The Human Condition.
Citations
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14 citations
14 citations
14 citations
Cites background from "The Human Condition."
...Referencing Hannah Arendt (1998) (who he views as a modern Stoic) on truth and reliability, Brinkmann tells us ‘there may be no such thing as absolute truth but that is exactly why it is up to us to create it in our own lives....
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...Referencing Hannah Arendt (1998) (who he views as a modern Stoic) on truth and reliability, Brinkmann tells us ‘there may be no such thing as absolute truth but that is exactly why it is up to us to create it in our own lives.’ Lacan (1977), among others, has pointed out that, rather than self-determining, the being of the being is ‘subject to’ and the ego has only the illusion of autonomy....
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...Referencing Hannah Arendt (1998) (who he views as a modern Stoic) on truth and reliability, Brinkmann tells us ‘there may be no such thing as absolute truth but that is exactly why it is up to us to create it in our own lives.’...
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14 citations
Cites background from "The Human Condition."
...Whether as an alternative form of rationality that is counter to the instrumentality of capitalist systems (Marcuse, 2007), a model of intersubjective experience (Adorno, 1997 [1970]; Dewey, 2005), a space of social contestation (Dubin, 1992) or one of encountering difference (Kompridis, 2011; Ranciere, 2009), art and aesthetic forms have been linked to normative questions that go to the heart of how we inhabit a world with others. If aesthetic experience is, as Susan Buck-Morss (2003) suggests, a means or an occasion for reflecting on our common life, or if it is linked, in David Hesmondhalgh’s (2013) account, to the possibilities of collective flourishing, potential changes in the nature of that experience merit critical attention....
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...Adorno saw aesthetic experience as “a refuge for mimetic comportment” (1997 [1970]: 53) a receptive orientation that creates the potential for nonviolent, non-dominative relations between subject and object. As we encounter the aesthetic object, we are drawn into it but we neither merely succumb to stimuli nor remove the object from experience through the classifying procedures of formal reason. Mimesis is a form of “being with” rather than of mastery that, according to Nikolas Kompridis, can be understood in early critical theory as a form of “receptivity to the claims of the “other” (be it a person or a “thing,” a subject or an object)” (2006: 103). Kompridis himself conceptualizes receptivity as an active process in which “rather than willing something to happen, we allow ourselves to be affected by experience, allow ourselves to be decentered” (2006: 206). But receptivity is not merely openness to anything that comes along, in what would be a dangerous suspension of judgment. Rather, it is a form of normative agency in which we are called upon not only to let another voice become audible, but also to respond (2011). Beyond its clear ethical implications, Kompridis claims that receptivity also has a political dimension, as openness to change, to the possibility that things might be otherwise, is a foundation of critique....
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...Adorno saw aesthetic experience as “a refuge for mimetic comportment” (1997 [1970]: 53) a receptive orientation that creates the potential for nonviolent, non-dominative relations between subject and object. As we encounter the aesthetic object, we are drawn into it but we neither merely succumb to stimuli nor remove the object from experience through the classifying procedures of formal reason. Mimesis is a form of “being with” rather than of mastery that, according to Nikolas Kompridis, can be understood in early critical theory as a form of “receptivity to the claims of the “other” (be it a person or a “thing,” a subject or an object)” (2006: 103). Kompridis himself conceptualizes receptivity as an active process in which “rather than willing something to happen, we allow ourselves to be affected by experience, allow ourselves to be decentered” (2006: 206). But receptivity is not merely openness to anything that comes along, in what would be a dangerous suspension of judgment. Rather, it is a form of normative agency in which we are called upon not only to let another voice become audible, but also to respond (2011). Beyond its clear ethical implications, Kompridis claims that receptivity also has a political dimension, as openness to change, to the possibility that things might be otherwise, is a foundation of critique. Other philosophers, including Kant and Arendt (2006 [1954]), have made an explicit connection between aesthetic experience, judgment and politics....
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...Adorno saw aesthetic experience as “a refuge for mimetic comportment” (1997 [1970]: 53) a receptive orientation that creates the potential for nonviolent, non-dominative relations between subject and object....
[...]
...Whether as an alternative form of rationality that is counter to the instrumentality of capitalist systems (Marcuse, 2007), a model of intersubjective experience (Adorno, 1997 [1970]; Dewey, 2005), a space of social contestation (Dubin, 1992) or one of encountering difference (Kompridis, 2011; Ranciere, 2009), art and aesthetic forms have been linked to normative questions that go to the heart of how we inhabit a world with others....
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References
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