The Imperatives of Sustainable Development
Erling Holden,
1
*
Kristin Linnerud
2
and David Banister
3
1
Department for Engineering and Science, Sogn og Fjordane University College, Sogndal, Norway
2
CICERO Center for International Climate and Environmental Research-Oslo, Norway
3
Transport Studies Unit, School of Geography and the Environment, Oxford University, Oxford, UK
ABSTRACT
The United Nations sustainable development goals are under fire. By attempting to cover all that
is good and desirable in society, these targets have ended up as vague, weak, or meaningless.
We suggest a model for sustainable d evelopment based on three moral imperatives: satisfying
human needs, ensuring social equity, and respecting environmental limits. The model reflects
Our Common Future’s central message, moral imperatives laid out in philosophical texts on
needs and equity, and recent scientific insights on environmental limits. The model is in conflict
with the popular three-pillar model of sustainable development, which seeks to balance social,
environmental, and economic targets. Rather, we argue that sustainable development consti-
tutes a set of constraints on human behaviour, including constraints on economic activity. By
identifying indicators, and thresholds, we illustrate that different regions or groups of countries
face different challenges. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment
Received 12 December 2015; revised 07 April 2016; accepted 11 April 2016
Keywords: sustainable development; sustainable development goals; sustainable development indicators; human needs; social
equity; environmental limits
Introduction
I
N THE 2015 REPORT TRANSFORMING OUR WORLD, THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) ANNOUNCED A SET OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
goals (SDGs) to guide world development until 2030 (United Nations, UN, 2015). However, in stark contrast to the
1987 UN report Our Common Future (World Commission on Environment and Development, WCED, 1987), the
reality of environmental limits and the potential drawbacks of ever-increasing economic growth have not been
firmly placed on the sustainable development agenda.
We claim that any notion of sustainable development must acknowledge environmental limits, as suggested by
Our Common Future, various scholars (e.g. Meadows and Club of Rome, 1972; Meadows et al., 1992; Spangenberg,
2013) and the new planetary boundary approach (Rockström et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015). Moreover, we claim that
economic growth cannot be one of sustainable development’s key goals (Holden and Linnerud, 2007; Stiglitz et al.,
2010; Daly, 2007; Griggs et al., 2013; Meadowcroft, 2012; Holden et al., 2014). Rather, the key dimensions of
*Correspondence to: Erling Holden, Department for Engineering and Science, Sogn og Fjordane University College, Sogndal, Norway. E-mail:
erling.holden@hisf.no
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment
Sustainable Development
Sust. Dev. (2016)
Published online in Wiley Online Library
(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/sd.1647
sustainable development – which we claim to be the moral imperatives of satisfying needs, ensuring equity and
respecting environmental limits – represent constraints on human activities, including our efforts to maximize
economic value. Thus, we believe that the announced SDGs rest on wrong premises as they seek to ‘balance the three
dimensions of sustainable development: the economic, social and environmental’ (United Nations, UN, 2015, p. 2).
Furthermore, by attempting to cover all that is good and desirable in society, the SDGs have ended up as vague,
weak or meaningless (Hopwood et al., 2005; Stafford-Smith, 2014; Stokstad, 2015). First, they do not distinguish
between what we regard to be primary and secondary goals.
1
In not prioritizing the goals, the UN risks being satis-
fied with achieving secondary goals while simultaneously failing to achieve primary goals. Indeed, having too many
goals (Transforming Our World announced 17 SDGs, 169 targets and a preliminary set of 303 indicators; Hák et al.,
2016) amounts to having no goals at all, even more so if no priority has been allocated. Second, many of the SDGs
are mere tautologies. Does it really help to have an SDG that will ‘promote sustainable agriculture’ or ‘make cities
sustainable’? Third, the SDGs are a mixture of goals to be achieved and the means by which to achieve them. Fourth,
whereas the development goals
2
(Goals 1–6) are concrete and quantifi able, the environmental goals (Goals 12–15)
are merely unquantified ambitions to ‘protect’, ‘strengthen’ and ‘promote’. Clearly, the lack of quantifiable ambi-
tions results from not acknowledging that there are environmental limits (ICSU, ISSC, 2015).
Our Common Future firmly placed sustainable development on the global political agenda. The 1992 Rio Summit gave
the agenda further momentum. After the Rio Summit the political interest in sustainable development slowly waned and
hit bottom at the unsuccessful 2002 Johannesburg Summit (often referred to as Rio+10). The 2012 Rio Summit (Rio
+20),however,ledtoa‘rebirth of sustainable development’ (Dodds et al., 2014). The strong language in Transforming
Our World leaves no doubt that sustainable development is now very much back on the international agenda. At the heart
of this agenda, UN member states decided on ‘new global Sustainable Development Goals’ and bravely committed them-
selves ‘to working tirelessly for the full implementation of this Agenda by 2030’ (UnitedNations,UN,2015,p.3).
