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The Handbook of Social Psychology
01 Jan 1985-
About: The article was published on 1985-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 7197 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Critical psychology & Theoretical psychology.
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TL;DR: Theories of the self from both psychology and anthropology are integrated to define in detail the difference between a construal of self as independent and a construpal of the Self as interdependent as discussed by the authors, and these divergent construals should have specific consequences for cognition, emotion, and motivation.
Abstract: People in different cultures have strikingly different construals of the self, of others, and of the interdependence of the 2. These construals can influence, and in many cases determine, the very nature of individual experience, including cognition, emotion, and motivation. Many Asian cultures have distinct conceptions of individuality that insist on the fundamental relatedness of individuals to each other. The emphasis is on attending to others, fitting in, and harmonious interdependence with them. American culture neither assumes nor values such an overt connectedness among individuals. In contrast, individuals seek to maintain their independence from others by attending to the self and by discovering and expressing their unique inner attributes. As proposed herein, these construals are even more powerful than previously imagined. Theories of the self from both psychology and anthropology are integrated to define in detail the difference between a construal of the self as independent and a construal of the self as interdependent. Each of these divergent construals should have a set of specific consequences for cognition, emotion, and motivation; these consequences are proposed and relevant empirical literature is reviewed. Focusing on differences in self-construals enables apparently inconsistent empirical findings to be reconciled, and raises questions about what have been thought to be culture-free aspects of cognition, emotion, and motivation.
18,178 citations
TL;DR: It is shown that LGBs have a higher prevalence of mental disorders than heterosexuals and a conceptual framework is offered for understanding this excess in prevalence of disorder in terms of minority stress--explaining that stigma, prejudice, and discrimination create a hostile and stressful social environment that causes mental health problems.
Abstract: In this article the author reviews research evidence on the prevalence of mental disorders in lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals (LGBs) and shows, using meta-analyses, that LGBs have a higher prevalence of mental disorders than heterosexuals. The author offers a conceptual framework for understanding this excess in prevalence of disorder in terms of minority stress— explaining that stigma, prejudice, and discrimination create a hostile and stressful social environment that causes mental health problems. The model describes stress processes, including the experience of prejudice events, expectations of rejection, hiding and concealing, internalized homophobia, and ameliorative coping processes. This conceptual framework is the basis for the review of research evidence, suggestions for future research directions, and exploration of public policy implications. The study of mental health of lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) populations has been complicated by the debate on the classification of homosexuality as a mental disorder during the 1960s and early 1970s. That debate posited a gay-affirmative perspective, which sought to declassify homosexuality, against a conservative perspective, which sought to retain the classification of homosexuality as a mental disorder (Bayer, 1981). Although the debate on classification ended in 1973 with the removal of homosexuality from the second edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM; American Psychiatric Association, 1973), its heritage has lasted. This heritage has tainted discussion on mental health of lesbians and gay men by associating— even equating— claims that LGB people have higher prevalences of mental disorders than heterosexual people with the historical antigay stance and the stigmatization of LGB persons (Bailey, 1999). However, a fresh look at the issues should make it clear that whether LGB populations have higher prevalences of mental disorders is unrelated to the classification of homosexuality as a mental disorder. A retrospective analysis would suggest that the attempt to find a scientific answer in that debate rested on flawed logic. The debated scientific question was, Is homosexuality a mental disorder? The operationalized research question that pervaded the debate was, Do homosexuals have high prevalences of mental disorders? But the research did not accurately operationalize the scientific question. The question of whether homosexuality should be considered a mental disorder is a question about classification. It can be answered by debating which behaviors, cognitions, or emotions should be considered indicators of a mental
8,696 citations
Cites background from "The Handbook of Social Psychology"
...Relevant theories discuss the adverse effect of social conditions, such as prejudice and stigma, on the lives of affected individuals and groups (eg, Allport, 1954; Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998; Goffman, 1963; Jones et al,, 1984; Link & Phelan, 2001)....
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TL;DR: A Monte Carlo study compared 14 methods to test the statistical significance of the intervening variable effect and found two methods based on the distribution of the product and 2 difference-in-coefficients methods have the most accurate Type I error rates and greatest statistical power.
Abstract: A Monte Carlo study compared 14 methods to test the statistical significance of the intervening variable effect. An intervening variable (mediator) transmits the effect of an independent variable to a dependent variable. The commonly used R. M. Baron and D. A. Kenny (1986) approach has low statistical power. Two methods based on the distribution of the product and 2 difference-in-coefficients methods have the most accurate Type I error rates and greatest statistical power except in 1 important case in which Type I error rates are too high. The best balance of Type I error and statistical power across all cases is the test of the joint significance of the two effects comprising the intervening variable effect.
8,629 citations
Cites background from "The Handbook of Social Psychology"
...Kenny, Kashy, and Bolger (1998) restated the Judd and Kenny causal steps but noted thatthe tests of α and β are the essential tests for establishingmediation....
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TL;DR: The results indicate that the decomposed Theory of Planned Behavior provides a fuller understanding of behavioral intention by focusing on the factors that are likely to influence systems use through the application of both design and implementation strategies.
Abstract: The Technology Acceptance Model and two variations of the Theory of Planned Behavior were compared to assess which model best helps to understand usage of information technology. The models were compared using student data collected from 786 potential users of a computer resource center. Behavior data was based on monitoring 3,780 visits to the resource center over a 12-week period. Weighted least squares estimation revealed that all three models performed well in terms of fit and were roughly equivalent in terms of their ability to explain behavior. Decomposing the belief structures in the Theory of Planned Behavior provided a moderate increase in the explanation of behavioral intention. Overall, the results indicate that the decomposed Theory of Planned Behavior provides a fuller understanding of behavioral intention by focusing on the factors that are likely to influence systems use through the application of both design and implementation strategies.
8,127 citations
TL;DR: Research suggesting that certain illusions may be adaptive for mental health and well-being is reviewed, examining evidence that a set of interrelated positive illusions—namely, unrealistically positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism—can serve a wide variety of cognitive, affective, and social functions.
Abstract: Many prominent theorists have argued that accurate perceptions of the self, the world, and the future are essential for mental health. Yet considerable research evidence suggests that overly positive selfevaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism are characteristic of normal human thought. Moreover, these illusions appear to promote other criteria of mental health, including the ability to care about others, the ability to be happy or contented, and the ability to engage in productive and creative work. These strategies may succeed, in large part, because both the social world and cognitive-processing mechanisms impose niters on incoming information that distort it in a positive direction; negative information may be isolated and represented in as unthreatening a manner as possible. These positive illusions may be especially useful when an individual receives negative feedback or is otherwise threatened and may be especially adaptive under these circumstances. Decades of psychological wisdom have established contact with reality as a hallmark of mental health. In this view, the well-adjusted person is thought to engage in accurate reality testing, whereas the individual whose vision is clouded by illusion is regarded as vulnerable to, if not already a victim of, mental illness. Despite its plausibility, this viewpoint is increasingly difficult to maintain (cf. Lazarus, 1983). A substantial amount of research testifies to the prevalence of illusion in normal human cognition (see Fiske& Taylor, 1984;Greenwald, 1980; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Sackeim, 1983; Taylor, 1983). Moreover, these illusions often involve central aspects of the self and the environment and, therefore, cannot be dismissed as inconsequential. In this article, we review research suggesting that certain illusions may be adaptive for mental health and well-being. In particular, we examine evidence that a set of interrelated positive illusions—namely, unrealistically positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism—can serve a wide variety of cognitive, affective, and social functions. We also attempt to resolve the following para
7,519 citations