The ‘Governance Gap’, or missing links in transnational chains of accountability for extractive industry investment
Citations
79 citations
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Cites background from "The ‘Governance Gap’, or missing li..."
...On the other hand, the GEI–Sinohydro cooperation demonstrated both implicit and explicit types of CSR: implicit in that Sinohydro was responding both to voluntary guidelines set out by Chinese institutions such as the StateOwned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC, , guoziwei), China Exim Bank, MOFCOM and MEP (the former two exerting significant influence over Chinese SOEs) as well as Chinese NGO–Firm Partnerships 59 to mandatory environmental and social impact mitigations required of the loan issued by MIGA – but explicit in that the level of its community involvement was largely carried out under its own discretion, and in that its partnership with GEI in the NN5 case has been referenced in its own promotional materials (Sinohydro 2011)....
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...Thus, in addition to a more explicit role of assisting in the pursuit of organizational legitimacy among international stakeholders, an NGO like GEI also had a more implicit role in providing assistance to the implementation of environmental standards by government institutions, both in China with MOFCOM and the MEP, and in Laos with the NLMA....
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...In 2007 GEI began an integrated policy package project to improve the environmental and social impact of Chinese overseas enterprises, working with Chinese government institutions (the Ministry of Environmental Protection, MEP, and the Ministry of Commerce, MOFCOM) to develop guidelines on overseas environmental and social conduct, and with governments and NGOs in host countries....
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...In a similar vein, the “Going Out” strategy, spearheaded by institutions such as the China Exim Bank and overseen by institutions including MOFCOM and SASAC, demonstrates similar levels of complexity in the governance of Chinese enterprises abroad, re- Chinese NGO–Firm Partnerships 61 garding financial targets and incentives as well as, more recently, environmental and social guidelines (for example, under MOFCOM, MEP, China Exim Bank and the State Council)....
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...B&Q CSR approach reflected in the firm Mainly implicit: firms faced significant pressure from local government to comply with environmental regulations and planning priorities; partnership referenced mainly in GEI promotional materials Both implicit and explicit: Implicit: encouragement from Chinese regulatory bodies (SASAC, MOFCOM, MEP) Explicit: active development of community rehabilitation plan; partnership referenced mainly in GEI promotional materials Mainly explicit: overt partnership described extensively by each organization’s promotional materials Source: Author’s own compilation....
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References
91 citations
"The ‘Governance Gap’, or missing li..." refers background or methods in this paper
...Likewise China’s Economic and Commercial Councils (which operate as local arms of China’s Ministry of Commerce in overseeing Chinese companies within each host country) state that ‘Chinese companies must simply follow local laws’ (Haglund, 2008)....
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...Finally in 2008, SEPA signed an agreement with the IFC to introduce the Equator Principles in China for use by domestic banks (Haglund, 2008)....
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...Financial incentives are also covered in the Government CSR framework – among the guidelines released by the Ministry of Commerce in 2006, five apply to ‘government agencies that authorize overseas projects’ (Haglund, 2008)....
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...Six more suggestions apply to overseas enterprises, requesting that ‘subsidiaries abroad to report to home government… on any risks or issues that increase the potential for economic or social conflict’ (Haglund, 2008)....
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...…financial rewards in the long term, financial institutions and their accreditation criteria can play a key role in influencing firm behaviour: in general, enterprises in the mining sector contribute about 30% of project funding, with bank loans contributing the remaining 70% (Haglund, 2008)....
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90 citations
"The ‘Governance Gap’, or missing li..." refers background in this paper
...Besides the Exim Bank, Chinese overseas investors also have access to local branches of the state-owned Bank of China (BOC) (Kragelund, 2008)....
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...The BOC subscribes to a GCP, restricting credit to highly polluting or energy-intensive industries (Bank of China, 2008)....
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85 citations
"The ‘Governance Gap’, or missing li..." refers background in this paper
...The TSX also mandates listed mining companies to set allocations aside to a ‘Closure Fund’, in view of future plant de-commissioning (Haglund, 2009a)....
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...While these recommendations are non-binding, they can place significant pressure on overseas companies by exposing Chinese managers to a threat of replacement or political sanctions (Haglund, 2009b)....
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41 citations
"The ‘Governance Gap’, or missing li..." refers background or methods in this paper
...Moreover, provincial governments have also begun to issue their own ESG requirements (Chen and Jian, 2009)....
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...recommended that local governments take on more responsibilities in regulating companies themselves (Chen and Jian, 2009)....
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...When putting forward the SASAC guidelines in 2008, China’s Minister of Commerce Journal of Sustainable Finance and Investment recommended that local governments take on more responsibilities in regulating companies themselves (Chen and Jian, 2009)....
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