The logic of asymmetric contests
TL;DR: In this article, a theoretical analysis is made of the evolution of behavioral strategies in contest situations, and it is concluded that in asymmetric contests the ESS is likely to be a "mixed" strategy; that is, either the population will be genetically polymorphic or individuals will be behaviourally variable.
About: This article is published in Animal Behaviour.The article was published on 1976-02-01. It has received 1750 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Evolutionarily stable strategy & Uncorrelated asymmetry.
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01 Apr 1984TL;DR: In this paper, a model based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game was developed for cooperation in organisms, and the results of a computer tournament showed how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established.
Abstract: Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.
17,720 citations
TL;DR: A model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game to show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established.
Abstract: Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.
10,675 citations
TL;DR: Much recent progress has been made toward integrating developmental and evolutionary biology, especially in vertebrate morphology, developmental genetics, and molecular biology, though an unfortunate one because it seems to imply that the main effect of developmental constraints is that of "Developmental constraints".
Abstract: Phenotypic plasticity is the ability of a single genotype to produce more than one alternative form of morphology, physiological state, and/or behavior in response to environmental conditions. "Plasticity" and "development" are related terms that are becoming increasingly common in evolutionary biology and ecology. Both phenomena have passed through a period of neglect. In the 1960s Wigglesworth (228, p. 107) described some geneticists as being "apologetic" about environmentally cued polymorphisms, which they considered examples of unfortunate defects in the delicate genetic apparatus: "As R. A. Fisher once said to me, it is not surprising that such elaborate machinery should sometimes go wrong." And Bradshaw (19, p. 148) noted that botanists were carefully avoiding any mention of plasticity; environmental effects in experiments were considered "only an embarrassment." Until recently, genetic considerations have predominated in discussions of evolution and selection. Compared to the enormous progress made in genetics, there has been relatively little systematic effort to analyze environmental effects on the phenotype, and their evolutionary consequences. The plastic phenotype, stigmatized by poorly understood environmental influences and the ghost of Lamarck, has sometimes been lost from view as the focus of selection (e.g. 46; but see 48, 49). Much recent progress has been made toward integrating developmental and evolutionary biology, especially in vertebrate morphology (2, 12, 16, 216), developmental genetics (16, 163, 164), and molecular biology (103; also see 10, 111). "Developmental constraints" is a term symptomatic of this progress, though an unfortunate one because it seems to imply that the main effect of
1,966 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that every game has at least one such equilibrium set and that the departure from the usual notion of single-valued equilibrium is relatively minor, because the sets reduce to points in all generic games.
Abstract: A basic problem in the theory of noncooperative games is the following: which Nash equilibria are strategically stable, i.e. self-enforcing, and does every game have a strategically stable equilibrium? We list three conditions which seem necessary for strategic stabilitybackwards induction, iterated dominance, and invariance-and define a set-valued equilibrium concept that satisfies all three of them. We prove that every game has at least one such equilibrium set. Also, we show that the departure from the usual notion of single-valued equilibrium is relatively minor, because the sets reduce to points in all generic games.
1,378 citations
01 Jan 1979
1,258 citations
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TL;DR: Game theory and computer simulation analyses show, however, that a “limited war” strategy benefits individual animals as well as the species.
Abstract: Conflicts between animals of the same species usually are of “limited war” type, not causing serious injury. This is often explained as due to group or species selection for behaviour benefiting the species rather than individuals. Game theory and computer simulation analyses show, however, that a “limited war” strategy benefits individual animals as well as the species.
5,524 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: The paper extends arguments used by Maynard Smith & Price (1973) showing that ritualized behaviour can evolve by individual selection, and the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy, or ESS, is defined.
Abstract: The evolution of behaviour patterns used in animal conflicts is discussed, using models based on the theory of games. The paper extends arguments used by Maynard Smith & Price (1973) showing that ritualized behaviour can evolve by individual selection. The concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy, or ESS, is defined. Two types of ritualized contests are distinguished, “tournaments” and “displays”; the latter, defined as contests without physical contact in which victory goes to the contestant which continues longer, are analyzed in detail. Three main conclusions are drawn. The degree of persistence should be very variable, either between individuals or for the same individual at different times; a negative exponential distribution of persistence times is predicted. Individuals should display with constant intensity, independent of how much longer they will in fact continue. An initial asymmetry in the conditions of a contest can be used to settle it, even if it is irrelevant to the outcome of a more protracted conflict if one were to take place.
1,985 citations
"The logic of asymmetric contests" refers background in this paper
...Maynard Smith (1974) defined an 'evolutionarily stable strategy', or ESS, and argued that natural selection, acting between individuals, would produce such a strategy....
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TL;DR: In this article, the evolution of behavior patterns used in animal conflicts is discussed, using models based on the theory of games, and the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy, or ESS, is defined.
1,944 citations
TL;DR: Predictions compatible with the observations are given, indicating that RHP loss alone can be adequate to explain withdrawal: escalation behaviour.
1,914 citations
"The logic of asymmetric contests" refers background in this paper
...Parker (1974a) discussed the consequences of the fact that most contests between animals are not symmetric....
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...Individuals may differ in some intrinsic feature such as size, weapons, etc. or there may be extrinsic circumstances favouring one contestant (for example, 'postural' advantages in contests between insects, as discussed by Parker (1974a))....
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated whether or not spring territorial behavior was limiting the breeding density of a population of Great Tit on Wytham Estate, near Oxford, and found that the hedgerows were suboptimal in terms of reproductive success.
Abstract: This paper describes an investigation into whether or not spring territorial behavior was limiting the breeding density of a population of Great Tits on Wytham Estate, near Oxford. The analysis of distances between neighboring nests showed that nest sites were more spaced out than would be expected from a random distribution; this indicated that interactions between the birds produced at least a local density—limiting effect. In 2 successive years, established territorial pairs were removed from a stable spring population in mixed woodland. The removed birds were rapidly replaced by new pairs. These newcomers were largely first—year birds; they came from territories in the hedgerows that surrounded the wood; the vacated hedgerow territories were not refilled. The hedgerows were found to be suboptimal in terms of reproductive success. Thus territory limited the breeding density in the optimal habitat. Song advertisement is probably important in maintaining territorial boundaries, hedgerow birds being able to detect the presence of individual woodland territory holders by recognizing their songs. The effect of winter food supply on the population was investigated by supplying excess food throughout one winter. This artificial food supplement appeared to have no effect on the number of Great Tits breeding in the wood, but did produce an increase in the case of a related species, the Blue Tit. The results show that territorial behavior influences density; this is not considered to be a function of territory in the evolutionary sense, but rather a consequence of spacing out that has been selected for in some other context. A possible advantage of spacing out in the Great Tit is as a defense against predators. Territory size varies considerably from year to year. These variations are the result of interactions between the birds themselves, rather than direct adjustments of territory size to fluctuations in some environmental resource. Even though territory has an effect on the number of birds breeding in the wood,it is not an important density—dependent factor acting to regulate the population.
670 citations