The research community has responded to this commitment by publishing a tremendous number of books on
sustainable development (e.g. Baker, 2016; Sachs, 2015; Mulligan, 2015; Washington, 2015; Kopnina and
Shoreman-Ouimet, 2015; Blewitt, 2015; Jacques, 2015; Miller, 2015; Mandal, 2015; Williams, 2014; Caradonna,
2014; de Vries, 2013). Based on these books, and other lit erature (e.g. Redclift, 2005; Agyeman, 2013; Stern,
2015), we argue that there has been ‘an ethical turn’ in the academic literature on sustainable development.
3
This
article aim s to contribute to that turn by presenting a normative model of sustainable development.
We suggest a model based on three moral imperatives: satisfying human needs, ensuring social equity and
respecting environmental limits. The model reflects the emphasis on needs and limits in the sustainable concept’s
origin: Our Common Future. More importantly, it reflects both moral principles laid out in philosophical texts on
needs and equity, and new scientific insights into environmental limits. Since Our Common Future, a tremendous
number of sustainable development models, assessments and indicators have been suggested.
4
However, they
suffer from ‘an insufficiently developed theoretical framework’ (Hák et al., 2016). The moral imperatives presented
later here constitute the theoretical foundation of our model.
Our model is in conflict with the popular three-pillar model, which seeks to balance social, environmental and
economic targets.
5
Rather, we argue that sustainable development constitutes a set of constraints on human
activities, including economic activities. By identifying key themes, headline indicators and thresholds, we claim
that the moral imperatives of needs, equit y and limits should guide policy-making.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. In the following section, we define the three moral imperatives
of sustainable development: satisfying human needs, ensuring social equity and respecting environmental limits. In
the next section, we lay out a theoretical foundation for the three moral imperatives. In the fourth section, we link theory
1
No one will question the importance of goals such as ‘strengthen the prevention and treatment of substance abuse, including narcotic drug abuse
and harmful use of alcohol’ (Target 3.5), ‘ensure that all youth and a substantial proportion of adults, both men and women, achieve literacy and
numeracy’ (Target 4.6) and ‘ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development’ (Target 4.7).
These targets are, we would argue, well outside what should be the primary goals of sustainable development.
2
Built on the millennium development goals (MDGs).
3
Stern (2015) suggests a similar turn in the academic literature on climate change.
4
For example, by the European Environmental Agency, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, United Nations Environmen-
tal Programme, Eurostat and World Bank.
5
Also known as the ‘tripartite model’, ‘three-legged stool model’, ‘3P model’ (people, planet, profit) and ‘triple bottom line’.
E. Holden et al.
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment Sust. Dev. (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/sd
to practice by identifying goals, choosing suitable indicators and setting thresholds to be met. We conclude the article by
briefly discussing some policy implications and the moral imperatives of sustainable development.
The Moral Imperatives of Sustainable Development
Sustainable development is a normative value system, on a par with human rights, democracy and freedom (and it is
closely interlinked with all these systems). Thus, sustainable development is essentially a strong ethical, or moral,
pronouncement as to what should be done. We call such a pronouncement a moral imperative.
We claim that the concept of sustainable development rests on three moral imperatives: satisfying human needs,
ensuring social equity and respecting environmental limits. Daly (2007) considers these ethical imperatives categorical,
interpreting them as moral values when referring to them as ‘fundamental objective values, not subjective individual
preferences’. The moral imperatives of satisfying human needs and ensuring social equity are thoroughly articulated in
Our Common Future (World Commission on Environment and Development, WCED, 1987, p. 43) and in Transforming
Our World (United Nations, UN, 2015). The moral imperative of respecting environmental limits – acknowledged in
Our Common Future but not in Transforming Our World – is grounded on two claims. First, we agree with Brown Weiss
(1992) that, as members of the present generation, we hold the Earth in trust for future generations. Hence, not respecting
environmental limits most likely prevents future generations from having resources vital to meeting their needs. Second,
we agree with Amartya Sen (2009) that, since we are enormously more powerful than other species, we have responsibility
towards them. This responsibility means that we must respect environmental limits.
