance. The dependence of preferences on the formulation of decision problems is a significant concern for the theory of rational choice.
Topics: Decision field theory (60%), Framing effect (56%), Fuzzy-trace theory (53%), Prospect theory (52%), Framing (social sciences) (52%)
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Journal ArticleDOI
17 Apr 1987-Science
TL;DR: This research aims to aid risk analysis and policy-making by providing a basis for understanding and anticipating public responses to hazards and improving the communication of risk information among lay people, technical experts, and decision-makers.
Abstract: Studies of risk perception examine the judgements people make when they are asked to characterize and evaluate hazardous activities and technologies. This research aims to aid risk analysis and policy-making by providing a basis for understanding and anticipating public responses to hazards and improving the communication of risk information among lay people, technical experts, and decision-makers. This work assumes that those who promote and regulate health and safety need to understand how people think about and respond to risk. Without such understanding, well-intended policies may be ineffective.

9,364 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Raphael Amit1, Paul J. H. Schoemaker2Institutions (2)
Abstract: We build on an emerging strategy literature that views the firm as a bundle of resources and capabilities, and examine conditions that contribute to the realization of sustainable economic rents. Because of (1) resource-market imperfections and (2) discretionary managerial decisions about resource development and deployment, we expect firms to differ (in and out of equilibrium) in the resources and capabilities they control. This asymmetry in turn can be a source of sustainable economic rent. The paper focuses on the linkages between the industry analysis framework, the resource-based view of the firm, behavioral decision biases and organizational implementation issues. It connects the concept of Strategic Industry Factors at the market level with the notion of Strategic Assets at the firm level. Organizational rent is shown to stem from imperfect and discretionary decisions to develop and deploy selected resources and capabilities, made by boundedly rational managers facing high uncertainty, complexity, and intrafirm conflict.

7,767 citations


Cites background from "The Framing of Decisions and the Ps..."

  • ...Tversky and Kahneman (1981) offer persuasive examples of how simplified framing (such as isolating alternatives or expressing outcomes relatively) can lead to inconsistent decisions....

    [...]


Journal ArticleDOI
George P. Huber1Institutions (1)
Abstract: This paper differs from previous examinations of organizational learning in that it is broader in scope and more evaluative of the literatures. Four constructs related to organizational learning knowledge acquisition, information distribution, information interpretation, and organizational memory are articulated, and the literatures related to each are described and critiqued. The literature on knowledge acquisition is voluminous and multi-faceted, and so the knowledge acquisition construct is portrayed here as consisting of five subconstructs or subprocesses: 1 drawing on knowledge available at the organization's birth, 2 learning from experience, 3 learning by observing other organizations, 4 grafting on to itself components that possess knowledge needed but not possessed by the organization, and 5 noticing or searching for information about the organization's environment and performance. Examination of the related literatures indicates that much has been learned about learning from experience, but also that there is a lack of cumulative work and a lack of integration of work from different research groups. Similarly, much has been learned about organizational search, but there is a lack of conceptual work, and there is a lack of both cumulative work and syntheses with which to create a more mature literature. Congenital learning, vicarious learning, and grafting are information acquisition subprocesses about which relatively little has been learned. The literature concerning information distribution is rich and mature, but an aspect of information distribution that is central to an organization's benefitting from its learning, namely how units that possess information and units that need this information can find each other quickly and with a high likelihood, is unexplored. Information interpretation, as an organizational process, rather than an individual process, requires empirical work for further advancement. Organizational memory is much in need of systematic investigation, particularly by those whose special concerns are improving organizational learning and decision making.

7,743 citations


Posted Content
Daniel Kahneman1, Amos TverskyInstitutions (1)
Abstract: This book presents the definitive exposition of 'prospect theory', a compelling alternative to the classical utility theory of choice. Building on the 1982 volume, Judgement Under Uncertainty, this book brings together seminal papers on prospect theory from economists, decision theorists, and psychologists, including the work of the late Amos Tversky, whose contributions are collected here for the first time. While remaining within a rational choice framework, prospect theory delivers more accurate, empirically verified predictions in key test cases, as well as helping to explain many complex, real-world puzzles. In this volume, it is brought to bear on phenomena as diverse as the principles of legal compensation, the equity premium puzzle in financial markets, and the number of hours that New York cab drivers choose to drive on rainy days. Theoretically elegant and empirically robust, this volume shows how prospect theory has matured into a new science of decision making.

7,382 citations


Cites background from "The Framing of Decisions and the Ps..."

  • ...It has also been observed with nonmonetary outcomes, such as hours of pain (Eraker & Sox, 1981) and loss of human lives (Fischhoff, 1983; Tversky, 1977; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981)....

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  • ...The same option, however, can be framed or described in different ways (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981)....

