The Human Condition.
Citations
9 citations
Cites background from "The Human Condition."
...The question of a full, just and loving life presupposes a subject who can speak and act, and can be held responsible for his or her speaking and acting (Arendt 1998)....
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...This space of appearance is characterised by freedom and plurality (Arendt 1998: 198)....
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9 citations
Cites background from "The Human Condition."
...In fact, Arendt’s valuation of homo faber still presupposes a hierarchy of human action, at whose extreme lies a wordless animal laborans – a hierarchy, therefore, that is ultimately grounded on the opposition between human and animal life (Arendt, 1958; see Loeve 2011, pp. 37-38, 44-47)....
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9 citations
9 citations
9 citations
Cites background from "The Human Condition."
...Arendt’s claims reaffirm her position that the relation of happiness to intentionality makes it unique within the spectrum of emotions. We must have some sense of happiness in order to recognise it when it occurs, which suggests that, without this knowledge, happiness would not be experienced as such. Here, we see a similar shift to that proposed by William James. For James, an emotion exists because it is acted upon, while for Augustine it is because the self is able to recognise it as such. Arendt’s examination of Augustine indicates that recognition of an emotion, its meanings and interpretations go hand in hand; when an individual feels something they have never felt before, their immediate response tends to be confusion rather than recognition. The notion of happiness in the future is ‘guaranteed by a kind of absolute past, since the knowledge of it, which is present in us, cannot possibly be explained by any experiences in this world’ (Arendt, 1996 [1929]: 47). There is a larger question looming in Arendt’s work, namely, how can the ‘happy life’ serve as a guiding principle for ‘human endeavours’ when prior knowledge for the recognition of one’s experiences? Inevitably, hopes of future happiness are anchored in our limited knowledge of the past and happiness is more a matter of reflection than experience in the present. Arendt’s (1958) position is clarified and expanded in The Human Condition which develops a theory of action/appearances (vita activa) and contemplation (vita contemplativa) under the categories of human activity: labour, work and action....
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...Arendt (1958) shares some of his concerns ‘happiness’ and its links to a manipulative mass culture (p. 134) and insists that happiness in the present can amount to little more than an absence of pain....
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...The breaking of time into categories of past, present and future are contradictory concepts in theoretical analyses of time, yet, in The Life of the Mind, Arendt (1971) presents an alternative view (p. 205)....
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...Criticising Jeremy Bentham’s hedonistic notion of happiness, Arendt (1958) writes that ‘[w]hat pain and pleasure, fear and desire, are actually supposed to achieve in all these systems is not happiness at all but the promotion of individual life or a guarantee of the survival of mankind’ (p. 311)....
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...The breaking of time into categories of past, present and future are contradictory concepts in theoretical analyses of time, yet, in The Life of the Mind, Arendt (1971) presents an alternative view (p....
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