Moreover, we argue that these three moral imperatives set constraints on human behaviour. Thus, we agree with
John Rawls (1999) that the priority of following moral imperatives (Rawls’s moral imperative was justice, to which
we will return soon) sets the constraints that individuals need to comply with before deliberating on their own
preferences. Consequently, sustainable development sets constraints with which individuals need to comply.
Thus, rather than having dimensions that should be balanced (as suggest ed by the popular three-pillar model),
sustainable development can be defined, we argue, as three key constraints on human behaviour: satisfying basic
human needs, ensuring social equity and respecting environmental limits. The constraints define ‘the sustainable
development space’ (Figure 1).
Four Important Notes About the Model
First, a policy that leads to sustainable development is one that achieves a socially desirable goal that is not in conflict
with the three sustainable development constraints. A socially desirable goal (for instance economic growth, well-
being or quality of life) rests on different preferences in time and space, and so we do not define the specific policy
Figure 1. A model for sustainable development that rests on the constraints derived from the normative imperatives of needs, eq-
uity and limits
The Imperatives of Sustainable Development
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment Sust. Dev. (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/sd
goal, nor do we defi ne the policy goal as being optimal or the development path to get there. Rather, we define what
sustainable development is not by identifying sustainable development constraints on human behavio ur.
Second, the constraints are not negotiable. They are equally important. None can be trespassed. This approach
excludes the possibility of trespassing one constraint because of ‘overperformance’ in another. Hence, there is no
hierarchy among the constraints; rather they represent a panarchy.
Third, we argue (perhaps controversially) that economic growth is not one of the primary dimensions of sustain-
able development.
6
True, economic growth may contribute to a more sustainable development by improving social
welfare, satisfying human needs and lifting people out of poverty, but economic growth may also reduce social
equity by contributing to income and wealth inequality (Atkinson, 2015; Piketty, 2014). True, economic growth
may bring about the technological solutions needed to mitigate greenhouse gases and adapt to climate change
(Stern, 2015), but economic growth may also contribute to a less sustainable development by increasing greenhouse
gas emissions and by overexploiting species and resources for human use. Thus, economic growth is neither inher-
ently sustainable nor inherently unsustainable. It may be part of the solution, it may contribute to the problem, or
both; it depends on the policies, the laws and regulations, and the institutions in place. Thus, we present a model
that interprets sustainable development as a set of constraints to which economic activities, and all other human
activities, must adhere. Human activity is already exceeding environmental limits, income and wealth are unevenly
distributed and extreme poverty exists. These facts show that such constraints are needed.
Fourth, we argue that social equity, including democratic participation, is a key theme of sustainable develop-
ment (see later in this article). Consequently, even though a country or region successfully achieves all development
and environmental targets outlined in this article, it cannot be assessed as sustainable if these achievements are
made by a political system that does not secure effective citizen participation in decision-making. This argument
also applies the other way around: even though a country or region successfully involves society in defining
development and environmental targets, it is not necessarily sustainable if this involvement results in political aims
and policies that are in conflict with planetary boundaries defined by natural scientists or in confl ict with the needs
of the poor.
However, we claim, this does not imply that stakeholder acceptance is crucial to defining and operationalizing
sustainability as a normative concept (see, e.g., Martin and Rice, 2014; Martin et al., 2014). Rather, we aim at
designing a normative model against which the outcome of democratic processes could be evaluated. In this model,
the choice of constraints (and the corresponding themes, indicators and threshold values) should not echo ‘what
people would like to sustain and how to reach agreement on this, constrained by estimates of what is feasible’
(Ehrlich et al., 2012, p. 69).
7
The Moral Imperatives’ Theoretical Foundation
Satisfying Human Needs
In A Theory of Human Need, Doyal and Gough (1991) argue that human beings have universal and objective needs
for health and autonomy and, moreover, a right to their optimal satisfaction. They develop a system of social
indicators to show what such optimization would mean in practice. While the individual’s basic needs for physical
health and autonomy are universal, they acknowledge that the goods and services required to satisfy these may
depend on culture.
6
The three-pillar model has an economic dimension, not an economic growth dimension. However, the economic dimension in the model is
usually interpreted as an imperative for economic growth, recently illustrated by the UN in SDG 8. Moreover, the economic dimension is often
given priority in policies (Giddings et al., 2002).
7
Given the normative imperatives of sustainable development, it is not up to any group of stakeholders to define what they would like sustainable
development to be. It would (for example) be strange to let a group of stakeholders decide what part of, say, human rights (another moral imper-
ative) they would like to accept and act accordingly. Likewise, it is not for any group of stakeholders to decide what part of the sustainable devel-
opment imperatives they would like to accept. That would make any development sustainable as long as people agree and accept the conditions.