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Journal ArticleDOI
Robert D. Benford1, David A. Snow2Institutions (2)
Abstract: ■ Abstract The recent proliferation of scholarship on collective action frames and framing processes in relation to social movements indicates that framing processes have come to be regarded, alongside resource mobilization and political opportunity processes, as a central dynamic in understanding the character and course of social movements. This review examines the analytic utility of the framing literature for un- derstanding social movement dynamics. We first review how collective action frames have been conceptualized, including their characteristic and variable features. We then examine the literature related to framing dynamics and processes. Next we review the literature regarding various contextual factors that constrain and facilitate framing processes. We conclude with an elaboration of the consequences of framing processes for other movement processes and outcomes. We seek throughout to provide clarifi- cation of the linkages between framing concepts/processes and other conceptual and theoretical formulations relevant to social movements, such as schemas and ideology.

7,041 citations


Cites background or methods from "The Framing of Decisions and the Ps..."

  • ...See Johnston & Klandermans 1995, pp. 85– 106 Gamson WA, Croteau D, Hoynes W, Sasson T. 1992....

    [...]

  • ...negotiated processes, not always under the tight control of movement elites, and that employing a particular alignment strategy does not always yield the desired results. Frame transformation, the final strategic alignment process, refers to changing old understandings and meanings and/or generating new ones. Few movement studies deal explicitly with this form of frame alignment. One recent notable exception is White's (1999) participant observation study of a Black feminist collective's...

    [...]

  • ...Evidence of this trend can be found (a) in recent edited volumes based on papers presented at social movement conferences (Johnston & Klandermans 1995, Lara˜na et al 1994, McAdam et al 1996, Morris & Mueller 1992); (b) in the almost meteoric increase in articles, chapters, and papers referring to the framing/movement link since the mid-1980s, from only one such reference in theSociological Abstractsin 1986 to 43 in 1998, with almost two thirds of the nearly 250 references during this period occurring since 1994; (c) in the parallel pattern of citations in the three core conceptual articles on framing and social movements (Snow et al 1986, Snow & Benford 1988, 1992) beginning with seven citations in 1990 and increasing to 106 in 1998, with more than half of the over 500 citations appearing after 1995; and (d) in a variety of recent critiques focusing on specific conceptual dimensions of the movement framing literature (Benford 1997, Fisher 1997, Hart 1996, Jasper 1997, Oliver & Johnston 2000, Sherkat 1998, Steinberg 1998, Williams & Benford 2000) or on its relationship to other perspectives (Goodwin & Jasper 1999, Meyer 1999)....

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  • ...Tversky A, Kahneman D. 1981....

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  • ...See della Porta et al 1999, pp. 134– 47 Klandermans B, Goslinga S. 1996....

    [...]


References
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Book ChapterDOI
Daniel Kahneman1, Amos TverskyInstitutions (1)
01 Mar 1979-Econometrica
Abstract: This paper presents a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision making under risk, and develops an alternative model, called prospect theory. Choices among risky prospects exhibit several pervasive effects that are inconsistent with the basic tenets of utility theory. In particular, people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty. This tendency, called the certainty effect, contributes to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains and to risk seeking in choices involving sure losses. In addition, people generally discard components that are shared by all prospects under consideration. This tendency, called the isolation effect, leads to inconsistent preferences when the same choice is presented in different forms. An alternative theory of choice is developed, in which value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets and in which probabilities are replaced by decision weights. The value function is normally concave for gains, commonly convex for losses, and is generally steeper for losses than for gains. Decision weights are generally lower than the corresponding probabilities, except in the range of low prob- abilities. Overweighting of low probabilities may contribute to the attractiveness of both insurance and gambling. EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY has dominated the analysis of decision making under risk. It has been generally accepted as a normative model of rational choice (24), and widely applied as a descriptive model of economic behavior, e.g. (15, 4). Thus, it is assumed that all reasonable people would wish to obey the axioms of the theory (47, 36), and that most people actually do, most of the time. The present paper describes several classes of choice problems in which preferences systematically violate the axioms of expected utility theory. In the light of these observations we argue that utility theory, as it is commonly interpreted and applied, is not an adequate descriptive model and we propose an alternative account of choice under risk. 2. CRITIQUE

34,961 citations


Book
Amos Tversky1, Daniel Kahneman1Institutions (1)
01 Jan 1974-
Abstract: This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: (i) representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; (ii) availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and (iii) adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value is available. These heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead to systematic and predictable errors. A better understanding of these heuristics and of the biases to which they lead could improve judgements and decisions in situations of uncertainty.

30,770 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jan 1979-Econometrica

24,566 citations


Book
01 Jan 1944-
Abstract: This is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based. What began more than sixty years ago as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a short paper together blossomed, in 1944, when Princeton University Press published "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior." In it, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern conceived a groundbreaking mathematical theory of economic and social organization, based on a theory of games of strategy. Not only would this revolutionize economics, but the entirely new field of scientific inquiry it yielded--game theory--has since been widely used to analyze a host of real-world phenomena from arms races to optimal policy choices of presidential candidates, from vaccination policy to major league baseball salary negotiations. And it is today established throughout both the social sciences and a wide range of other sciences.

19,323 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Herbert A. Simon1Institutions (1)
Abstract: : A model is proposed for the description of rational choice by organisms of limited computational ability.

12,521 citations


Network Information
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