E. Holden et al.
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment Sust. Dev. (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/sd
Doyal and Gough call all objects, activities and relationships that satisfy our basic needs ‘satisfiers’. Basic needs
are always universal, but their satisfiers may not be. They identify universal satisfiers, that is, goods, services,
activities and relationships that enhance physical health and human autonomy in all cultures.
They argue that universal satisfiers
8
are most important for basic need satisfact ion, and refer to them as
‘intermediate needs’. The intermediate needs can be grouped as follows: nutrition and clean water, protective
housing, a nonhazardous work environment, a nonhazardous physical environment, appropriate health care, secu-
rity in childhood, significant primary relationships, physical security, economic security, appropriate education, and
safe birth control and childbearing. Satisfying inte rmediate needs would therefore most likely help to eradicate
extreme poverty and eliminate hunger.
However, seeing people’s needs only in terms of these intermediate needs gives a ‘rather meagre view of human-
ity’ (Sen, 2009, p. 250). Indeed, Our Common Future ackno wledged people’s ‘legitimate aspirations for an improved
quality of life’ (World Commission on Environment and Development, WCED, 1987, p. 43) and ‘aspirations for a
better life’ (World Commission on Environment and Development, WCED, 1987, p. 44). Surely, there must be
more to satisfying human needs than various forms of basic-need approaches.
Our point of departure for this broader view of human needs is the capability approach. According to Alkire
(2010), the capability approach is the main philosophical foundation for the concept of human development.
9
Amartya Sen’s writings in the 1980s and 1990s are key to the literature on the capability approach. More recently,
the approach has been further developed by the philosopher Martha Nussbaum and a number of other scholars
(Robeyns, 2005).
The capability approach is a broad normative framework for evaluating individual well-being and social arrange-
ments, the design of policies, and proposals for social change (Robeyns, 2005). It is used in a wide range of fields,
most prominently in development studies, welfare economics, social policy and political philosophy. It can be used
to evaluate several aspects of people’s well-being, such as inequality, poverty, the well-being of an individual or the
average well-being of the members of a group.
10
The capability approach focuses on what people are effectively able to do and to be, that is, on their capabilities.
Thus, according to Sen (2009), the capability approach contrasts philosophical approaches such as the basic-need
approach (which focuses on necessities), utility-based approaches (which focus on individual happiness or pleasure)
and resource-based approaches (which focus on income, wealth, or resources). Rather, Sen (2009) argues that
policies should focus on assessing what people are able to do and be and on removing obstacles in their lives so that
they have more freedom to live the kind of life that, upon refl ection, they have reason to value.
A key analytical distinction in the capability approach is that which distinguishes between the means and the
ends of well-being and development. Only the ends have intrinsic importance, whereas means are instrumental
to reach the goals of increased well-being, justice and development. According to the capability approach, the ends
of well-being, justice and development should be conceptualized in terms of people’s capabilities to function, that is,
their effective opportunities to act and do as they please, and to be whom they want to be.
According to Alkire (2010), the capability approach has two interpretations in the literature. The ‘narrow’ inter-
pretation focuses on basic human development issues such as income, education and health. The ‘broad’ interpre-
tation includes attention to principles such as freedom, equity and sustainability. The literature on human
development (and the capability approach) was for a long time separated from the literature on sustainable develop-
ment (Neumayer, 2010), and the broad interpretation of the capability approach is an attempt to reconcile the two
literature strands. We acknowledge the importance of the broad interpretation, which, in fa ct, is very close to our
notion of sustainable development. We argue, however, that each moral imperativ e in our model should be looked
at separately to avoid any concealed trade-offs between them. Thus, the moral imperative of satisfying human needs
9
Though some authors attempt to distinguish between human development and the capability approach, there is no consensus as to a concep-
tually clear distinction between the two. Nor is it obvious that such a distinction is useful or required (Alkire, 2010).
10
Importantly, the capability approach is not a theory that can explain poverty, inequality or well-being; instead, it provides a framework within
which to conceptualize and evaluate these phenomena. Applying the capability approach to issues of policy and social change will therefore often
require the addition of explanatory theories (Robeyns, 2005).
8
The Chilean economist Artur Manfred Max Neef was one of the first to make a distinction between needs and satisfiers: ‘A prevalent shortcom-
ing in the existing literature and discussions about human needs is that the fundamental difference between needs and satisfiers of those needs is
either not made explicit or is overlooked’ (Max-Neef, 1991, p. 16).
The Imperatives of Sustainable Development
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment Sust. Dev. (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/sd
